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SYNOPSIS 
Despite a successful process of economic growth in Chile principally engineered by a 
dramatic rise and diversification of primary exports since the late 1970s, rural poverty is still 
a widespread condition throughout the country; nearly 40 per cent of the rural population are 
affected by this condition. From a geographical perspective, rural poverty in Chile is a 
complex result of different intervening factors. The adoption of outward-oriented strategies 
of development since the mid-1970s has initiated some new trends that have adversely 
affected a significant segment of the rural popUlation. 
Thus, one of the results of the socio-productive change, which can be observed in the 
Chilean countryside, is a growing number of landless peasants and an aggressive market for 
agricultural land. New lands have been required for the expansion of export-led primary 
resources, notably agricultural and forestry. In parallel, the developing of a seasonal 
structure of labour demand has become an additional constraint affecting the rural labour 
force and the quality of life in rural areas. 
Within the institutional framework of the government rural problems have been largely 
perceived as a responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, usually the main 
difficulties affecting rural population are not only related to productive concerns but they are 
also associated with a wider number of inter-sectoral constraints (e.g. availability and access 
to housing, social services and infrastructure, to grass root organisations, to culture and 
recreation among others). So, any attempt oriented to increase rural development transcends 
unisectoral policies. 
This study has three main general aims. First, it attempts to explore the background to rural 
poverty in Chile in a national and international context. Secondly it examines the regional 
evolution of agriculture in a highly-competitive framework. In this context, a comparison is 
made of a region that has been transformed by export-led agriculture with a region whose 
products have not been competitive internationally and, indeed, have found it difficult to 
remain competitive in the national market. Thirdly, it pretends to present and evaluate an 
intersectoral attempt by the democratic government of President Patricio Aylwin to alleviate 
rural poverty through better organisation and coordination of ministerial responsibilities 
dedicated to rural areas. The vehicle for improving horizontal coordination was the 
Interministerial Commission for Rural Development-CIDER. The regional focus was the VII 
Region (Maule), a region that had not benefited from export-led agriculture. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Although theoretical perspectives can provide a valuable context with respect to 
socio-economic change and their spatial implications, the final geographical outcome in any 
particular country is highly influenced by its national, regional and local features. The 
requirement of gathering data concerning holistic socio-geographical processes at these 
different spatial levels is not only relevant for establishing a more accurate diagnosis of the 
geographical evolution at the macro- ,meso- and local-scales, but also for the policy-making 
process. This thesis attempts to link diagnoses of agricultural restructuring in Chile with the 
need for generating national polices and frameworks to better coordinate rural development 
and alleviate rural poverty. 
1.1. Aims of the Thesis 
This thesis has three main aims: 
a) It proposes to characterise and explore the background of rural poverty in Chile by taking 
into consideration national and international factors. 
b) It intends to identify socio-geographical patterns at the regional level that have resulted 
from the insertion of the agricultural sector in a highly competitive national and 
international framework. 
c) It aims to presents, discuss and evaluate an intersectoral attempt by the democratic 
government of President Patricio Aylwin to confront rural problems of poverty through 
a better horizontal coordination of these ministerial responsibilities dedicated to rural 
areas. The vehicle for this purpose was the Interministerial Commission for Rural 
1 
Development 
1.2. Objectives 
The main objectives that will be pursued in order to fulfil the previous aims are the 
following: 
1.2.1. Analysis of the socio-geographical manifestation of poverty in the rural areas of the 
country 
At an aggregate level nearly 40 per cent of the Chilean population was affected by poverty 
in the early 199Os. Proportionally this problem was higher in rural areas than in urban ones. 
From a geographical perspective rural poverty in Chile is the complex result of different 
intervening factors. Poor people in the different regions of Chile are affected by different 
constraints and challenges that need to be faced in order to allow them to improve their social 
conditions. The complexity of poverty in rural areas makes it extremely difficult both to 
identify and implement public policies oriented to overcome the needs of the rural poor. 
This this study intends to provide some information on the regional distribution of rural 
poverty by using the official information that was available at the beginning of the 1990s. In 
addition, some attempts at explanation will be presented concerning the socio-geographical 
factors which characterise two of the poorest "transcommunal" areas of the country: the 
semi-arid region of the Norte Chico and the Coastal-Range's "secano". These two areas were 
chosen due to the relation that they have as regards exploring the second aim (the Norte 
Chico region) and the third aim (the Coastal Range "secano"). 
1.2.2. Analysis of some socio-productive changes that have been occurring at the regional 
level as a result of the opening up of the Chilean economy 
2 
The adoption of outward-oriented strategies of development since the mid 1970s has initiated 
some new trends with opposing results in the Chilean countryside. On the one hand, there 
are some regions that have significantly benefited in terms of increased production. But, on 
the other hand, there are others that have benefited much less as a result of the process of 
economic restructuring. From the social perspective, however, processes have evolved in both 
types of regions that have adversely affected a significant segment of the rural population, 
especially small- and medium-scale producers. However, in spite of the intensity with which 
some governments have stimulated nontraditional exports in last decades, there are few 
published studies that provide detailed information of the socio-geographical impact of such 
strategies on the Latin American process of evolution. 
Consequently, this research intends to characterise the main trends that have been occurring 
at the meso-scale level in two of the most affected regions of the country; the Norte Chico 
region (one of the most reactive territories in terms of the development of export-led fruit 
production) and the Maule region (one of the less competitive areas that has specialised in 
traditional agriculture with respect to both domestic and international products). Due to the 
complexity that the whole socio-geographical evolution of these regions presents, most of the 
attention is going to be focused on the analysis of those variables which appear to be more 
closely related to the most adversely-affected rural inhabitants. The analysis intends to 
generate primary information concerning the dynamics affecting: the allocation of private 
investment; the land market and the demand for labour. With respect to the backward region 
of Maule, the attention is also focused on the analysis of the evolution of prices, production, 
land use, and on the case of more competitive import crops. In addition, some insights are 
given at the local level (in the rural commune of Empedrado) concerning the impact of the 
growing development of forestry plantations in the area of the "secano", where the need for 
new land has started to severely affect its population. This case study has been selected due 
to its relevance with respect to the third aim. 
3 
1.2.3. Identification and analysis of some internal and external factors which have been 
significantly affecting rural development and rural policies in Chile 
Many economic, social and political factors are directly and indirectly influencing rural 
development in developing countries. These factors, derived from both external and internal 
sources, very much restrict the capacity for manoeuvre that the state has for the 
implementation of feasible policies. The means that the state has in order to intervene directly 
has severely decreased as a result of the conditions imposed by the free-market economy that 
the country has adopted. However, these restrictions have not implied that the state has to 
become an observer within this new context. On the contrary, the state has inevitably to adopt 
a new role in order to deal with the new emerging challenges generated by the new external 
and internal factors that affect the country's development. Undoubtedly, these challenges go 
far beyond agricultural sectoral policies. The capacity of governments to negotiate within the 
geopolitical international context has proved to be determinant, especially if the new 
characteristics that world trade has shown since the recent adoption of the new international 
division of production are taken into consideration. No doubt, this new international context 
has started to generate important trends within most participant nations. 
Consequently, in order to fulfil this objective, information will be provided concerning some 
of the most relevant external factors that have been contributing and affecting the 
reorientation of Chilean primary exports (especially in agricultural products). Some of these 
are: the present dynamic of world agricultural prices and markets; the role played by two 
important international funding agencies (the I.M.F. and the World Bank) in the Chile's 
structural adjustment process; the different sources of international protectionism for 
agricultural production within some of the countries of the advanced world -the cases of the 
U.S., Europe (Common Agricultural Policy), and Japan are studied because of their influence 
on Chilean agricultural imports and exports. Information on how protectionist measures do 
apply in these three cases might provide valuable background for the country's attitude with 
respect to international trade, especially if a number of emerging new trading-blocks within 
4 
which Chile is starting to participate as a member is considered (e.g Apec, Nafta and 
Mercosur). Nevertheless, some internal factors affecting rural policies in Chile will also be 
presented. Information will be provided on the institutional, social, financial and political 
constraints that prevent a more active role of government in rural development policies. 
1.2.4. Analysis of an intersectoral strategy of public coordination for rural development 
within the new framework of the state 
Traditionally, rural problems in the country have been largely perceived as a responsibility 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. Most of the time, however, the main constraints affecting 
rural population are not only related to productive concerns but are also associated with a 
wide number of inter-sectoral restrictions (e.g. availability and access to: housing, social 
services and infrastructure; to grass root organisations; to culture and recreation, among 
others). Therefore, any attempt oriented to increase rural development not only must 
transcend unisectoral policies but also should require increasing the level of popular 
participation. From the policy-making perspective, President Aylwin's government decided 
to use all existing institutional means to combat the level of poverty that the country presented 
when it assumed power. This was especially the case when the government considered the 
traditional inflexibility of the country' public institutions to combat rural poverty. One 
instrument that the state used was the Interministerial Commission for Rural Development. 
Consequently, the final part of this research intends to present and discuss the intersectoral 
attempt by the Aylwin government to benefit rural areas by focusing most of the attention on 
the alleviation of rural poverty. This strategy was mainly established taking into consideration 
three main aspects: the need for tackling rural problems in a country with substantial regional 
variations; the need for increasing regional and popular participation; the need to raise the 
level of state efficiency. In order to fulfil this objective, some information is provided on: the 
new regional and municipal laws which led to high levels of state deconcentration and 
democratisation at the local level; antecedents related to the Interministerial Commission for 
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Rural Development; the presentation of a strategy of rural joint-actions; and further 
propositions for institutional reforms in order to increase the long-term prospects for State 
intervention in favour of rural areas. Significant attention is going to be focused on a pilot 
strategy of rural development implemented at the local level by the regional government of 
the Maule region. 
1.3. Methodology 
In accordance with the aims of this thesis, this study was oriented to link the two following 
aspects: the provision of current information directly related to the factors and processes that 
affect some of the poorest rural areas of Chile; the attempts of government, through the 
implementation of coordinated policies from public bodies directly and indirectly related to 
the rural sector. 
This link has been made possible as a result of the direct involvement of the author in both 
processes. The author has worked as: a researcher in the field of nontraditional exports and 
regional change since 1983, as a member of the Department of Geography of the University 
of Chile; and as the coordinator (deputy executive secretary) of the Interministerial 
Commission for Rural Development at the Ministry of Agriculture, between 1991 and 1994. 
This latter position was assumed by the author after a request made by the Minister of 
Agriculture (the head of the interministerial commission) in order to propose to him general 
guidelines for an intersectoral programme of coordination oriented to benefit rural 
populations, especially those living in poverty 
Accordingly, the main sources of information that this study provides have been obtained 
from the direct participation of the author in all the stages that the research presents. Special 
attention is focused on the planning exercise due to the fact that one of the main purposes of 
this work was to identify and evaluate the coordinated public policies, oriented to benefit the 
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rural population of Chile (in this respect it is worth mentioning that this research has been 
jointly sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture and by the Geography Department of the 
University of Chile). 
There were four general methodological steps followed in order to fulfil the aims and 
objectives of this thesis. They were as follows: 
A. Characterisation of rural poverty in Chile: 
i) Gathering and aggregation of the latest information on rural poverty at the communal 
level of Chile (further details in Chapter two). 
ii) Analysis of the main socio-geographical variables which could explain the high level 
of rural poverty in two homogeneous geographical aggregates (the Norte Chico and the 
"secano"). 
B. Identification of socio-geographical patterns at the regional level in two regions affected 
by the opening up of the Chilean economy (the Norte Chico and the Maule region): 
i) Collection and processing of primary and secondary information mainly concerned with: 
sources of productive investment involved in nontraditional agricultural exports 
(principally in export-table grape production); land markets in export-oriented areas; 
and in labour markets. Most of the information has been directly collected from 
questionnaires and structured interviews in the field (in both regions), either as a 
member of an academic research group (as in the case of the Norte Chico) or as an 
individual researcher (as in the case of the Maule region). 
ii) Gathering and analysis of the latest statistical information on prices, imports, and land 
use concerning the recent evolution of the agricultural and forestry sectors in the 
backward Maule region. 
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C. Identification of internal and external factors affecting rural development in Chile: 
- External factors: 
i) Revision, selection and analysis of secondary information concerning: recent trends in 
world agricultural trade; the role, course of actions and conditions established by two 
main international lending agencies (I.M.F. and World Bank) to lend to developing 
countries; and different internal and international protectionist measures applied by the 
U.S., the E.U. and Japan as regards both agricultural production and trade. 
ii) Collection of direct information on factors affecting world trade and production in 
agriculture (Land Reform Training Institute, Taiwan 1992; FAD World Conference, 
Rome 1993; and International Seminar on World Trade and International 
Organisations, Bogota 1993 -in the two first cases as an official representative of the 
Chilean government). 
- Internal factors: 
i) Collection and analysis of primary and secondary information on variables restricting 
the implementation of direct policies in rural areas such as: financial, institutional, 
political, and these of grass-root organisations. 
ii) Identification and analysis of new challenges for state intervention in rural areas such 
as: in production, infrastructure and in the social domain 
iii) Analysis of some instruments that could be potentially used for coordinated and 
participative strategies for rural development. A detailed analysis is going to be 
provided as regard the new Regional and Municipal Laws (presented to the Congress 
by President Aylwin). In addition, the code of the Interministerial Commission for 
Rural Development (Decree No 55) will be more extensively analysed in order to 
identify its potential for the implementation of an intersectoral strategy of coordination 
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for rural policies. 
D. Presentation, analysis and evaluation of the Coordination Programme for Rural 
Development -CPRD. 
The CPRD was identified by the interministerial Technical Advisory Committee installed for 
this purpose, and started to be implemented by the respective ministries since mid-1991. 
i) Identification and discussion of some proposals for increasing the level of public 
coordination presented to the Ministers which conformed the Commission: proposal 
for referential axes for joint interministerial programmes; contextualisation of rural 
development; implementation of a pilot experience of coordination for rural 
development at the regional level in the Maule region; identification of institutional 
reforms for widening the potential effectiveness of the Commission at both the central 
and regional levels. 
ii) Presentation and discussion of some jointly-identified and -implemented programmes 
at both central and regional levels. Special attention was focused on the experience 
carried out by the Maule Regional Government in combination with 9 local 
governments. 
iii) Evaluation of the preliminary results obtained from the whole planning exercise 
implemented by the Interministerial Commission for Rural Development at both 
regional and central levels. 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
The results of this research are going to be presented through the ten following chapters. 
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Chapter two provides some discussion and information on poverty in Chile, even though most 
of the attention is focused on rural poverty especially at the communal level. Two wider 
socio-geographical patterns of rural poverty are presented in depth; the Norte Chico and the 
"secano" of the Coastal Range. 
The next two chapters compare a region that has been favoured by rapid export 
growth-agriculture with one that has not. The regional impacts of the rapid development of 
export-led vineyards in the area of the Norte Chico (Copiap6 and Limari Valleys) are the 
focus of Chapter Three. Attention has been directed to the regional evolution of investment 
capital, land and labour markets. In contrast, Chapter four analyses the backward Maule 
region. In particular, this chapter focuses on the socio-productive effects in small- and 
medium-scale peasant farmers that have resulted from the low competitiveness of the Maule 
region's agricultural sector with respect to international grain production. The social impacts 
from the expansion of forestry activities in the "secano's" Commune of Empedrado are also 
examined. 
Given that Chile's agricultural growth has been so intimately linked to supplying international 
markets a global perspective is also required. 
Chapter five presents information on external factors affecting rural development in Chile 
such as: the evolution of prices and markets for agricultural products at the world scale; the 
role played by the I.M.F. and the World Bank in redirecting the economies of developing 
countries towards outward-oriented strategies of development; and finally, some internal and 
external protectionist measures implemented by the U.S., the E.U., and Japan with respect 
to agricultural production and markets. At the national scale of analysis, Chapter six presents 
and discusses some of the domestic imperatives and restrictions for the implementation of 
state-led strategies of rural development. 
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The following two chapters describe the instrument that the Chilean government has 
introduced to promote greater decentralisation and deconcentration within the national space. 
Chapter seven explores the background to uneven spatial pattern of development in Chile and 
gives some insights into the new Municipal and Regional Laws. These are two important 
means in the search for more equitable and participative strategies of development. Chapter 
eight introduces the Interministerial Commission for Rural Development as an interesting 
instrument used by the Aylwin government for increasing the level of public coordination 
with respect to rural-oriented policies. A general background of its origin, objectives and 
structure is provided. In addition, it also considers some arguments which explain its recent 
evolution and, finally it introduces the way in which it was going to be utilised by ,the new 
democratic government from 1991. 
The following two chapters explore and evaluate the programme of rural coordination itself. 
Chapter nine introduces the "Procider" (Coordination Programme for Rural Development 
-CPRD) identified by the Commission's Technical Advisory Committee during 1991. The 
main proposals for both specific joint programmes, at both national and regional levels, and 
some institutional reforms are presented in some detail. 
Chapter 10 presents an evaluation of the implementation of the CPRD since mid-1991. The 
second part of this chapter is oriented to evaluate preliminary results obtained from a 
regionally-based coordinated programme for rural development carried out in some of the 
poorest communes of the Maule region. 
11 
Chapter 2. Poverty in Chile: Definitions and Patterns 
Introduction 
Rural poverty in Chile is a complex concept to face, especially from the policy-making 
perspective. Working at the policy-making level as regards rural poverty presents serious 
challenges especially if the main intention of public measures is oriented to overcome the 
origin of its symptoms rather than to provide temporary alleviation. Thus, problems related 
to the difficulties in defining and measuring rural poverty, the multiplicity of factors that 
cause poverty, and the different theoretical approaches which have been used through the last 
three decades in Chile have contributed not only to the lack of agreement regarding this topic 
but also to the use of different strategies to deal with it. 
However, despite the recent socio-productive change which has been affecting the Chilean 
rural sector through the last 25 years, 36.2 per cent of rural homes are still classified as poor 
according to the latest official poverty survey (MIDEPLAN, 1993). This has motivated 
government to devise new attempts to tackle the problem of poverty. However, the 
characterisation and identification of these social groups and territorial areas that should 
receive help from the state are unclear, especially if poverty is defined from a wider 
perspective than the economic one. Moreover, the current process of socio-geographical 
evolution affecting the country as a result of the opening up of the economy has induced new 
questions regarding economic growth and poverty trends. This has recently and explicitly 
been declared by the World Bank, one of the strongest advocators of economic growth as the 
best alternative to fulfil development in the following terms: "Despite the relative high rate 
of growth that the economy in general, (the Chilean) and the agricultural and forestry sector 
in particular, have shown in the l~st ten years, this growth does not seem to have benefitted 
all sectors of society to the same extent." (World Bank, 1994 pag 3). 
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Accordingly, the main aims of this chapter are threefold. In first place, some of the most 
recent information on poverty at the national level is presented, taking into account both the 
different methodological and conceptual approaches used. Secondly, since poverty appears 
to have a relatively higher incidence in rural areas, attempts are made to determine the spatial 
incidence of this condition in the rural environment. Thirdly, two important areas of rural 
poverty in the country are more closely examined -the drylands of the Norte Chico region 
and the drylands of the Coastal Mountain Range. This will give some insight as regards the 
particular socio-geographical elements that characterise and influence rural poverty in areas 
significantly affected by the opening up of the Chilean economy since the mid-1970s. 
It should be noted, however, that, because of statistical constraints, this analysis is based on 
a rather static approach. More dynamic qualitative information, as regards recent rural 
poverty trends, will be considered in the next chapter. 
2.1. Poverty at the National level: Some Insights 
Poverty is still a widespread condition throughout the Chilean territory. A series of studies 
agree that over 40 per cent of the Chilean population lived in poverty in 1990, with a level 
of income that was insufficient to cover basic needs; that is to say a group of people living 
together unable to afford an equivalent of two basic food baskets ("canasta basica de 
alimentos") valued at 12,875 Chilean pesos for urban areas and 9,921 Chilean pesos for the 
rural one in 1992 (US$34.8 and US$26.9 respectively in 1992) (MIDEPLAN, 1994). 
Furthermore, according to the World Bank (1994), nearly 50 per cent of these poor people 
lived in extreme poverty (destitute), defined as those which were unable to satisfy their 
minimal nutrient requirements. The definition of "destitute" ("indigente") was applied to 
people who could not even afford one basic food basket. The last CASEN Survey carried out 
in 1990 (see Table 2.1 and 2.2), also stated that 40 per cent of people lived in poverty, 
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· Table 2.1 Population in Poverty by Regions in Chile, 1990. 
Region Destitute Poor/Not Total Poor Not Poor Total 
destitute 
I 27,685 79,849 107,534 238,644 346,178 
II 42,537 89,432 131,969 246,831 378,800 
III 18,360 51,918 70,278 117,745 188,023 
IV 77,349 148,859 226,208 251,140 477,348 
V 226,161 372,916 599,077 774,207 1,373,284 
VI 96,060 177,040 273,100 367,659 640,759 
VII 152,593 252,765 405,358 422,956 828,314 
VIII 305,844 456,673 762,517 882,967 1,645,484 
IX 163,198 204,596 367,794 407,117 774,911 
X 128,557 263,964 392,521 504,641 897,162 
XI 6,602 18,108 24,710 50,558 75,268 
XII 12,712 33,512 46,224 97,760 143,984 
MR 532,732 1,262,940 1,795,672 3,398,845 5,194,517 
TOTAL 1,790,390 3,412,572 5,202,962 7,761,070 12,964,032 
)ource: Cas en Surve 199 y 0: MlnIstr of Plannm y g 1994. 
Table 2.2 Population in Poverty by Regions in Chile, 1990 (%) 
Region Destitute Poor/Not Total Poor Not Poor Total 
destitute 
I 8.0 23.1 31.1 68.9 100.0 
II 11.2 23.6 34.8 65.2 100.0 
III 9.8 27.6 37.4 62.6 100.0 
IV 16.2 31.2 47.4 52.6 100.0 
V 16.5 27.2 43.6 56.4 .100.0 
VI 15.0 27.6 42.6 57.4 100.0 
VII 18.4 30.5 48.9 51.1 100.0 
VIII 18.6 27.8 46.3 53.7 100.0 
IX 21.1 26.4 47.5 52.5 100.0 
X 14.3 29.4 43.8 56.2 100.0 
XI 8.8 24.1 32.8 67.2 100.0 
XII 8.8 23.3 32.1 67.9 100.0 
MR 10.3 24.3 34.6 65.4 100.0 
TOTAL 13.8 26.3 40.1 59.9 100.0 
Source: Casen Survey 1990; Ministry of Planning 1994. 
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and that this condition applied to 34.5 per cent of Chilean households (MIDEPLAN, 1993). 
This means that poor households have larger families that the average Chilean household. 
However, because of methodological differences in approaching poverty, it is practically 
impossible to establish with reliable accuracy and precision the trend and incidence of poverty 
in the country during the last three decades. In that way, different combinations of indicators 
could show completely opposite trends. 
Some surveys have reported an increasing poverty while others claim to identify a reduction 
in poverty. One analysis using combined information based on family expenditure on a 
minimum food basket and the family level of income (ECLA, 1987; MIDEPLAN, 1991) 
published by FIDA (International Fund for Agricultural Development) in 1993, estimated that 
the percentage of Chilean people living in poverty rose from 20 to 40 per cent between 1970 
and 1987 (FIDA, 1993). This trend could be partially explained by both the fall of real 
income and the availability of food consumed by lower-income population groups. The 
Central Bank estimated that the level of per capita food consumption fell 8 per cent between 
1970 and 1987. Per capita absolute consumption of food in five of the nine groups that 
comprise the Chilean basic food basket diminished in the period (potatoes, meat, eggs, dairy 
products and pulses). This trend contributed to the substantial rise in the number of families 
living under the standard of minimal nutrient consumption. According to an official survey 
carried out in the Great Santiago Metropolitan Area, between 1976 and 1986, 40,3 per cent 
of households had a level of food consumption below the minimum standard in 1980; by 
1986, this percentage had risen to 50,9 per cent (FlOA, 1991). 
Conversely, there exist more optimistic approaches in this field. The only source of consistent 
time series information on the incidence of poverty can be found in the Maps of Extreme 
Poverty (Odeplan-Ieuc, 1975; 1986) which were drawn up on the basis of the Official 
National Population and Housing Censuses. In 1970, 21 per cent of the population lived in 
poverty (1.9 million Chileans), while in 1982 the number of poor had declined to 14 per cent 
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(1.5 million Chileans). In this case, however, the concept of poverty was based on four 
criteria: a) type of housing; b) type of domestic sanitary system; c) presence of 
over-crowding; and d) possession of consumer durables. No reference was made to household 
income or expenditure data, so the maps did not identify poverty as traditionally understood 
-in terms of food consumption. Moreover, the information contained in the maps cannot even 
be interpreted as a partial index of basic needs fulfilment, due to the fact that the possession 
of a single item such as a radio, television or a telephone was sufficient to place a household 
above the extreme poverty line. 
Other poverty estimates from the application of different methodologies exist for various 
periods after 1979 (e.g. ECLA, 1970 and 1980; ODEPLAN, 1979, 1982 and 1985). These 
estimates suggest that between 31 and 45 per cent of the population were living in poverty 
by the mid-1980s (Scott, 1993 pag 130). Thus, as this same author stated, "it seems that 
aggregate poverty increased substantially between 1970 and 1985. In terms of the headcount 
ratio, the extent of poverty more than doubled during this period". 
As part of its efforts to combat poverty, Aylwin's Government created in 1990 a Solidarity 
and Social Investment Fund (FOSIS) to channel additional finance to existing public and 
private schemes to increase the social integration of the poorest sectors and improve their 
living and working conditions. More than 2,100 projects have been financed through FOSIS, 
with a total cost of about US$ 34 million, in different parts of the country, with a strong 
participation of the beneficiaries in the generation and execution of projects. According to 
the latest estimates on poverty, the combination of uninterrupted growth with its impact on 
employment, increased social expenditure and larger investment in poverty alleviation 
projects, have resulted in a decline in the national poverty rate from 40 per cent to 33 per 
cent between 1990-1992. Rural poverty, however, seems to have remained largely unchanged 
(yVorld Bank, 1994). Alleviation of poverty has been concentrated in urban areas. 
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2.2. The Dimension of Rural Poverty 
Even though in absolute terms the majority of poor people live in urban areas, most of the 
social indicators show that the intensity of poverty is deepest in rural areas (see Figure 2.1). 
This statement can be easily demonstrated if the national distribution of illiteracy is 
considered as an example. As shown in Figure 2.2, the percentage of illiterate people is 
significantly higher in rural areas, and particularly in the regions with high percentages of 
rural population (Regions VI to the X). In relative terms poverty is much more important in 
the countryside. As can also be seen in Figure 2.1, 36 per cent of households were 
considered in poverty in 1990 (MIDEPLAN, 1994). 
At the national level, Table 2.3 and 2.4 shows that 1,065,185 people living in rural areas 
have been classified as poor (42.7 per cent of the country's rural population) of which 
443,056 people were destitute (4l.5 per cent)(MIDEPLAN, 1994). However, poor rural 
populations are concentrated in the most active agricultural areas. 78.8 per cent of the rural 
poor and 80.8 per cent of rural destitute are located in five of the thirteen Chilean 
administrative regions -Regions VI to X. It is important to stress the case of the Maule region 
(VII) due to the fact that more than the half of its rural population lived in poverty in 1990. 
Moreover, at a more aggregate level, the study of poverty and rural life by the Ministry of 
Agriculture (1991) concluded that out of the 100 poorest municipalities (comunas) of the 
country, 84 were rural (more than half of their population living in rural areas). According 
to the last population census (1992) the population of the 75 poorest rural "comunas" reached 
847,276 persons out of which 69.5 per cent (588,671 person) lived in the countryside. These 
"comunas" are mainly concentrated in the Coquimbo Region (IV) and in the regions 
stretching from Libertador Bernardo O'Higgins (VI) through to Los Lagos (X). 
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Figure 2.1 Chile: Population and Households in poverty. 1990 (%) 
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Figure 2.2 Chile: Illiteracy by Region. 1990 (%) 
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Table 2.3 Rural Population in Poverty by Regions in Chile, 1990. 
Region Destitute PoorlNot Total Poor Not Poor Total 
destitute 
I 1,239 4,525 5,764 15,093 20,857 
II 1,407 1,648 3,055 4,171 7,772 
III 1,880 4,620 6,500 10,780 17,280 
IV 26,607 54,915 81,522 85,929 167,451 
V 33,934 31,026 64,960 118,098 183,058 
VI 41,870 76,320 118,190 165,784 283,974 
VII 77,870 119,210 197,080 191,230 388,310 
VIII 101,448 90,364 191,812 251,258 443,070 
IX 86,265 88,290 174,555 191,970 366,525 
X 50,150 107,533 157,683 237,273 394,956 
XI 1,334 2,639 3,973 20,155 24,128 
XII 1,116 1,356 2,472 5,448 7,920 
MR 17,936 39,683 57,619 127,557 185,176 
TOTAL 443,056 622,129 1,065,185 1,425,292 2,490,477 
Source: Casen Survey 1990; Ministry of Planning 1994. 
Table 2.4 Rural Population in Poverty by Regions in Chile, 1990 (%). 
Region Destitute PoorlNot Total Poor Not Poor Total 
destitute 
I 5.9 21.7 27.6 72.4 100.0 
II 18.1 21.2 39.3 60.7 100.0 
III 10.9 26.7 37.6 62.4 100.0 
IV 15.9 32.8 48.7 51.3 100.0 
V 18.5 16.9 35.5 64.5 100.0 
VI 14.7 26.9 41.6 58.4 100.0 
VII 20.1 30.7 50.8 49.2 100.0 
VIII 22.9 20.4 43.3 56.7 100.0 
IX 23.5 24.1 47.6 52.4 100.0 
X 12.7 27.2 39.9 60.1 100.0 
XI 5.5 10.9 16.5 83.5 100.0 
XII 14.1 17.1 31.2 68.8 100.0 
MR 9.7 21.4 31.1 68.9 100.0 
TOTAL 17.8 25.0 42.8 57.2 100.0 
Source: Casen Survey 1990; Ministry of Planning, 1994. 
19 
2.2.1. An attempt of spatial aggregation of rural poverty: the communal level of analysis 
Most of the information on poverty in the Chile comes from primary statistical information 
gathered either through special municipal surveys (e.g. CASEN) or through the national 
population census (carried out every ten years). Because most of this information is used for 
the distribution and allocation of social subsidies at the local level (principally through 
municipalities), the most common level of spatial aggregation regarding statistical information 
has traditionally been the "comuna". However, even though information at the communal 
level has become important for local planning, it gives little assistance for achieving a deeper 
understanding of the processes and patterns that cause poverty and for developing particular 
strategies to combat poverty from a different perspective to the communal one. 
Furthermore, data restrictions tend to increase if the main policy focus needs to be directed 
specifically to the rural environment. Very often the larger statistical dominance of urban 
populations in most of the "comunas" tend to neutralise what happen in the countryside. In 
some cases the extreme level of poverty in some rural areas (as in the case of Petorca in the 
Aconcagua Region) does not appear at the communal level of aggregation due to the fact that 
such a "comuna" has been statistically classified as urban. Moreover, populations living in 
rural areas sometimes have to face restrictions which are not considered among the traditional 
indicators of poverty. For example, there are the problems of accessibility and the additional 
costs rural people have to pay in order to overcome the friction of distance to get to their 
work and to the different services they need. However, the cost of the "basic basket" which 
differentiates between poverty and non poverty was 32.5 per cent lower in rural areas than 
in the urban one in 1992. 
2.2.2. A communal classification of rural poverty at the national level 
Thus, it is difficult to examine the spatial pattern of rural poverty at a different scale that of 
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the "comuna." 
Perhaps the most explicit attempt to identify rural poverty at the national level in the present 
decade was published by the Interministerial Commission of Rural Development (CIDER) in 
1992. One of its main aims, was to orientate the spatial distribution of interministerial actions 
against rural poverty. Thus, the study was oriented to classify and rank the poorest rural 
communes of the country by considering the most recently available social indicators. This 
was produced by integrating three complementary diagnoses on poverty at the national level. 
These were: 
1. "Poverty and Rurality in 286 Communes by the Ministry of Agriculture, 1991. 
This survey examined 12 variables related to 3 issues (four related to education, six to health 
and two to housing). The weight of labour in agricultural activities was used to determine the 
spatial universe of this survey. Accordingly, the regions of Tarapaca (I), Antofagasta (II), 
and Atacama (III) covering the desert areas in the north of the country were excluded from 
the survey due to their low rural populations. The same happened with regions of Aisen (XI), 
and Magallanes (XII) in the extreme south of the country in where agriculture is only a 
marginal activity according to both labour and economic criteria. 
2. "Communal Rank and Classification According to their Poverty Level". FOSIS-Ministry 
of Planning, 1991. 
The outcome of this survey corresponded to the combination of three inputs. The first one 
was the "Map on Extreme Poverty in Chile" (an aggregate indicator on poverty which covers 
the whole country); the second was the level of illiteracy; and the third was the national 
distribution of primary students in their first year that were below the basic food consumption 
requirements . 
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3. "A Bio-medical and Socio-economic Attempt of Communal Classification According to 
Socio-economic and Bio-medical Features Determining Infant Vulnerability". UNICEF-
Ministry of Health, 1990. 
This outcome on poverty was principally oriented to rank the communes by noting social 
features directly linked with children. It included one population indicator related to the 
distribution of children younger than six years old; four health indicators related to children 
with less than normal health standards; and four related to educational features of the 
vulnerable child's family. 
However, due to the fact that none of these surveys differentiated between urban and rural 
populations with the same criteria, (or that they did not at all in as the UNICEF case) the 
condition of rurality for the communes was defined by CIDER following the Ministry of 
Planning criteria: a rural commune was any commune which had at least 50 per cent of its 
population classified as rural according to the 1990 National Institute of Statistics's national 
population projection. Thus, the CIDER's final integrated universe of poor rural communes 
comprised 113 administrative units (Table 2.5). 
All three studies confirmed the seriousness of poverty throughout the country but especially 
in the rural areas. In fact, both the Ministry of Agriculture and UNICEF studies stated that 
if the 307 communes used as a global universe were considered, 218 (71 per cent) of them 
presented either high or very high levels of vulnerability, of which 70 per cent were rural. 
Furthermore, both studies agreed that the 100 poorest commune of the country were rural or 
mixed (combination of rural and urban). They were mainly located in Regions IV 
(Coquimbo), VII (El Maule), VIII Biobio and IX (Araucania). According to a FIDA 
(International Fund for Agricultural Development) report, the social groups most affected by 
poverty in rural areas were nearly 500,000 landless labourers (150,000 permanent and 
350,000 temporary labourers); and 350,000 peasant families (250,000 working in fruit 
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activities and 100,000 in traditional agriculture) (FIDA, 1993). 
Table 2.5 Communal Coincidence on Rural Poverty According to Three Surveys (1992). 
Coincidence No of communes Cumul % Cumul % 
3 of 3 50 50 44.2 44.2 
2 of 3 33 83 29.2 73.4 
1 of 3 30 113 26.6 100.0 
Source: CIDER, MINAGRI, 1992. 
Table 2.5 shows a significant coincidence as regards the level of poverty that rural communes 
presented according to the different variables. Due to the wide variety of indicators utilised 
to determine poor communes, the different criteria and spatial coincidence of all three studies 
was an important input in identifying the most backward rural areas of the country. (This was 
main CIDER'S aim). In addition, the use of these surveys identified the main problems 
causing rural poverty. 
Although CIDER's maps reinforced the idea that poverty was a rather generalised condition 
throughout most rural areas of the country, it was also possible to identify some 
geographically homogeneous sectors characterised by poverty (see Map 1 to 10). 
The interfluvial area of the Coquimbo region and the landscape associated with the coastal 
range from the regions of Bernardo O'Higgins (VI) to Los Lagos (X) appeared to be among 
the most disadvantaged geographically-homogeneous areas. Conversely, the lowest level of 
rural poverty appeared to be located in the Chilean Central Valley, that is to say the 
intermediate plain located between the main mountain ranges of the Andes and Coast, from 
the Metropolitan Region of Santiago to the southern "Los Lagos Region". Undoubtedly, this 
condition can be explained by both larger amount of urbanised communes and by the 
existence of a more efficient domestic-market oriented agriculture due to the predomination 
of relatively good soils. 
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In these two landscapes, however, there seems to be a high level of interdependence between 
poverty conditions and socio-environmental features. This can be considered a rather static 
argument for explaining poverty. The analysis of new processes resulting from the expansion 
of agricultural exports has also been contributing to a wider understanding of the dynamic of 
rural poverty in these areas. It is also important to be aware of both critical intra-and 
inter-communal manifestations of rural poverty which are not represented in any of these 
rankings due to lack of statistical weight in influencing communal aggregates. 
Relevant examples of these omissions are some small communities in Chile's Altiplano of the 
"Norte Grande" (the communes of Putre and San Pedro de Atacama in Tarapaca and 
Antofagasta Regions respectively) (see Map 1). Another example is the situation of small 
itinerant miners principally working in copper in the most urbanised communes of the 
semi-arid " Norte Chico", as in the cases of Copiap6, Tierra Amarilla, Andacollo and llIapel 
(see Map 2 and 3) Furthermore, there is the case of small-and medium-scale coal miners in 
the communes of Coronel, Lota, Arauco, Curanilahue, and Lebu within the Biobfo region 
(Map 7) -all of these present high levels of rural poverty particularly during the last ten years 
of crises in the domestic coal price. Last but not least, more than three hundred small-scale 
fishing villages, most characterised by extreme poverty and located along the Chilean coastal 
fringe, are also omitted due to the predominance of urban popUlation in those communes. An 
important number of these villages are also located in the same Biobfo region, notably in the 
communes of Tome and Penco. 
The inter-communal analysis of poverty permits one to aggregate and visualize in a relatively 
clear way wider spatial areas of rural poverty than those at the communal level. This permits 
one to identify wider developmental priorities and scales than the communal ones regional, 
national and transcommunal strategies against rural poverty. 
24 
MAP 1 
SURVEY 
Mideplan Fosis rmrrn 
Legend 
- - - International bOrder 
- - - Regional bOrder 
- - - ProvInCIal border 
- - - -. Communal bOrder 
Numbers ldenllty Communes 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
REGION OF TARAPACA 
Rural Poor COmInunes 
CIDER 
1 
5 
> 
... 
/ ' ' 
" , .... ( ~A ) 
.-_-----' I 
._--,,_ .. --_.. " (""-'" 
,I \ I' 
( ... 1 r--.. --... .l) 
\ \ 
I 9 I-------~, .............. ;; 8 \ - t \ f,
\ '~ , I , '. 
, I 
\ , /" ( 1-' 
tJ' ........ -( ,....- .. 
--- ' , / \ , 
'v 
PROVINCE COMMUNE 
PARINACOTA 1 • GENERAL LAGOS 
2 ,PUIRE 
ARICA 3 ·ARICA 
4 ,CAMARONES 
5 ·HUARA 
IQUIQUE 6 ·CAMINA 
7 ·COLCHANE 
8 ·IOUIOUE 
9 • POZO ALMONTE 
10· PICA 
~-'""':~ (~)
---.~ ....... ,.' .. ' 
MAP 2 
Legend 
- - - IntematlOnal border 
- - - Regional bortler 
- ....,.. - Provlndalborder 
- - - _. CommunalllOrder 
Numbers ldentlly Communes 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
REGION OF ATACAMA 
Rural Poor Communes 
CIDER 
PROVINCE 
CHANARAL 
COPIAPU 
HUASCO 
SURVEY l 
Mideplan Fosis U.l.llJJ 
Unicef Salud [~::'. ~I 
COMMUNE 
1·CHANARAL 
2· DIEGO DE ALMAGRO 
3·CALOERA 
"·COPIAPO 
5· TIERRA AMARILLO 
6· HUASCO 
7'VALLENAR 
8'FREIRINA 
9 • ALTO DEL CARMEN 
MAP3 
Legend 
- - - Inlemallonal border 
- - - Regional border 
- -. - Provincial border 
- - - _. Communal border 
Numbersldenllfy Communes 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
REGION OF COQUIMBO 
Rural Poor Communes 
CIDER 
_~...,I 
.. :r-I-~_I-I- ~ 
--:j" . 
. ~~~~~~~, \ 
\_~""\ 
~ , 
, 
2 
, 
, 
\ 
, 
, 
, 
\ ) 
l. .. , 
SURVEY 
MidepJan Fosis rIf.Il" I 
Unicef Salud /':':::;::1 
Agriculture [=1 
PROVINCIA COMMUNE 
ELOUI 1 • LA HIGUERA 
2 • VICUNA 
3· LA SERENA 
4· COClUIMBO 
5 • ANDACOlLO 
8· PAIHUANO 
UMARI 7 • OVALLE 
8 • RIO HURTADO 
II • PUNITAOUI 
10· MONTE PATRIA 
11 • COMBARBALA 
CHOAPA 12·MINCHA 
13·ILLAPEL 
14· LOS VILOS 
15 • SALAMANCA 
PROVINCIA 
CHACABUCO 
SANTIAGO 
PROVINCE 
COROUERA 
MEUPUA 
TALAGANTE 
COMMUNE 
1 • TL TIL 
2 - COlINA 
3 • LAMPA 
4 - QULICURA 
5 .. HUECHURABA 
6 .. LO BARNECHEA 
7 .. PUOAHUEL 
8 .. RENCA 
9 .. CONCHAU 
10 .. VITACURA 
11 - INOEPENOENCIA 
12 .. RECOlETA 
13 • LAS COODES 
14 .. CERRO NA VIA 
15 .. QUINTA NORMAL 
16 .. PROVIOENCIA 
17 .. LOPRAOO 
18 - ESTACION CENTRAL 
19 • SANTIAGO 
20 - NUNoA 
21 • LAREINA 
22 - MAIPO 
23 - CERRIl.LOS 
24· IOESPEJO 
25 .. PEDRO AGUIRRE CEIIOA 
26 .. SAN MIGUEl 
27 .. SAN JOAQUIN 
28 .. MACUl 
29 .. PENAlOLEN 
30 .. LA CISTERNA 
31 .. SAN RAMON 
32 .. LA GRANJA 
33 .. LA flORIDA 
34 .. El BOSOUE 
35 .. LA PINT ANA 
MAP 4 
'----....i.-.'\~ j ! 
-- , '--.. , ( 
/ .... , • ,'"\ . I 
" . . , 
' J J )-...... /'J \ ' ___ I ( 
I "\ ',,-
r \ , 
\ ''( 
, / \ R'iI ' ~', , "j\---... ....--'.-: ,j 'l (r'\,; , E/ \.-/ . \ " , --.J I), \ V , / F' " , 
I =:3=1".J") ) 
\ ( : _''"7-0.., ~ (' " I >- I., ... ~ I / " ',\:-=-::;:;r ''':_~.>,,,! ~_ '. / 
- " -•.• <.,,--," '. r· , / I 7 \"..I!..L.'!.l 4(~)!; It' I / I /', -, 'I1r ", r JII J-_--.., , _ / 
' I I • _""-... II ~-, 9 >l-_ ( ' ....... _-_..., .... -,. , -,~J~,., 2 _-r \ 
'-- ,n ',2' "____ . 
'. . "'-'""'11 i9-A , ' .• \. f---..... ' 'ttt;..... : ( \ 
.... -----............... ). Y'o "1.-) 37 , , 
' .. /.. OJ ....... , 
. ~ .. .. '" . / -. \ J- -~.--{, /"<-'. ,'oJ +- I " 
.... r y r~''', , 
. -.. -' \. , 
-/ I. "/- ." ••. -' '" I I \ 1'., '1~ _-\, { .~. .. -'" r 5. (''-.'\. I \ 
METROPOLITAN REGION OF SANTIAGO 
'-';\ 
! • 
~ j Rural Poor Communes CIDER 
• -) 41 -.t: . ./\--(. /_J).-. ; '> 
I .. • • .. ...._...) 
,-,- t '., < , 
. . , ' . . . . . '" ---- "-t· ..... , J./ I 
/- • • • ....... '\ .A 
r .... ..... '42' ••• , "_. 
. _ ... . \ '".-'. 'r-T /"",,, , /~ .. - .. 'J I I i I 
"- . . . . . 1 
COMMUNE 
36 - SAN JOSE DE MAIPO 
37 - PUENTE At TO 
38 - PIRQUE 
39 • CURACAVI 
40 .. MARIO PINTO 
41 .. MELIPIllA 
42 • SAN PEDRO 
43 • AlHUE 
..... PENAFlOR 
45 .. ELMONTE 
46 - T AlAGANTE 
47 .. ISLA DE MAIPO 
PROVINCIA 
MAIPO 
\ ( 
? " Suovey nd \. \ l' mm lege. ) 
• ....uJ Illll Mideplan Fosis Will ___ .... ematlo;:.:::-'i __ ~ f" 
COMMUNE 
48 -CAlERA DE-TANGO 
49 - SAN BERNAOO 
50 .. BUIN 
51 • PAINE 
Unicef 1"'::1 ."-"' __ 'v- V ~_ 
'" --- ~. Salud :-::.:: """"""" ..... , ,~ ,,;.~ _ • Agriculture ~ Nuntlers IdertIfy Convnunes 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
PROVINCIA 
CACHAPOAl 
PROVINCIA 
CAROENAl 
CARO 
COlCHAGUA 
COMMUNE 
I 1 • MOST AZAl 
2 • GRANEROS 
3 • COOEGUA 
... RANCAGUA 
5 • MACHAU 
6 • LAS CABRAS 
7 • COlTAUCO 
8 • ooNlHUE 
9 • OlIVAR 
10· COINCO 
11 • REQUINOA 
12· PEUMO 
13· OUINTAOETIlCOCO 
14 • PICHIOEGUA 
15 • SAN VICEENTE 
16· MAllOA 
17 • RENGO 
(:CWUII ... " 
18, NAVIOAO 
19 • llTUECHE 
20 • LA ESTREllA 
21 • PICHIlEMU 
22 • MARCHIHUE 
23 • PAREDONES 
24· PERAlUO 
25· PALMIUA 
26 • SAN FERNANOO 
27 • PUMANQUE 
28 • SANTACRUZ 
29 • NANCAGUA 
30 • PLAClllA 
31· lOlOl 
32· CHEPICA 
33 • CHIMBARONGO 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
MAP 5 REGION OF BERNADO O'HIGGINS 
Rural Poor Communes 
CIDER ,....,,~, 
"'v'''- l 
--/ \ ttttr,>-; '-" ,_, 1 ,-"J,:\ ' .,. :--:-.. .'7"",,,z:::::. ,/ .. ", __ ..... __ ' I ("' ... 
··:t8 "'~. ./ , ,. I , "L ,J ) 
.......... : :: • ~I ~ ,I ,,2 I 3 ,. .. ' ... \ 
• , .,. , 7. • • (-:.. "'". • • I I \ I " ... 
.", "''; ' ..... ,... \, \ ~-, I I ( 
· . ...:-: . 19 . . . . r.......... . . . : : : : \. .1 4 '\.. ___ , 
• •••• ' .•• -~J i.:::. ." :--..._>--_""'_ ' .... _____ , , \ 
· . . . . " • • I \' 6, , . , , .' Jar:.. -A ! "-
a;.....;.-.....:..'::' .... =::_::: .. ~.;::.....;;_  ...;.:":"'./;=_ \: : : ~ :, ,., ,,s I .. <- 9 _, ,_... '\ 
· . . '. -'-i' 20 ') . . ' . . . . . '," \ " C:">, ... .. 
. , ., t-'-.. , ' . . .--,...:. 7 " 1'"01 > ~f' ............ <_ .. ~, I ,.1 10 ... : _ "", ,~ " --1 "-.. II "'-.\ ~~ , -- .... ~ <: 11 I 
)7 . , r I 1 ' ... 12 '\ ,' ..... _--' , ~ I 5 \ r· . . . ~, '\ ( I 13 I ", I \ 
£21-:.-t 22 V 1\ ,. '- \, \ --~, ,_ I ,/ ~ •. 'J I I~ , r - -~ I 
I.. .. . . ." ~ 'r- rt r- -'"'1-16 -! _ 17 .~' , (' ..... -' I . I', ,....... ~. ' .... ~ .. \: .. : . . ~" I ,...:... 2.. • j "j 15 • I ". \ I \: " " .... " "';,iJ. I I " r J \. , m: ',:~~1- ·I·'t~ v .... ~· 25' ~ "'_ \ " --.... • • • I T I· • I· , • , ;,;- \, l ? ' . ~\ . ',..,.,l---., I '. • • ... .' .~ •• t-{ \ ... '\'-"'7 .  " .. '::::. ~h':i:'27'1' ,.t:. _ ... _J ,I p:30 .. ( '_ \ I " , . .'.' .... ~ ( ........... ,> '> '-I \ 
' . ' , : . : .. 'r.I~. . I, , . .i 28 I 2~ \ ',- I V 
te:: . :2~~" "R;":~::':::~ +'.1-. i \ 28 I ..... " •• ", , ' •• L .(I. 1,1, ,J • .lJ 33 ---\ , '~ • • , , •• " .1 ' ..J) ~-r''''''.l. I.. . I, ~ , "'-
-'\:-' ., .-=-~. , . ::it:::;, ~':"l.3.Z.J..' i,...L./"./l, ) 
\ ..... ' " :1 ," '1'1' • ·,r g-:-;." ,,./"' \ " 
.......... -. I .......... '" , ~...( ., '1-1' ,IT 'I' ... ...!.~.... <-=:;::::=:;r"''', ( 
.. ';-'-~~ -- " i,f. I ""-""~ , 
-- , -\_, ~"""'-J 
SURVEY 
Mideplan Fosis Legend 
P.A 
-
rTn fl 
I" .. "1 
- - - lnIemailonal border 
Unicef Salud 
Agriculture 
.' . ... 
I 
I--
- - - Regional border 
-'-'- Provlndal border 
- --_. ComIlUlllI border 
~ .
PROVINCE 
CURICO 
TAlCA 
CAUOUENES 
LINARES 
COMMUNE 
1 • TENO 
2 • VICHUOUEN 
3 • HUAlANE 
4 • RAUCO 
5 • CURICO 
6 • ROMERAl 
7 • llCANTEN 
8 • SAGRADA FAMILIA 
9 • MOLINA 
10· CUREPTO 
11 • RIO ClARO 
12 • CONSTITUCION 
13· PENCAHUE 
14· TALCA 
15 • PEl.ARCO 
16 • SAN CLEMENTE 
17 • MAUlE 
18· EMPEDAAOO 
19· CHANCO 
20 • CAUOUENES 
21 • PELLUHUE 
22 • SAN JAVIER 
23 • VUAALEGRE 
24 • YERBAS BUENAS 
2S • COLBUN 
26 • LINARES 
27· RETIRO 
28· lONGAVI 
29· PARRAl 
MAP 6 REGION OF MAULE 
Rural Poor Communes 
CIDER e~: .,~. : . ~ ..+~~-"\ - n::;J~ad ~. 
.. J.-. 'F,=?:-. :'. 7U; C~~f' . d' 
....... ';'4;"'7' 'e- ·z • .... ' "'-.. ~ . 3' .•. , .... 4...... . ....... L.'.:J .... :-....-_ I!'-. .~ >-:~ .1 • • .- ............... ~ 7 tk'--··~· ...... - f~' ... \ \.., .... , 
~ ' III I.. A, ..•.. " ~.~ 1";'''1:1' .. :, .... __ 1' ••• :;, \ :. .... .;. •• ~ • i ': S.t!'.!·. :!:~":::::>'~:I:-:r'" \ :......... :/ 
... . . .. 1. 10· 1.1. I . ,,~. . " .. , /." ~', "''i':;:'~;j:::::~~g.: 
, "-.1. , ~" ...... -...... .. t .. °1 
.. 0, •. 0",.1 ..... -... ....... ...... \ 5 ' .. ,_0.r---
.1. . .: ..... Ij. ." . "\ • ...... f ••••• , . 
"' ... to .... 1"· ............. i'*-.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ~ , ............. :../ 
,.1 ... 1/ .......... ,·. ···1lr.~ " , 
~,;.:...? .... " .......... -,' ...... .." ... i~ " ,-...,................ '~_ 
c .... '13~> ••.• ':!'I~ - '.... J 
". • ••.•• ' •• I ,1:" ':'15: ••. , • '. •• '-....) 
......... ...J • ............ I ..... 1.' , r 
d 12 ~" ...... "4. 14'. ......~ "" -=---=-- ... '>'"-, 1-- • /H '\ • ::'---', I~'. r~ ) r" ~ I '\ 1 T ....., 'l) A" ~ , ~ • ,L" .,. .... -........... .( I I .1 \ 
. . .:1.' :' I! ,. .... ___ 1:. .... II 
\!. .. ~ : ~ 11.,:t. i 22 ) -~)·: .. ·I./ 1 J ..1 J 
. - ~ ... - .. ~. ! 23 -" •.. / --.. 
.• I' .. ~I.. L,;< .' • 1"\ ,'-24f ......::: 
·r· ;y- I \ , ..•. 
. , ,,~ . 
,.... ~ 
...... ----~'-"'--, L ,\:::;:~~:j:tt~· p.~ ...."'1 " \ 
'." •...•... , .. -", I 
••••.•.. •. . 28,' 
1111111111/1* "n'Il" rf· ~ 
. . .. 
. ·2 . ; 
.: ., .. 21 . . ~ 
• ,-.-.:...... . . ·1., -"\ I '\:T' ',,' .. " ..... \ : n;IIII!? 
"W 
~""I 20 Qlll' . 'r 
legend 
, , __ ' 'ttl' 
I 
-., __ ) j,,> 'J "tr~> ! 
-"-./-- \_ .. ~ 29 
\ r' 
Survey . 
Mideplan Fosis [l1T1 fTI \, ' ........ 
--
, 
r 
'I'j~ I 
\~4 ( 
... _:.; "'I , 
I I , 
~ \ r---- ... 
, 
lnIemaiionai border 
- - - Regional border 
Unicef Salud ,-.. : : I 
... \,J l..... .. 1 
--.- ProvIndaJ border 
- - - _. Communal border Agricuhure L_·~=l 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
-~ ..... ~
COMMUNE MAP 7 
t • C0600ECURA 
2 • OUIRIHUE 
3 • NINHUE 
4 • SAN CARlOS 
5 • NIQUEN 
6 • SANFASIAN 
7 • SAN NICOlAS 
8 • TREGUACO 
(I • PORTEZUElO 
10- CHIUAN 
11 • COIHUECO 
12- COELEUU 
13- RANOUIl 
14- PINTO 
15- auUON 
16- BUlNES 
17- SAN IGNACIO 
18- ElCARMEN 
19- PEUUCO 
20- YUNGAY 
21- TOME 
22- TALCAHUANO 
23- PENCO 
24- FlORIOA 
2S. CONCEPCION 
26-COAONEl 
27- HlJAlCUI 
28- LOlA 
29- SANTA.JJANA 
30- SAN ROSENOO 
31- YUUBEl 
32- CABRERO 
33- IAJA 
34 • LOS ANGELES 
35- TUCAPEl 
36- ANTUCO 
37- auLlECO 
38- NAClMllNIO 
39- NEGRETE 
40- MUlCHEN 
4 t • SANTABARBARA 
42- OUIlCO 
Survey 
Mideplan Fosis I ! IIIII 
43- ARAUCO 
44 • CURANLAHUE 
45- LEBU 
Unicef Salud j • ""1 ........ 
46- LOS AlAUOS 
47- CANETE Agriculture L ~_J. 
48· CONTUlMO 
49· TIRUA 
{) 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
REGION OF BIOBIO 
f.P.'h-:-, Rural Poor Communes 
. ,. fl ~ 
•. I.b 2 1£f;-"~ , 
.. • * •• I;P '- - .... .,-..... 
\. 
If"" A CIDER 
,,_1"1. 1.1'" _ --L5 
!-l... .;r·3.j\._ __"""'-. ~ ~r.r.-,:8&· .. , .... J. ·r . .,.-.- , " -I"~ ,,~.I:'. 't:~'" • '~:l':7!1" .' _ d.:. \ .r., .~ 
... 
. ' .• ,/.,." .t; I·'· ""... . '1,' .. ~ . r:-r -1 .. :J r 2 ,,".;,j 9 '. '"~> ,;;.". . .. ..,., '1 
", i .... :,,?- -../ 11<,;Y, . ''''t.i.'' 
: .f '-r-I.' ".~ . ..' , ".,l- .,., 1'.:1', ... d~ 21 ~l3 H?' 10 .> ..... ,. , .. 
" ·1· . ---b . ..,..c... . .. , .. t ... 
' 23' ~·I· ....... \ ~' .... ~.' • ,I' .• ' .. 
_2 " .. "I'I'lli'15~~ 18 I~·til· cl'-"-" ....... ~.-..... 'TiE[., 
-t' -~1024·1.1_.. . , &. ... -~ . , ... t· . :'I.:Jo:.. 
Go- .. ·!i -'~",,-,-;:="':r ...... -.14 .. "' .. _:.I 
~"I ~,. .. .1 
25 , '''. .! = '. :-<~, . I , I. • ,.. • ". ......'~:!\ "'·\'loI·Ic'·I·I·~' , •.••• ',~ ,'" '" ... ~ 
'--,( ( ... v,.,., . . 1, <'~1i: '<'; •• : •••• , ',,_ , •••• ':=1 ~ 28 1\····.· I ~ 32 .~:'. .1' " _ . . . . ' 27l:l"··.L:1 ..,.. • ..;",.r • . \ ~ Ig!31 1-. ,., I 20 1-1-. , .~ 
r·'·'·'·I·t5-.. J '..LI.' ., ( 
.... '"t .... j --.- •. '±U~ _~"""')~ ....... : ) 
- r I 1 _30 _~.o..ar 1;'..:,;'('. 35 I r 
" \ 'i:~ #' , ~ -4-t-29-+-+_~...;.;;.,o 33 \ ... #<"c- 38 \ 
-"'" j'J ',.,.1., .. ,.. \ 
",-- -- - ... - 34 /~3 \ 
' .. ·\;r·1 I 
-<... ... , 44 )'--31--'"-_" (1"t--:-'!"i.:-~,~.~;tfj~~:tH*~" 
{ - (' \ (--... "':';'.,' ':"; "'~f'.:.' ~+-~~H-r.::t.~r.t (" \ /'- '.i  . ... . 
t"_ .... '--,\ ~-"'~39, ... , "'ool' ... , •• , ......... ,., ••• ,. 
" -'I - "'"'="'y "'< ., .. , ....... ,., .. 
1 ~. " , ••••••••• ,., •••• 
I -- --1 -... T.+.t""'I" ~1:""'" . I ,- ' ... ' \ , I 
'\., ... , .. '; .. ,.,., .. 
" I "7~\ , ,_"2 \.,., ... , ... ,.,., ... ,." 
,/ '- 40 ....... ~.: .... , ...... " ....... 1 
- ... \'  ,~ 
'C> .. -'''' '" _ ... ".,.,.,.,.,.:., •• .., 
. . " " .... , ........ "'!'\" 
legend \.. I ', .. , ............ -tI --~- /-, \ ... \:!::.~.~:.:.:.!:..~" 
- - - lnIemailonai border 
- - - RegIonal border 
-_.- Provincial border 
----. Communal border 
'-"" \. I ~ __ ~:..:., 
\/ ,J 
I .J 
\....' 
bl 
~ 
IC .. " ~ 
~ 
-
~- 
MAPS 
PROVINCE COMMUNES 
1 • ANGOl 
2 • RENAICO 
3 • COUIPUllI 
4 • PUREN 
MALlECO 5 • lOS SAlICES 
8 • ERCIUA 
7 • lONOUIMAY 
8 • LUMACO 
9 • TRAIGUEN 
10· VICTORIA 
11 • CURACAUTIN 
10::' 
13· PEROUENCO 
14. CARAHUE 
15· NUEVA IMPERIAL 
16· TEMlICO 
17· LAUTARO 
CAUTIN 18· VllCUN 
19· MELIPElICO 
20· SAAVEDRA 
21 • TEOOORO SCHMIDT 
22· FREIRE 
23· CUNeo 
24· TOLlEN 
25· PITRUFQUEN 
26· GORBE" 
27· lONCOCHE 
29· PlICON 
30 • CURARREHUE 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
---.-.. ----------
REGION OF LA ARAUCANIA 
Rural Poor Communes 
CIDER 
Survey 
Mideplan Salud 
Unicef Salud 
Agricu~ure 
• .J ~ •••• .!. 
.! ; ! •• .: = • 
.:.... 0' .: •••• ..: 
........ 
,. -: - - -
.: t-!- .: 
· .' ~ 
· .. 
· .. 
• • I 
Legend 
rnw [ .... "I 
- - - Inlem8llonal border 
... 
(- J 
- - - Regional border 
-. -. - ProvIIlCl81 border 
- - - -' Communal border 
~~ (~-~,~) '.,~ .': ......... . 
MAP9 REGION OF LOS LAGOS 
Rural Poor Communes 
CIDER 
SURVEY 
Mideplan Fosis 111111 
, ..... '1 Unicef Salud ...... 
Agriculture F3 
Legend 
_"' ___ IniemaliOnai border 
___ RegIonal border 
__ . _ Provlndal border 
- ___ • Communal border 
Numbers ldelllily Communes 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
VAlDIVIA 
COMMUNE 
1 • MAAIQUINA 
2 • LANCO 
3 • PANGUIPUllI 
4·MAFIL 
5 • VALDIVIA 
8 • lOSLAOOS 
7 • CORRAL 
8 • PAlllACO 
9 • FUTRONO 
10· LA UNION 
11 • LAOO RANCO 
13· SANJUAN 
DE LA COSTA 
14· SAN PABLO 
OSORNO 15· OSOARO 
16· ENTRE LAGOS 
17· RIO NEGRO 
18· PUERTOOCTAV 
19· PURRANOUE 
20· FRESIA 
21 • FRUTIUAR 
22· PUERTO VARAS 
23· llANOUIHUE 
llANOUIHUE 24· lOS MUERMOS 
{ 
2S· PUERTO MaNIT 
_ 26· COCHAMO 
. ___ • 27· MAULLIN 
l----.,:., 28· CALBUCO 
, \ 29· ANCUD 
40 -.... 30· OUEMCHI 
r
J ~ I .... 31 • DALCAHUE ~.---- .. J 32· CASTRO 
(§~~~~~'~::.... CHILOE 33· CURACO DE VELEZ r r 34. CUINCHAO ') .. !-, 35· CHONCHI 
,\-l,... 36· PUOUELOON 
I a. 37· QUELLEN 
( 
38· OUEUON 42--- r--------~~~~~--~ 39· HUALAIHUE 
PALEN" 40· CHAITEN 
.. I ~-; 41 • FUTALEUFU 
\) 42· PALENA 
(~) 
......... : •.•• ! •.•... , 
MAP 10 
Legend 
IntemaJlonal border 
Regklnal boroef 
ProvInCial border 
Communal border 
Number.lldenilly communes 
Source MINAGRI (1992b) 
Region of Aisen 
Rural Poor Communes 
CIDER 
PROVINCE 
AlSEN 
COIHAIOUE 
GENERAL 
CARRERA 
CAPITAN 
PRAT 
COMMUNE 
1 • GUAITECAS 
2 ·CISNES 
3 ·AISEN 
4 • LAGO VERDE 
5 • COIHAIOUE 
6 • RIO IBANEZ 
7 • CHILE CHICO 
8 ·COCHRANE 
II -TORTEl 
10 - O'HIGGINS 
MAP 11 Sketch Map of Regional Division and Economic Activity in Chile 
I-Tarapaca (Mining/Fishing) 
II - Antofagasta --+--(Mining/Fishing) 
IV - Coquimbo (Agriculture) 
v · Valparaiso 
(Agriculture) 
VII- Maule 
(Agricu Iture) 
IX • Araucania 
(Forestry) 
Source Gwynne (1994) 
~- III • Atacama 
(Mining/Agriculture) 
VI • O'Higgins 
(AgriculturelMining) 
VIII • 810-810 
(F orestry/Fishing) 
X· Los Lagos 
(Forestry) 
XII - Magallanes 
N 
t 
2.3. Two Trans-communal Homogeneous Landscapes of Rural Poverty: The Norte Chico 
Region (The Little North), and The Drylands of the Coastal Range ("Secano Costero") 
2.3.1. The Norte Chico region 
Within the Norte Chico macroregion, the Region of Coquimbo is one of the poorest of the 
country. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), this region 
would be considered one of the poorest between Regions IV (Coquimbo) and X (Los Lagos). 
They estimated that 231,094 inhabitants live in poverty out of a global population of 445,136 
persons (PAF-Chile, 1993). The share of communal people living in extreme poverty can be 
seen in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Share of People Living in Extreme Poverty in the Communes of the Coquimbo 
Region 
Commune % Commune % 
La Serena 12.8 Combarbahi 242.9 
La Higuera 37.0 Punitaqui 38.3 
Coquimbo 12.0 Illapel 17.7 
Andacollo 15.6 Salamanca 18.3 
Vicuna 16.3 Los Vilos 24.4 
Paihuano 14.2 Mincha 33.0 
Ovalle 20.6 Montepatria 28.4 
Rio Hurtado 40.5 
Source: UNICEF (1987), quoted from FIDA, 1993. 
The Norte Chico region has a rather homogeneous environmental landscape corresponding 
to a transitional semi-arid zone, between the Atacama desert of the "Norte Grande"(Big 
North) and the Mediterranean central region. This region, which covers a surface of 
approximately 90,000 square kilometres, is largely characterised by its mountainous territory 
which is transversely crossed by five main rivers; Copiap6, Huasco, Elqui, Limar( and 
Choapa (see Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3 The Five Valleys of the Norte Chico Study Area. 
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Regional rainfall averages vary from 25 mm/year close to the northern border to 215 
mm/year near to the southern extreme (see Table 2.7). However, water is not only scarce 
because of the relatively low amount of rainfall but also as a result of its extreme seasonal 
concentration. Furthermore, this region has been constantly affected by periodic droughts due 
to significant historical variations in rainfall events through the years and high annual 
variability. This can be noticed in Figure 2.4, which shows the annual distribution of rainfall 
in La Serena, the Norte Chico's largest city. 
Table 2.7 Rainfall in the Norte Chico. 
Station/Basin Mean Rainfall % of years in which rainfall 
(mm 1950-80) below mean 
Copiapo 25 60 
Vallenar (Huasco) 46 66 
La Serena (Elqui) 85 66 
Vicuna (Elqui) 100 62 
Ovalle (Limari) 109 S8 
Combarbala (Choapa) 215 S8 
Illapel (Choapa) 178 54 
Source: Geografia de Chile (1988), pp. 18, 26, quoted from Gwynne and Meneses, 1994. 
Because of the scarce availability of water, productive agricultural activities cannot be 
developed without irrigation. Hence, the five river systems have historically been significant 
for regional agricultural activities, since they are the main permanent sources of water 
supply, sourced by snow melt from the upper Andes Range. 
Despite this climatic constraint, the Norte Chico was populated early as a result of the 
discovery of rich mining ores throughout its territory. The finding of significant gold and 
copper deposits in the Copiap6 valley at the beginning of the 18th century, initiated an intense 
process of migration to the area, mainly by small-scale miners. Later in the nineteenth 
century, important silver mines started to be exploited in the region (as in the 
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Figure 2.4 Frequency Distribution of Annual Rainfall in La Serena per Period. 1869-1971 
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case of Chafiarcillo), becoming an additional source of attraction for people from the south. 
As a result, a population of no more than 8,000 people in the northern half of the Norte 
Chico in the mid-18th substantially increased to 77,400 in the second half of the 19th century, 
most of them directly or indirectly attracted by mining activities. 
So, mining activities can be considered to be the first factor in explaining the Norte Chico's 
process of socio-geographical structuring, since from the very beginning it started to initiate 
close inter-sectoral and intra-regional linkages (Apey, 1987). Incipient agricultural production 
started to appear in these valleys in order to provide food for miners and pasture for breeding 
a large amount of cattle needed for both dietary and transport purposes. 
In parallel, however, the enormous pressure that small and medium-scale mining activities 
imposed on the regional landscape (principally on the fragile vegetation of this dry 
eco-system), initiated a severe and generalised deforestation in the Norte Chico region. This 
has been considered the first stage in a long- term process of desertification, high levels of 
environmental degradation in soils, water and vegetation; all of these are easily visible 
nowadays throughout most of the regional landscapes. However, this process of 
environmental deterioration has been exacerbated as a result of the enormous pressure that 
the rural poor produces in terms of providing themselves with the basic elements of food and 
energy. The share of rural population in the fourth region of the Norte Chico's regions has 
been decreasing dramatically through the last three decades (see Table 2.8). 
An important and exclusive socio-geographical feature of the southern half of the Norte 
Chico, is the presence of historical systems of communal land -the "Comunidades Agricolas 
del Norte Chico"-(agricultural community land of the Norte Chico). These 187 agricultural 
communities"comunidades agricolas" covered a surface of nearly 1 million hectares; there 
were 37 communities in Choapa Province, 128 in Limarl Province and 22 in Elqui Province 
(FIDA, 1993). 
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Table 2.8 Distribution of Rural and Urban Population in Coquimbo (1970, 1982, 1992)(%). 
Provincial 1970 1982 1992 
Government Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Elqui 80.4 19.6 88.8 11.2 91.8 8.2 
Limari 43.7 56.3 56.0 44.0 64.9 35.1 
Choapa 37.0 63.0 56.9 43.1 63.0 37.0 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (lNE) 
Furthermore, the agricultural communities covered 25 per cent of Coquimbo's regional area 
and 58 per cent of the rural property regime under which community members ("comuneros") 
enjoyed: permanent exclusive usufruct of residential and irrigated sites in the valley bottoms 
("goces singulares"); temporary exclusive usufruct of dry land located above the gradient 
irrigation channels of the valley systems for cultivation of rainfed cereals("lluvias"); and 
permanent non-exclusive usufruct of common pasture mainly devoted to goat herding ("campo 
comun")(Scott, 1993). By law, these "comunidades" were not allowed to be sub-divided 
among their members until the Decree Law 108 was passed in 1978. This law permitted 
members of an agricultural community to dispose of their rights in the community to people 
who were not members of the community, providing that property ownership had already 
been regularised. 
Historical features and environmental constraints, have contributed to produce a particular 
spatial pattern in the Norte Chico largely characterised by high levels of urbanisation, with 
one dominant medium-sized city heading a transverse distribution of small settlements along 
each of the five valleys. As regards rural activities, most of the region has been historically 
characterised by the presence of a large number of medium-and small-scale mining ventures 
of low productivity(principally in dry inter fluvial areas), and by a rather dualistic system of 
agricultural production, very much associated with geographical and economic accessibility 
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to both fertile soils and an irrigated water supply. As far as the agricultural sector is 
concerned, three main productive patterns have been historically co-existing in the Norte 
Chico's landscape: 
a. A productive association of fodder crops and cereals with tree fruits -notably vines for the 
spirit "pisco", olives, walnuts and avocados. These dominate the largest plots of the 
valleys' most advantageous irrigated land (more than 70 per cent of land under use). 
b. A small-scale productive system - principally devoted to grow early-season horticultural 
crops such as tomatoes, green beans, courgettes, red chilies, green peppers and some 
fruits, these are produced in small irrigated plots (less than 1 hectare to less than 10 
hectares). This productive pattern has been common in the surroundings of the main 
towns of these valleys. However, these crops have also became particularly important 
in permitting the development of an incipient market-oriented agriculture for people living 
in the higher sections of the Norte Chico's valleys. 
c. Upland-dry farming almost totally devoted to small surfaces of rainfed wheat. Productivity 
levels of this self-sufficient agriculture is significantly low if it is compared with national 
or regional standards. This is because production comes as a result of a combination of 
two elements: a limited undulating semi-arid landscape, and the occurrence of rainfall 
events, followed by the sowing of stored seeds. 
The last two productive systems are the most distinctive and dominate economic activities 
within the Norte Chico's agricultural communities, though they can be combined with 
geographically-extensive practises of goat rearing. However, small-scale mining is still a 
common feature in the region and a significant portion of the male population combine 
mining and agricultural activities (they engage in this last activity especially when mineral 
prices decline below certain critical levels). 
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Thus, people living in these communities have historically had a significant socio-productive 
interaction with both regional landscapes, the irrigated valley bottoms and the non-irrigated 
dry lands of the inter fluvial zone. 
The weakness of regional natural resources in association with rather inefficient technologies 
has largely contributed to reduce the quality of life, especially in rural areas but notably in 
the interfluvial sections where many agricultural communities are located. Some indicators 
show the depth of poverty in rural areas where 68 per cent of houses are with minimal 
services and poor constructions (ranchos and mediaguas), 57 per cent of households do not 
have sewer, and only 37 per cent of them have access to piped water (FIDA, 1993). 
It is in the margins between irrigated and non-irrigated lands of the Norte Chico valleys 
(notably in Limarf and Copiap6) where the dramatic process of agricultural change started 
to take place in the late 1970s. 
2.3.2. The coastal range drylands ("Secano Costero") 
The whole geographical area of the Coastal Range's drylands ("Secano") corresponds to a 
longitudinal area that stretches from the Aconcagua region (V) to the Los Lagos region (X), 
between parallels 32 20' and 42 30' South. This landscape, which covers an area of almost 
6.0 million hectares is closely associated with the Coastal Range ("Cordillera de la Costa"), 
comprising the two sub-areas of the Coastal Drylands ("Secano Costero", associated with its 
western slopes) and the interior Drylands ("Secano Interior" related to the eastern slopes). 
This landscape is normally divided into two latitudinal sub-areas. The Biobfo river basin 
constitutes a clear geographical border in dividing the macro-region. The main focus of this 
analysis is going to concern the northern area, between the Aconcagua and Biobfo regions 
(V and VIII respectively), The main reasons for doing this are: 
43 
a) the high level of poverty this area presents; 
b) the complexity of the traditional association of physical and social factors contributing to 
explain historical poverty in this area; 
c) recent social impacts in the poorest sections of this area as a result of intensive expansion 
of forestry activities; and 
d) the fact that this area comprises, among others, the Maule Region (VII), where a 
substantive part of this research has been carried out. 
- Main geographical features: the northern section of the "secano" area extends over nearly 
4.9 million hectares, of which 1.2 million are arable (class I to IV), almost 0.8 million 
limited to pasture (class VI), and about 2.6 million hectares suitable only for forestry. The 
climate in this area is characterized by relatively scarce rainfall, concentrated in winter 
months, with a total absence of rainfall in summer and in long periods of spring and autumn. 
The dry period lasts about 8 months in the northern extreme (La Ligua, Aconcagua Region) 
becoming shorter as one moves south, lasting no more than 1 month around the Biobfo river. 
Average annual rainfall increases from 350 mm in the northern extreme to 1,200 mm in the 
Biobio basin, and occurs in winter time when low temperatures limit plant growth. 
Periodically, there are up to three consecutive years of drought (as in the Norte Chico case), 
with heavy losses to agricultural production in the "secano" area. 
The total population of the "secano" area has been estimated at 3.3 million inhabitants 
distributed in 89 communes. Nearly 0.6 million (17 per cent) is currently classified as rural. 
In the northern "secano " section total population grew by 14 per cent between 1982 and 
1992, while rural population rose by more than 7 per cent, mainly as a consequence of the 
harsh living conditions in this landscape. According to ECLA IMIDEPLAN figures it has 
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been estimated that more than 53 per cent of the "secano" , s rural population live in poverty 
(see Table 2.9). Accordingly, the level of formal education of the population over 18 years 
of age is less than 6 years, well below the national average (even for rural areas nationwide). 
Thus, illiteracy rates in the "secano" reaches about 19 per cent, higher than in any other 
spatial aggregate in the country (World Bank, 1994). 
Production in the "secano" area is dominated by agriculture, agriculture-livestock-forestry 
systems, where a rather limited number of crops intervene, predominantly cereals and pulses. 
However, the productive pattern with crops only and crops associated with livestock 
principally prevail in the Aconcagua region. From that region southwards forestry has been 
gradually introduced, acquiring more importance as one moves further south. In both Maule 
and Biobfo regions grapevines are also cultivated. 
Thus, in general terms, it is possible to estimate that nearly 45 per cent of the "secano" is 
currently devoted to natural pasture, the majority of which (over 90 per cent) is severely 
degraded, with only 5 per cent consisting of improved or artificial pastures. Close to one 
third of the area corresponds to forest uses and other marginal uses. Forestry plantations in 
the "secano" represent close to 86 per cent of the country's exotic forest, where Pinus 
Radiata represents 92 per cent and Eucalyptus the remaining 8 per cent. 
However, land distribution in the "secano" can undoubtedly be considered as a major factor 
to explain social contrasts amongst its population. As is clearly shown in an estimate made 
by the World Bank (1994) using CIREN information -Natural Resources Information Centre 
(see Table 2.10), land distribution by size of plots presents a highly uneven system, with a 
large domination (85 per cent) of relatively small plots (defined as those smaller than 50 
hectares), with an average size of 23 hectares. But, if the poor quality of most "secano's" 
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Table 2.9 "SECANO" Area: Population Distribution by Regionsl. 
Population2 
Region Total Rural 
(1,000 bab) (1,000 bab) 
V 1,075.4 65.1 
VI 469.2 163.7 
VII 473.3 132.2 
VIII 1,021.8 141.2 
MR 170.3 52.1 
TOTAL 3,210.0 554.3 
1 Refers only to communes in the Secano 
2 Source.' population census of 1992 
3 Source: ECLA 1987 
Source: World Bank (1994 pag 13). 
Rural Povertr 
(%) (1,000 bab) (%) 
6.1 28.4 43.6 
34.9 61.4 37.5 
27.9 88.7 67.0 
13.8 89.9 63.7 
30.5 25.4 34.3 
17.3 293.8 53.0 
soils is considered the average size for this share diminishes to 5 Basic Irrigated Hectares 
equivalent (BIH). Conversely, only 3 per cent of the units covered more than 50 per cent of 
the total area, showing a size average of 1,898 hectares or 47 BIH. Nevertheless, even those 
farms within the range of 50 to 200 hectares (normally considered medium-size plots) have 
an average size equivalent to less than 12 BIH, and are within the range of small farms 
according to INDAP's classification. 
It is also estimated that there are at least 50,000 small farmers in this northern share of the 
"secano" area, which would represent nearly 25 per cent of the total number of small farmers 
in the country. An additional productive problem that these small farmers are currently facing 
is a number of restrictions related to land rights. In fact, about 4S per cent of the farmer of 
this "secano" area (22,500) still have serious problems regarding their land titles; 30 per cent 
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have no titles at all. As a result, they are currently marginalised from gaining access to 
benefits and subsidies as in the cases of: the forestry subsidy under the Forestry Development 
Programme (Decree Law 701); the allocation of water rights for irrigation and subsidies for 
small irrigation projects (Decree Law 18,450); the subsidy for the rural housing programme; 
and most of the INDAP programmes oriented to allocate credits and technological transfer 
to the small-scale peasants. An additional consequence which arises as a result of unclear land 
titles is the difficulty in developing a land market. 
Table 2.10 "SECANO" Area: Land Distribution by Size. 
Size Units Areas Average Size 
% % 
(ha) (No) (%) (ha) (HRB)I (ba) , (HRB)I (ba) (HRB)I 
Less than 50 45,500 85 1,057,206 230,988 22 61 23 5 
50 to 100 6,500 12 955,158 79,279 20 21 147 12 
More than 200 1,500 3 2,847,512 70,367 58 18 1,898 47 
Total 53,500 100 4,859,876 380,634 100 100 91 7 
• HRB: Basic Irrigated Hectares equivalent 
Source: World Bank, 1994 pag 13. 
Furthermore, small farmers have only minimum agricultural equipment, limited working 
capital, and make little use of credit facilities due to both the difficulties imposed by 
commercial banks and the risk involved. As a result, small farmers use a simple and low cost 
production technology, which not only results in low yields (see Table 2.11) but also has 
caused negative effects as regards natural resource conservation. 
These farmers are temporarily linked to the market through the sale of their labour 
(principally to the forestry sector), and the occasional sale of production surpluses. Their 
agricultural activity is mostly oriented towards self-sufficiency, in which livestock is used 
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both as a source of draught power and a kind of "reserve fund" for unforeseen circumstances. 
The small-scale of their marketing operation, their lack of organization, with their high 
relative isolation from the main regional urban centres of consumption, poor means of 
transport and lack of information on marketing, make them extremely dependent on the small 
traders (middlemen) who periodically, visit the zone (Cox, 1984). The lack of organization 
among these farmers makes it extremely difficult for them to improve the marketing of their 
agricultural products and accessibility to new inputs (seeds and fertilisers). 
Table 2.11 "SECANO" Area: Average Yields Obtained by Small Producers. 
Yields by Region 
Product Unit Va VI VII y VIII 
National 
Average 
Actual Potential Actual Potential Yield 
Wheat t/ha 1.2 4.0 1.5 4.0 3.4 
Legumes t/ha 0.3 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.8 
Pastures t/ha 0.8 1.8 1.0 2.0 n.a. 
(dry matter) 
Wine grapes lIha - - 3,000 4,000 6,800 
Maize tlha - - 0.8 1.5 8.4 
Potatoes t/ha - - 6.0 8.0 14.2 
Beef/lamb kg/ha 21 75 30 80 n.a. 
Source: World Bank, 1994 pag 59. 
This condition is made worse by the lack of productive and transport infrastructure such as 
post-harvest storage, processing and marketing and all-weather rural roads. This is especially 
problematic in the south of the Maule region. Such constraints, along with the poor quality 
of the provision of basic services such as health, education, drinking water and electricity, 
have contributed to further depress the quality of life of the poorest segments of the rural 
population of the "secano". Thus, the combination of productive, social and environmental 
48 
constraints affecting the local population of this fragile landscape have become a significant 
constraint for achieving better level of development according to sustainable basis in both 
economic and ecological terms (World Bank, 1994). 
2.4. Concluding Remarks 
As this chapter has shown, poverty in general and rural poverty in particular is the result of 
the interaction of a complex set of factors. Rural poverty presents different faces throughout 
the territory and actions oriented to simply increase levels of minimum income would have 
little overall effect. There are so many other factors that contribute to lower the quality of 
life in both urban and rural areas. There is no doubt that the rise in the minimum wages 
would contribute to improve consumption and as a consequence the standard of living of the 
poorest social groups. This can even contribute to lower the current statistical level of poverty 
in the country. This alternative, however, would contribute little to the removal of the 
different factors which are inducing poverty to exist within the socio-geographical 
heterogeneity of the country. In some of these areas, the level of income does not necessarily 
appear as the main developmental restriction. 
This argument becomes even more important if some rural patterns resulting from the 
regional impact of the opening of the Chilean economy is considered. As is going to be 
discussed in the following chapter, some of these patterns seems to have become important 
factors contributing to the explanation of new trends concerning poverty in some particular 
rural areas of the country. One important factor has become the increasing spatial and labour 
mobility of poor people as they move from rural to urban areas -the process of rural 
depopulation. 
49 
Chapter 3. The New Economic Model and Regional Change: the 
Development of Nontraditional Agricultural Exports and the 
Norte Chico Region 
Introduction 
The strengthening of a wide variety of primary exports in Chile since 1975 can be 
considered the starting point for the development of the country I s process of nontraditional 
export growth. In the regional mosaic of Chile, however, there have been some regions 
that have benefited from this shift to an outward oriented economy in terms of increased 
production, and others that have benefited much less. In this chapter, the general aim is 
to examine the socio-productive evolution of a region that has significantly benefited in 
terms of production from the promotion of nontraditional exports as a strategy for 
development. 
The following analysis, therefore, will be principally oriented to examine some 
socio-productive features which have resulted from the strengthening of nontraditional 
exports at the meso-scale level. This will produce some insights regarding market shifts 
and spatial implications for regions in Chile. 
In order to deal with this aim, the chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first 
place, some insights concerning nontraditional exports in Latin America are presented as 
a general background. Secondly, a brief analysis with respect to the evolution of 
agricultural and forestry exports at the national level is provided in order to contextualise 
the Norte Chico's process of evolution. Finally, the analysis is focused on two of the 
more active areas of export-led fruit production of the Norte Chico (the Copiap6 valley 
and the Guatulame section of the Limarf valley) in an attempt to characterise the main 
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features that have started to emerge in the region as a result of the agricultural 
modernisation process that started in the late 1970s. In this regard, however, most of the 
attention is going to be focused on three main variables: productive investment, market 
of land markets and labour markets. From the very beginning of this process of 
agricultural shift, the evolution of these variables very much affected the social dynamic 
of the local population. 
3.1. Nontraditional Exports in Latin America: A General Background 
Primary exports have always been one of the most important factors in explaining the 
socio-productive evolution of Latin American countries since colonial times. A clear 
pattern of export-led economic specialisation based on one or two products was for a long 
time a rather distinctive feature among these countries. As a result, most of these 
economies have been affected by the fluctuation with world prices for these primary 
goods. 
Although significant efforts have been historically made in the region in order to 
overcome these constraints, the general framework has shown little change. Thus, 
inward-oriented strategies of development, implemented in most Latin American countries 
since the World Depression of the 1929-1933 period, proved unsustainable unless heavy 
protectionist measures were maintained. Furthermore, during the 1950's, a well respected 
United Nations's body was established in the region -The Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA)- whose main role, notably inspired in the Argentinean economist Raul 
Prebisch, was to search for a more regionally-based strategy of socio-economic 
development. The strengthening of import substitution industrialisation could be 
considered one of the main outcomes of both processes. However, even though the Latin 
American geographical pattern of production changed very much as a result of the 
development of its industrial sector, specialisation in primary exports continued 
51 
(Kohlhepp, 1987) 
In most Latin American countries, the encouragement of nontraditional exports has come 
in parallel with an active discouragement and restructuring of most of its import 
substituting industry. However, little has been said on the regional impacts that such a 
shift has generated inside Latin American countries compared with the wide literature on 
the social and spatial implications of the post-Fordist process of industrial restructuring 
(as one of the new features of the world economy). It needs to be considered that one of 
the remarkable features of the collapse of the old world economic order from the 
mid-1970s, apart from its severity, was its high uneven impact across different sectors, 
national states and regions. As Sadler (1992 pag xiv) pointed out: 
... "the significance of places was being (re)discovered in social science at 
just the same time as capital was apparently increasingly able to transcend 
space. Yet production still had a geography; not only in its physical 
location, but also more generally in the sense that key strategic decisions 
incorporated a heightened awareness of the competitive advantages and 
disadvantages to capital of particular places and regions from within the 
global web, and the diversity of ways in which they could be connected as 
part of truly international strategies. Such decisions rested on a conscious 
evaluation of particular attributes to do with historical-geographic processes 
of development" . 
Therefore, both the integration and disintegration of places and regions within broader 
national and international circuits via corporate and state policies poses some harsh 
challenges not only to people living and working there but also to the state. Accordingly, 
concerns on how regions can adapt to an increasingly volatile international market place 
become a paramount aspect to be considered in medium- and long-term development. The 
spatial mobility of capital used to be much higher than the capacity of readaptation of 
labour, services and infrastructure. 
By the beginning of the 199Os, a major shift in the orientation of economic policy had 
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occurred in the majority of Latin American countries. After the severe crisis of the 1980s, 
in which economic decline was practically a general feature throughout the region, most 
Latin American countries turned to more outward-looking economic strategies to redirect 
their process of development (Gwynne, 1990, 1993a; Messner, 1993; De Janvry, 1993; 
Hojman, 1994). This dynamic towards change has come as a result of a combination of 
internal political actors and international lending aid agencies, looking for mechanisms to 
stabilize the balance of payment and to revitalise long-term economic growth in Latin 
American countries. The centrepiece for this new strategy of development has been the 
promotion of "nontraditional" exports (Barham, 1994 pag 53). Because "nontraditional" 
exports is a rather vague concept, it seems useful to adopt Barham's definition as a 
general reference for a better understanding of Latin American countries's process of 
economic shift: 
"The term nontraditional exports is used to describe three distinct 
phenomena. First, an export can be nontraditional because it involves a 
product that has not been produced in a particular country before, such as 
snow peas in Guatemala. A second type of non traditional export is a 
product that was traditionally produced for domestic consumption but is 
now being exported, like various tropical fruits. Finally, the term can refer 
to the development of a new market for a traditional product, such as 
exporting bananas to the Soviet Union". 
Even though most Latin American countries are currently involved in serious attempts at 
increasing nontraditional exports, this process did not start simultaneously throughout the 
region, nor has it been the result of a unifactoral process of evolution. Despite the fact 
that the continent has lost much of its importance as an exporter of food and the 
percentage of exports derived from agriculture has declined, absolute outputs of 
agricultural cash crops and exports continue to rise and new exports are constantly sought 
in the region (Kohlhepp, 1987; Townsend, 1987). 
One important factor that explains this process has been the growing transnationalisation 
of agricultural production in the region. In addition to consolidating its control over the 
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production and external commercialisation of traditional agricultural goods, transnational 
capital has diversified and expanded significantly in both new agricultural and agribusiness 
activities such as: export-led horticultural and fruit production in Mexico and Central 
America (other than bananas) and Chile; the development exports of cut flowers in 
Colombia; the introduction of soya beans in Brazil (increased its exports of soya products 
from a value of US$15 million in 1965 to US$I,644 million in 1979), Argentina, 
Colombia, Guatemala, EI Salvador and Peru; the development of export-oriented poultry 
farms in Colombia, Brazil and Mexico; and meat production in Brazil and Central 
America became clear examples of export-oriented diversification in Latin America's 
primary production, as regards the agricultural sector (Gomes, 1979; Townsend, 1987). 
Therefore, it seems not easy to define clearly the particular moment in which the new 
outward-oriented strategy of development started to be a common feature in most Latin 
American economies (in contrast to the establishment of The Great Depression of 1929 
as the starting point for the inward economic strategy). However, it can be suggested that 
the process began as a result of several contributing factors, such as: urgent needs for 
foreign currency to face the debt problem which had reached truly staggering proportions 
in some countries (specially in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina); the expansion of 
transnational capital in the region (involved not only in production with the latest advances 
of the green revolution, but also ensuring commercialisation in international markets); 
improvement in both internal and international transport systems and a substantial fall in 
transport costs (reducing the frictional effect of geographical distance); development in 
communication systems allowing investors quick decision-making and using information 
received in real time; the role played by military regimes (especially in Chile, Argentina 
and Uruguay) in the restoration of the free operation of the market and the opening of the 
economy to the rest of the world; and last but not least as a result of a demonstration 
effect by trying to emulate other countries' successful experiences as regards 
macroeconomic stability. 
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3.2. Nontraditional Exports in Chile 
Although every particular country could find different factors for explaining the beginning 
of its own nontraditional export-oriented dynamic, the role played in the region 
(principally since the beginning of the external debt crisis in 1982) by the economic 
international organisations -IMP, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank- cannot 
be neglected as the main factor in explaining the latest expansion and generalisation of this 
strategy throughout Latin America, as one of the main components of the structural 
process of economic adjustment (Hojman, 1994). 
In the case of Chile, the shift to an outward oriented strategy of development could be 
evaluated as highly successful, at least from the macroeconomic perspective. This 
statement can be supported by analysing the dramatic changes that the evolution of 
Chilean exports has shown since the 1970s. Since the nitrates crisis of the 1930s, copper 
production became the main source of the country's revenues for more than hal f a century 
(Apey, 1987a). Accounting for 73 per cent of Chilean exports in 1970, copper has started 
to lose pre-eminence as a result of the impressive development of nontraditional exports 
(see Table 3.1). Thus, the share of copper among total exports fell to 41 per cent in 1987 
and to only 36 per cent in 1993, in spite of the fact that copper production has been 
continuously rising from 0.83 million tons in 1975 to 1.42 million tons in 1987 and to 
2.04 million tons in 1993. In contrast, food imports had amounted to over US$500 
million in 1973, but by 1991 the situation was clearly reversed. Primary agricultural 
exports amounted to US$I, 136.9 million and agroindustrial exports (excluding forestry) 
totalled US$464.3 million. Thus, total exports related to agriculture amounted to 
US$1 ,601.2 million in 1991, whilst imports of primary agriculture and agroindustry came 
to US$467.6 million. As a result of that, Chile had a balance of trade 
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Table 3.1 Evolution of Chilean exports, 1971-87 (US$ millions). 
1971 1980 1984 1986 1987 
1. Mining 813.2 2,946.2 2,165.7 2,299.2 2,745.8 
(Copper) 701.8 2,154.8 1,584.4 1,771.0 2,100.5 
2. Agricultural products 29.4 339.9 428.1 683.0 743.0 ! 
(Fresh fruit) 13.4 244.4 291.5 476.8 527.2 I 
3. Manufactured goods 119.6 1,427.3 1,063.4 1,240.1 1,613.2 
(Fish meal) 29.8 233.5 275.7 314.9 358.3 . 
I 
! 
(Frozen/canned fish and shellfish) n.d. 50.8 78.7 106.5 141.3 
(fimber products) 7.0 286.2 116.3 137.4 151.5 
(Paper & Cellulose) 32.0 297.2 259.4 272.4 364.9 
(Chemicals) 11.8 163.2 124.3 119.5 103.2 
(Basic metals) 9.0 147.4 60.5 77.2 87.3 I 
(Metal products) 4.4 63.9 19.5 23.1 26.8 
TOTAL (1 + 2 + 3) 926.2 4,713.4 3,657.2 4,222.3 5,102.0 
Source: Annual External Trade Reports of Chile's Central Bank, quoted from Gwynne, 1990, p.80. 
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surplus ofUS$I, 133.6 million in 1991 (Gwynne, 1994). In general, nontraditional exports 
of agriculture, fishing, manufacturing and forestry products continued to develop after the 
deep 1982-1984 crisis (which created a 14 per cent decline in GOP). Thus, nontraditional 
exports more than doubled between 1984 and 1990 from US$1.67 billion to US$3.83 
billion (Gwynne, 1993a). 
3.2.1. The cases of fruit and forestry products 
Although Chilean fruit exports became relatively significant throughout the 1960s, only in the 
1980s did they start to be an important source of income for the national economy. As can 
be noticed in Table 3.2, export income from fresh fruits increased ten times between 1975 
and 1985, constituting, thus, 84 per cent of total agricultural exports at the end of this period. 
Fresh fruits were from the beginning the main component of the development of 
nontraditional exports in Chile I s agricultural sector. 
Table 3.2 Agricultural and Fruit Exports 
(US$ million of FOB each year) 
Year Agricultural Fresh Fruit Proportion Rate of Growth 
Exports Exports (2):(1) (%) (average per year) 
Agr icul tural Fresh Fruit 
Exports total Exports 
(%) (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1965 15.0 8.8 58.7 - -
1970 22.4 11.8 52.7 8.4 6.0 
1975 59.7 37.8 63.3 21.7 26.2 
1980 244.3 168.7 69.1 32.6 34.9 
1985 436.1 367.5 84.3 12.3 16.8 
Source: Central Bank; I.M., Cruz, 1988. 
This Table grape showed the most dynamic growth among all export fruits. Between 1975 
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and 1988, table grape exports grew by 40 per cent a year (Figure 3.1), constituting 60 
per cent of total fruit exports. In 1977, Chile exported only 36,649 tons of grapes at a 
total value of US$24.9 million. Thirteen years later, tonnage had increased by twelve 
times (to 471,923 tons) and total value by fifteen times in nominal terms (to US$379.3 
million). Grape exports as a percentage of total exports had risen from 1.1 to 4.4 per 
cent (Gwynne, 1990). This showed a very specialised export structure in agriculture, with 
table grapes and apples constituting more than 80 per cent of total agricultural exports in 
1990. This concentrated structure of fruit exports undoubtedly constituted risks for the 
national economy if market uncertainties and price fluctuations at the world scale are 
considered (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Fresh Fruit Exports, 1979-1985. 
Annual rate of growth Behaviour of average prices 
Fruit 
US $ Quantity Nominal prices Real prices 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Table Grapes 30.0 28.8 1.1 -0.5 
Apples 9.5 9.0 0.5 -1.0 
Plums 26.4 35.3 -8.9 -10.4 
Peaches 25.8 16.4 9.4 7.8 
Nectarines 32.9 35.8 -2.9 -4.5 
Pears 8.0 6.9 1.2 -0.4 
Lemons 15.5 4.2 11.3 9.8 
Rest -1.1 -4.7 3.5 2.0 
TOTAL 19.4 16.0 3.4 1.9 
Source: Central Bank Data, quoted from I.M.Cruz, 1988. 
According to Table 3.4, the combination of agricultural, agroindustrial and forestry exports 
became an important in total Chilean exports by reaching US$2,505 million in 1991 (more 
than trebled in value since 1985). Of this latter aggregate agroindustrial exports amounted 
US$I,145 million (45.7 per cent) in 1991, of which US$660.1 million corresponded to 
cellulose and forestry products. Forestry production and exports has developed significantly 
in the country during the last two decades. Accounting for US$39.1 million in 1973 {3.1 per 
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Figure 3.1 Fruit Exports. 1977-93 CUS$mn) 
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Table 3.4 Evolution of Chilean Exports: Agricultural and Forestry Products (1985-1991). 
(US$ thousands) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Total 836,706 1,101,900 1,360,139 1,637,392 1,780,500 2,122,726 2,508,233 
Primary Products 481,920 621,943 711,162 831,467 802,665 1,093,348 1,363,055 
Agriculture 50,834 55,141 39,019 63,923 107,477 86,636 73,369 
Fruit 355,669 476,983 527,401 582,296 552,649 747,484 999,076 
Horticulture 6,525 11,686 19,624 20,367 19,825 28,828 32,441 
Livestock 19,656 30,804 42,284 40,313 30,107 25,310 21,831 
Forestry 49,236 47,329 82,384 124,568 92,607 205,090 236,338 
IndustriaIised 354,786 479,957 648,977 805,925 977,835 1,029,378 1,145,178 
Products 
Agriculture 19,411 25,998 33,889 52,846 68,065 60,973 56.385 
Wine & Alcohol 13,558 16,656 21,667 26,195 37,015 71,899 88.375 
Fruit 28,912 52,409 71,506 77,530 95,594 117,672 187.778 
Horticulture 12,728 18,096 21,991 30,831 67,525 93,808 102.438 
Livestock 11,305 20,576 23,071 32,337 40,373 43,808 50.144 
Forestry 268,872 346,222 476,853 586,186 669,263 641,297 660.058 
Source: Central Bank Data, quoted from ODEPA, 1992. 
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cent of total Chilean exports), forestry exports rose to US$896. 4 million in 1991. 
The development of nontraditional export activities has undoubtedly implied a deep impact 
on land use. As an example, the area covered with forestry and fruits has expanded 
considerably. Between 1973 and 1991, the area planted with fruit trees more than doubled. 
to reach 165.400 hectares (ODEPA, 1992). The Central Valley's (Aconcagua to Curic6) 
share of this total was about 84 per cent (Cruz, M.E. 1993). In parallel, plantations of 
radiata pine (84.5 per cent of forestry plantations) increased from 1 million hectares in 1982 
to 1,31 million hectares in 1991; 67 per cent of the 1982 radiata pine surface was planted 
between 1974 and 1982 (Sanchez, R. 1986). According to World Bank calculations (1986). 
production costs (from the cost of afforestation to the cost of transport to the export 
terminals) for logs of the most important species in Chile, Monterrey pine (Pinus Radiata), 
are only 30 to 50 per cent of the costs of equivalent production locations in the USA and 
Scandinavia countries, which compete directly with Chile in world markets (Messner, 1993). 
This process of productive dynamism has generated deep changes within the national 
agricultural sector. Domestic fruit producers have diversified their business. transnational 
export companies have flourished in the country whilst packing and cooling plants can be 
seen throughout the main productive areas. New agri-business groups (with a new attitude 
to risk, technology and efficiency as regards export production) appeared and started to take 
advantage of the new macro-economic environment: private initiative and export promotion 
were highly encouraged; reductions in tariff protectionism and elimination of non-tariff 
barriers assisted in this process; multiple exchange rates and price controls and the 
commitment to an effective, competitive exchange rate that favoured exporters were 
established; certain subsidies for production were instituted (Decree Law 701) (Barham, 
1994). Furthermore, Pinochet's government early on dismantled the power of organised 
labour. eliminating its capacity to bargain collectively and ensure even the most basic 
workers' rights. Thus. little by little the Chilean countryside began to show deep 
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socio-geographical changes. 
3.3. Socio-geographical Implications of the Norte Chico's Process of Agricultural 
Restructuring 
Although the Norte Chico is not as relevant as the Central Valley in quantitative production 
of nontraditional exports, this macro-region is an interesting subject of socio-geographical 
analysis as regards the impacts of the opening up of the Chilean economy. 
In effect, the incorporation of more than 10 thousand hectares of export-led table grape 
vineyards between 1977 and 1990 in one of the most unproductive and poorest Chilean 
agricultural landscapes (Regions III and IV of the Norte Chico's semi-desertic region), could 
be considered one of the most remarkable socio-geographical responses to the opening up 
of the national economy. The rather homogeneous socio-geographical macro-region of the 
Norte Chico has historically led most of the country's poverty rankings in terms of both 
production and social standards of living (see chapter 2). Although different development 
initiatives have occurred in the area trying to improve social conditions, the combination of 
environmental constraints, the cultural attitude of local people as regards the process of 
capital accumulation, the difficulties in marketing practices, and the scarcity of productive 
capital investment in agriculture, have historically prevented significant success. As a result, 
the Norte Chico has not only been one of the less significant contributors to GDP but also 
one of the less favoured as regards private and public investment (Boisier, 1987). 
However, from the mid-1970s and as a result of the development of the open free-market 
economy, it has been possible to observe an intensive shift in regional agricultural 
production, principally along some of the irrigated valleys. Leading the national process of 
a boom in export-oriented crops, the Norte Chico region reacted rapidly to the different 
measures that the government applied for facilitating the implementation of a development 
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strategy based on the exploitation of comparative advantages. Thus, the Norte Chico's 
historic model of agricultural production where communal land ownership was a traditional 
common feature, started to coexist with an aggressive export-led productive system in the 
region, a system that incorporated new lands and demanded increased inputs of water. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, roughly 25 per cent of the country's export-led table grapes came 
from the Norte Chico valleys. 
The introduction of new productive activities in most of the regional valleys has undoubtedly 
improve the regional process of economic growth. This regional economic growth has been 
also an important component of the economic success at the national level. From the social 
perspective, however, deep changes have also occurred in those areas as a result of the 
regional restructuring process. Changes in the structure of land tenure, labour demand, urban 
dynamics, investment, and other variables, have notably re-directed the socio-productive 
development of these valleys. As regards productive outcomes, there is no doubt that this 
process has created significant improvements in most of these valleys. But from the social 
perspective, the evaluation of the whole process is still a rather controversial matter, very 
much depending on both the selected variables and on the ideological approach considered 
for evaluating development. 
3.3.1. The new regional productive pattern 
As soon as the country started to adopt the open free-market strategy of development the 
Norte Chico region was notably affected by the emergence of two unusual and closely related 
factors: first, new sources of investment flows of trans-regional productive capital and 
technology (notably transnational), and direct functional and productive linkages with new 
international markets. Consequently, both new factors very much interfered with the 
historical pattern of spatial organisation in the region (notably in the valleys), whose main 
output had historically been structured by the influence of the location factors of 
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domestically-oriented agricultural production. 
Suddenly, however, some traditional regional characteristics became attractive advantages 
for facilitating a progressive allocation of significant amounts of capital in three of the five 
Norte Chico valleys (Copiap6, Elqui and Liman'). Thus, the high level of sun radiation and 
spring temperatures in the upper sections of the Norte Chico valleys, availability of cheap 
land and labour in the region permitted the dramatic spread of table-grape vineyards to fulfil 
the counter-seasonal demand of northern hemisphere countries, principally winter-time U.S. 
markets (see Figure 3.2). 
The timing of Norte Chico table-grape production is very important. The climatic 
characteristics of these valleys allow a significant share of the crop to be ready for harvest 
as early as the beginning of November, that is to say, at least one and a half months in 
advance of the Central Valley of the country, whose harvest normally comes between 
January and April. This fact allows Norte Chico's freshly-picked grapes to be marketed in 
the Northern Hemisphere from the beginning of December, profiting thus from the high 
prices of the U.S. Christmas shopping period. At the beginning of the 1980s, prices for 
Copiap6's table-grapes production in U.S markets (8.2 kg. box), varied from US$38 to 
US$20 in less than one month, depending if it was commercialised before or after Christmas. 
According to one of the largest producers of the Limari valley prices decreased substantially 
after the 10th of January. 
If it is considered that the valley's average production is about 2,000 boxes per hectare, it 
can be said that no other crop in the region could have equalled the level of profits that 
vineyard plantations yield by hectare at the beginning of the Chilean export-oriented 
agricultural boom. This aspect undoubtedly became one of the most relevant factors that 
investors in the table grape business considered before choosing the particular place where 
to invest in vineyards. From the very beginning the spread of vineyards throughout the 
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Figure 3.2 Evolution of Table Grape Vineyards 
in the Five Valleys of the Norte Chico, 1977-1987 
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region occurred by both changes in land use (largely in the irrigated agricultural land) and 
by a significant expansion of the agricultural frontier (mainly on marginal newly-irrigated 
dry-lands) (see Table 3.5). In this way, the region started to show socio-geographical change 
as a result of its new operation at a scale of international economic space. 
Table 3.5 Land Use Change in Areas of Table Grape Production 
1965-88 (hectares) 
UPPER COPIAPO* GUATULAME 
LAND USE 1965 1979 1987 1962 1979 1988 
Annual Crops/Pasture 1,343 2,090 718 1,397 1,166 963 
Fruit Trees 73 82 67 10 81 76 
Table Grapes 255 272 3,514 73 129 1,514 
TOTAL 1,671 2,444 4,299 1,480 1,376 2,553 
*This corresponds to the commune of Tierra Amarilla 
Source: Field Work, quoted from Gwynne and Meneses, 1994. 
It is important to bear in mind, however,that in spite of the high level of climatic 
homogeneity of the five Norte Chico valleys and their ability to produce early 
table-grapes, production, there have been significant differences in the pace at which they 
have attracted international and national capital investment into the region. Furthermore, 
according to both direct fieldwork and indirect information on the valleys affected by the 
expansion of export-led table-grape vineyards, there were some minor differences also in 
the way and intensity in which the regional socio-geographical variables reacted to this 
process of agricultural expansion. Consequently, from the organisational perspective both 
inputs (or intervening factors) and outputs (spatial changes) affecting the study area at the 
meso-scale level have been rather the same, though from a structural perspective the 
Norte Chico valleys have been presenting some distinctions. Considering, however, that 
this chapter is primarily oriented to identify potential patterns rather than to deal with the 
peculiarities that the process of agricultural modernisation has been presenting within the 
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area, the following analysis will be principally oriented to give some insights at the 
organisational level. 
Without doubt, the high level of prices that Chilean table-grapes have been reaching in 
international markets became the principal factor for explaining the allocation of productive 
capital in the region. Thus, international demand, acting through prices, evolved into the 
main functional linkage between world markets and the Norte Chico Region. As a result of 
that, the whole socio-geographical dynamic of most of these agricultural valleys has become 
largely dependent on the prices that regional table-grape production cyclically reaches in 
world markets. Thus, markets and prices were (and still are) the main source of explanation 
for the deep changes the region presents They are also the main engine to maintain the new 
socio-productive system in operation. 
Undoubtedly, there are several factors which could be considered important to be analysed 
in order to have a better understanding of the whole process of regional change in the Norte 
Chico valleys. However, three of them have become extremely important as inputs for the 
new regional dynamic: productive capital, land and labour. 
As far as capital is concerned, most of the classical scholars in regional development theory 
-notably Hirschman (1958) and Myrdal (1957), have agreed that the attraction of productive 
capital to peripheral regions has to be considered one of the first problems to overcome (or 
at least to minimize). Inward capital flows can rectify the strongly uneven pattern of 
development that most developing countries present as a result of historically-based 
productive, social, and political influences. Thus, the spatial re-direction of investment flows 
from core to periphery was an important (though unsuccessful) goal advocated for most Latin 
American governments since the mid-1960s (deeply influenced by the Economic Commission 
for Latin America -ECLA). But, in spite of all efforts spent by those countries, the uneven 
development pattern not only remained unchanged but has also worsened. 
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Concerning the other main productive input, labour, it seems important to discuss some 
characteristics of the regional labour force recently engaged in table-grape production. 
Significant criticisms were focused on the agricultural modernisation process from the very 
beginning mainly because the social problems it initiated was one of its outcomes. However, 
official public speeches advocated that the creation of new agricultural employment (as a 
result of the strength of nontraditional exports) needed to be considered as one of the main 
factors for raising the level of regional development. Therefore, the Norte Chico case study 
has provided some useful empirical information for a better understanding of the new 
socio-productive regional dynamic and for the inspiration of potential social policies at both 
local and national level. 
3.2.2. Productive capital 
As soon as the economic strategy changed, productive investment started to flourish in parts 
of the Chilean periphery, even though the State did not have a direct role in the allocation 
of resources. Conversely, the main source of capital has come from the private sector and 
the most affected areas as regards this new spatial division of labour have precisely been the 
historically most dis-advantaged peripheral regions of the country, as in the Norte Chico. 
This is one of the reasons, therefore, why it seems important to have some information on 
both the way in which productive capital has been allocated in the region and the 
effectiveness in raising the level of regional development. 
Because of the large number of elements involved in the process of agricultural change. it 
is extremely difficult to estimate the total amount of capital that the Norte Chico valleys have 
received throughout its productive shift. However, according to field information, the single 
process of setting up a table-grape vineyard amounted nearly US$5,OOO per hectare (only in 
basic inputs) in the mid-1980s. By considering only this single aspect, and taking into 
consideration that in 1990/1991 there were already nearly 12,700 hectares of export-table 
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grape vineyards in the Norte Chico region (ODEPA, 1992), it is possible to estimate the 
basic investment at roughly US$63.5 million. This figure does not include, however, other 
expenses such as the cost of land, and the installation of a drip feeding irrigation system. 
According to Gwynne and Meneses (1994) if these expenses are also included (US$5,OOO per 
hectare of non-irrigated land in 1992) the global investment per hectare rises to about 
US$10,OOO (Riffo, 1993) estimated in US$l1,600 the basic investment for setting up 1 
hectare of export-led table grape in the Limari valley. Although these figures could be 
properly considered representative of the case of nearly 70 per cent of the Norte Chico 
vineyards, there have been exceptions which clearly show the capital interest for expanding 
this attractive business throughout the valleys. 
An illustrative example of this fast territorial process of capital expansion is one of the 
investments made by Alfonso Prohens in the upper section of the Copiap6 river (one of the 
largest and more successful table-grape growers in the Copiap6 valley). He borrowed 
. 
US$2.5 million from Standard Trading Fruit (trademark Dole) to shift the course of the 
Jorquera tributary to the north of the valley; to level and prepare the former river bed and 
valley bottom for cultivation; to dig two deep wells; to plant about 150 hectares of table 
grape vineyards; and to create a small settlement called Aldeano Rodeo with accommodation 
for both permanent and temporary labour (see Figure 3.3). 
Furthermore, private investment in other variables such as rights for irrigation water 
("derechos de agua"), packing and cooling buildings, machinery, labour accommodations, 
have been also significant. On the other hand, a large amount of public expenditure has been 
allocated to the region, mainly for the provision of electricity coverage and transport 
infrastructure (paving roads and port facilities) to assist the progress of domestic transport 
and table grape storage. Thus, whichever the final amount directly or indirectly invested in 
the Norte Chico for growing its principal nontraditional export, it certainly became the most 
significant flow of investment ever allocated in the agricultural sector of this region 1990b) 
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Figure 3.3 Land use in the Upper Copiapo. 1970 and 1990. 
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(Apey, 1990b). It was especially important if it is considered that this occurred in one of the 
most disadvantageous environmental regions of the country and throughout one of the more 
critical periods of the country's foreign debt. 
3.3.2a Sources of investment 
The main sources of productive investment came to the region from both domestic and 
transnational capital traditionally linked to fruit production. In the agricultural season of 
1989/90 Chilean exports of table grapes accounted 63,767,367 boxes, of which 49.6 per cent 
were exported by five enterprises (David del Curto, Standard Trading-Dole, United Trading 
Co., Unifrutti Traders, and Frupac S.A.). In the Norte Chico, at the end of the 1980s, more 
than 50 per cent of exports were commercialised by these same five enterprises. Only in the 
Copiap6 valley (4,292 hectares and 3,126,174 boxes) exports accounted for slightly more 
than US$30 million in 1988. 
Trans-regional capital (domestic and foreign), however, does not get directly involved in the 
whole process of fruit production but acts in an indirect way. These export fruit companies 
look for producers and establish a contract with them in which the whole process of 
production is clearly divided: the grower contributes with land and labour whilst companies 
provide the initial and subsequent flows of credits for setting up and running the productive 
rotation of the vineyards. They also supply the complete technological package for 
production and packing; give technical advice; and finally ship, transport and commercialise 
production in overseas markets. After some months (Julyl August) the company pays the 
producers in accordance with the obtained price minus all the costs of inputs received from 
the company for production, the agreed mortgage and the commission that the company 
charges for their services (between 8 and 10 per cent). Often producers get indebted with 
these companies. 
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At the beginning of the productive boom in both the Copiap6 and Limari valleys (notably 
in Copiap6), most of the investors in export-led table grape came not only from the 
agricultural sector. They came also from regional and inter-regional urban business and 
mining entrepreneurs living in the region's largest cities (Ovalle, La Serena and Copiap6) 
or in the central region of the country. 
Fruit production has turned into a highly sophisticated technical process requiring substantial 
capital investment and know-how. Growers who have been able to acquire the necessary 
capital and have invested in the latest technologies have managed to obtain yields as high as 
their counterparts in the United State and Europe. Not surprisingly, these managerial 
requirements have tended to exclude smallholders, few of whom have enjoyed the same 
success as some large landowners and urban and foreign investors (Rivera, 1988 and 
Echeiiique 1989; quoted by Barham, 1992), though, as soon as the productive process 
showed its profitability, some few medium-size regional agricultural producers have started 
to get involved in production. This local process of agricultural change very much endorses 
the diffusion of innovation through time presented by Rogers (1962 quoted by Ilbery, 1985), 
and the main characteristics of agricultural innovators by category of farmers presented by 
Jones, 1975 quoted by the same author). In the Norte Chico region, however, this process 
of diffusion of innovation has not reached the smallholders, so far. 
3.3.2b Factors affecting investment in export vineyards in the Norte Chico 
'~.", 
An additional interesting aspect to be considered in the Norte Chico as regards the process 
of capital expansion is the contrasting speed in which vineyards expanded through the five 
valleys. As was observed in Figure 3.2, both the Huasco and Choapa valleys showed a rather 
limited development in export-led vineyards. As all these valleys present similar climatic 
advantages to grow the crop, it seems important to give some insights as 
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Figure 3.4 Norte Chico: Ranking of Factors Affecting Investment in Export - Grape 
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to some of the reasons which could explain such a different pace. According to a direct two 
round survey conducted with the production managers of the 13 top fruit-export companies 
investing in export-led table grape production in the Norte Chico valleys, there was a high 
level of homogeneity in the way they defined and ranked the factors taken into consideration 
for the allocation of productive resources in the area (Rosales, 1990) 
As a result of the weight that the interviewed people gave to the different variables, the 
ranking shows clearly the relevance that external factors to the region present in influencing 
the allocation of capital in the Norte Chico. This is not strange since the other factors have 
played an unchanged role for a significant period of time. The role of new government 
macroeconomic policies (strongly encouraging nontraditional exports), in which the new 
Labour Code was important for neutralising potential pressures from workers, was repeatedly 
considered as the main factor for starting business in the region. 
A similar approach could be used for interpreting the weight played by the regional internal 
factors. The three most important factors (climatic conditions, water availability, and 
geomorphology) have been historically part of all five Norte Chico valleys (water availability 
is even larger in the non reactive areas). As far as the following variables is concerned, 
however, significant differences start to appear if all five valleys are compared: 
a) The lack of minimum standards in feeder roads in the Huasco and Choapa valleys make 
it extremely difficult for access to the upper valley areas where climatic conditions would 
permit earlier vineyard production. Export companies do not take the risk of losing 
production quality as a result of difficult internal transport along poor unpaved roads. 
b) According to the companies, one of the most important factors taken into consideration 
for selecting the allocation of productive resources in the valleys was a combination of 
two regional features: the size of the plots and ownership of land. Due to the fact that 
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a minimum size of plot is required for making grape production attractive to export 
companies (not only for obtaining economies of scale but also for providing a minimum 
income to local producers with a positive attitude to allocate capital risk). they preferred 
to start business with larger producers. In this regard. the Choapa and Huasco valleys 
show again some disadvantages -if they are compared with the others. since they have 
the smallest average in plot size in the Norte Chico region because of a generalised 
minifundia, especially in the upper sections (2.8 hectares and 6.2 hectares respectively). 
These figures are significantly different to the 43.2 hectares that the Copiap6 valley has 
as a size average and to the 9.3 hectares of the Limari (Apey. 1990b). 
c) A large number of small plots in both the Choapa and Huasco valleys present problems 
of land titles. This fact very much prevented the possibility of qualifying for credits as 
regards these small- and medium-scale landowners, because they could not use the land 
as a guarantee. Moreover. this circumstance was also an active barrier for a potential 
enlargement of the size of plots through the land market. This restriction has been 
especially important in the Choapa and Huasco valley and in the first stages of 
development of the Limari (before some agricultural communities were subdivided and 
sold or rented, allowing a fast expansion of investment in vineyards in previously 
non-irrigated areas). 
3.3.2c Productive capital: final remarks 
The most significant flows of productive capital invested in the table-grape business in the 
Norte Chico valleys came from trans-regional and transnational investors. Moreover, they 
have been currently participating in a rather indirect way in the whole process since they 
have very seldom become involved in the productive stage. By doing that, exports companies 
have been able to minimize as much as possible all the risks involved in potential market 
crises, and because they do not own land they can potentially behave in accordance with the 
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high level of spatial mobility characteristic of transnational capital. Thus, in long-term 
perspective most of the risks seems to be inevitably transferred to local producers. 
An additional aspect to be considered, especially by the new democratic governments, is the 
high weighting that the previous military regime's macroeconomic and labour policies had 
as a factor for allocating investment in the Norte Chico valleys. An intensive negotiation 
process between the government and the main sources of foreign investment seems important 
to be done in order to maintain a balance between the interest of export companies for 
maintaining investment throughout the country and all the changes in legislation (notably in 
the Labour Code) that the democratic government offered as regards improvements in social 
conditions. A long term agreement in this regard appeared to be a major pre-condition in 
order to allow a long term sustainability to the development of the country's nontraditional 
export process. 
Furthermore, if the government has intentions to continue with the expansion of 
nontraditional exports within a more equitable social approach some policies need to be 
identified in order to achieve both the expansion of export-led vineyards in the two laggard 
valleys (Huasco and Choapa), and the incorporation of the smaller agricultural producers into 
the export track. In relation to this point, the information provided by export companies -as 
explanation of their differential interest in allocating investment among these valleys, could 
be used as a source of information for inspiring public action. 
As an example, improvement in public infrastructure (particularly in roads and electricity) 
could facilitate the participation of these valleys in some of the benefits linked not only with 
transnational markets but also with larger domestic ones. Furthermore, to help the 
organisation of small producers in cooperatives (as has been a long tradition in these valleys 
for pisco vine production) could potentially overcome some productive constraints linked to 
small-size plots. Thus, the achievement of collective economies of scale resulted from 
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aggregating larger levels of production could allow smallholders to increase productivity, 
increase their bargaining power with export companies, and to gain a better standard of 
living. The case of Taiwanese agriculture (developed on a private basis) could be used as a 
successful example on this. With an average of one hectare per family, Taiwanese farmers. 
became very competitive in some crops (mainly in horticulture) as a result of cooperative 
practises in both production and commercialisation. Both regional and local governments and 
some NGOs such as JUNDEP which has had a significant role pursuing social development 
mainly in the Choapa basin could playa relevant function in the near future by changing the 
pattern in which export activities have been developed almost exclusively by a small 
agribusiness elite (Cruz, 1988). 
3.3.3. The agricultural land market 
The spectacular rise in export-oriented agricultural production has implied significant 
demands for land. This requirement (as was previously illustrated) has been fulfilled in the 
region through two main processes: expansion of the agricultural frontier along formerly 
uncultivated land on cones and in ravines adjacent to the rivers; and by an active agricultural 
land-market in which changes in the use of land have been a subsequent related output. Thus, 
in addition to the flow of financial capital to the region the availability of land became an 
other relevant input for the expansion of table-grape production in the Norte Chico. In 
general terms, the provision of land for table-grape business was a duty to be carried out by 
domestic producers. 
Whereas most of the previously uncultivated land currently devoted to export-led table grapes 
was owned by the state (notably in the Copiap6 River), its transfer process to private 
agribusiness entrepreneurs was rather fluid, through direct purchase, auction or even as a 
gift. As an indication, between 1981 and 1988. 1,538 hectares of public land were 
transferred to the private sector in the Copiap6 valley. out of which nearly 951 hectares was 
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obtained by only one company -CODELPA, previously mining company which wanted to 
diversify into export-led agricultural production. 
The majority of the land devoted to export vineyards, however, came as a result of a 
relatively fast development of a land market. The supply of land came from: small-sized 
farms derived from agrarian reform; private property that survived the agrarian reform; 
agricultural communities; and schemes of agricultural colonisation (Gwynne and Meneses, 
1994). The following analysis, therefore, has been oriented to give some insights as to the 
main processes which have characterised the land market in permitting the fast expansion of 
table-grape plantations in both the Copiap6 and Limari valleys. 
3.3.3a Land markets in the upper Copiap6 Valley 
Although land in this area was historically considered unsuitable for agricultural production, 
there were a number of small plots devoted to supply horticultural products. As soon as the 
export boom started, however, this geographical landscape became one of the most attractive 
productive zones within the country with respect to its potential link to overseas markets. 
Accordingly, as a result of the growing interest that external capital showed for investing in 
the area, domestic producers started an aggressive search for land along the valley in order 
to become involved in this new business. Thus, in about a decade more than 95 per cent of 
land use was devoted to export-led table grape production. 
According to Meneses (1990), the main sources of land devoted to export vineyards in the 
Copiap6 Valley were: 1,529 hectares transferred from public land and 1,068 hectares 
obtained from small-sized farms that were previously used for horticultural production. The 
public land was purchased through 38 land titles ("asignaciones de propiedad fiscal") of 
which 22 (1,067 hectares) went to 3 producers: CODELPA, Prohens and Agricola 
Chaiiarcillo. The remaining 463 hectares went to different smaller producers. 
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With respect to the land coming from small-scale producers living in the surrounding areas 
of Nantoco, Amolanas, Hornitos and 10tabeche (1,296 hectares grouped in 57 plot), 44 
properties (1,068 hectares) were bought by the largest producers. Thus, by 1989, 82 per cent 
of the land owned by small-scale peasants was transferred to the larger export-led producers. 
According to information provided by local sources (members of the police force and 
teachers), these plots were rapidly sold at low prices at the beginning of the productive 
boom. Two main reasons were given for explaining the rapid development of a land market: 
large indebtedness of these peasants with private banks; and restrictions in their access to 
INDAP credits which could have been used in order to increase land productivity. As a 
result of this, for most of these small-scale producers the opportunity for selling their land 
was perceived as a good way of tackling short-term financial problems. Most of these 
families migrated to either Copiap6 or Tierra Amarilla, the largest urban centres of the 
valley, even though two of them were hired as permanent workers on the land they 
previous-owned. 
It is interesting to note that after the initial purchasing of and investment in vineyards in the 
valley, there were practically no further transactions of land among producers, at least until 
the early 1990s. The business proved so profitable that no producer wished to sell their land. 
3.3.3b Land market in the Limari Valley (the Guatulame section) 
The active development of a land market in this valley, the largest Norte Chico valley 
producing export-led table grapes, has been dominated by two main processes: 
a) changes in the property of private land small-sized farms derived from agrarian reform 
and larger properties which survived the process of land redistribution. 
79 
b) purchases of irrigated and non-irrigated communal land owned by the agricultural 
communities of the Norte Chico. 
Whilst the former process was dominant in the northern section of the Guatulame tributary 
(El Palqui area), the latter was principally carried out further south in the area surrounding 
Chanaral Alto. Both areas contributed more than 80 per cent of the Limari Valley's total 
grape production in 1990. It is worth mentioning that in this area of the Limari valley land 
under table grapes increased by a factor of twelve between 1979 and 1988 (Gwynne and 
Meneses, 1994). 
a) Market of private lands in the El Palqui area 
According to information provided by the "Income Tax Office" ("Oficina de Impuestos 
Internos"), total private land in the EI Palqui area amounted to 4,100.64 hectares in 1990. 
Half of this surface (2,016.98 ha) corresponded to land unaffected by the process of agrarian 
reform, and the remaining 2,083.66 ha comprised 1,055.23 of communal-land ("bienes 
comunes") and 1,028.43 ha of small-sized plots; both resulted from the agrarian reform. 
i) Land which survived the process of land reform: In this category export-led vineyards 
increased between 1980 and 1990 from 1,663.50 ha (initially distributed in ten properties) 
to 2,016.98 ha (distributed in 33 properties). This extra amount of land came from the 
incorporation, by the main owners, of previously non-irrigated sectors of the area. 
Although there has been no significant changes in land ownership (only one estate was 
sold during the period) the additional number of properties was the result of the partial 
fragmentation of one of these ten estates in a number of smaller plots. The main purpose 
of this was the creation of a company shared between the owner of the land and its 
workers ("Sociedad Las Represas). 
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By 1990, however, 33 per cent of the surface covered by these properties was purchased by 
the other larger producers of the surrounding area of El Palqui (notably by the 
Prohens'"Sociedad Agricola del Palqui" and Santa Maria). As a result of land market, the 
surface in this category under export-led vineyards increased by 21.2 per cent between 1980 
and 1990. The size of these properties devoted to table grape is rather heterogeneous (Table 
3.6), 5 producers owned 59.9 per cent of this land (Riffo, 1992). 
Table 3.6 Guatulame Valley: Distribution by size of non-reformed land under export-led 
table grapes, 1990 (ha) 
No of Plots Size (ha) Total Surface Area (ha) Average 
9 > 0 - < 4 24.26 2.7 has 
7 ~ 4 - < 12 66.72 9.5 has 
9 ~ 12 - < 50 299.24 33.2 has 
2 ~ 50 - < 100 116.50 58.3 has 
6 ~ 100 1,510.26 228.0 has 
Total 33 2,016.98 61.12 
Source: Adapted from Riffo, 1992 
Thus, as in the case of the Copiap6 Valley, the largest estates devoted to grow export-led 
table grapes have not sold land. However, relatively small-scale farmers have experienced 
pressures to sell their lands. 
ii) Land affected by Agrarian Reform: As a result of the expropriation of 5 large estates in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were 2,310.25 hectares in 1980 affected by the 
Agrarian Reform Programme. This surface was sub-divided into two components: 
1,677.72 ha of communal-owned lands (7 communal properties and 2 agricultural 
cooperatives) and 632, 53 ha of private land (77 productive plots and 14 smaller plots 
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for housing purposes). In 1990, 68 additional productive plots were transferred to peasant 
owners as a result of a partial sub-division of the communally-owned lands. In this way, 
total land under peasant ownership increased by 62 per cent. 
Between 1980 and 1990, however, 35 plots out of the initial 77 plots transferred to the local 
beneficiaries of the agrarian-reform were purchased by table-grape producers and local, 
national, and international marketing companies. Furthermore, even though there is no 
detailed information on the destiny of the 68 plots assigned after 1990, 5 properties were 
purchased during the first year by one of the export-agricultural companies (Tracy). By 
1992, four companies had purchased 40 plots and had come to dominate nearly a quarter of 
the land previously assigned to present farmers by the state through the agrarian-reform 
process (Riffo, 1992). 
In aggregate terms, therefore, 9 export companies (though there are some common owners 
of these companies) have come to dominate nearly 82 per cent of the land devoted to grow 
table grapes for export. 
b) Market of the communallands (agricultural communities) 
In contrast to the northern lands of the Guatulame Valley (El Palqui sector) practically the 
whole southern area which has become devoted to export-led vineyards was communally 
owned by 9 different agricultural communities (Figure 3.5). 
These lands were registered as communal properties at least since the creation of the "Keeper 
of Land Ownership" ("Conservador de Bienes Raices") in 1857 (Silva 1993) and were not 
directly affected by the agrarian-reform process. However, the military regime passed 
Decree Law No 108 in 1978 which allowed members of an agricultural community to 
dispose of their land-ownership rights to people who where not members of the community. 
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In spite of the fact that most of these lands were not as attractive in productive terms as 
those established in the agricultural area of EI Palqui (mainly due to the larger investment 
required for levelling and irrigation) they have become rather valuable because of 
micro-climatological features. The narrowness of the valley and the better levels of solar 
radiation do permit grapes to be ready for harvesting from the first two weeks of November; 
that is to say as earlier as the Copiap6's first harvest (the first in the country's 
export-season) . 
The agricultural communities of Chacarillas and Las Tapias (the only ones which had 
regularised land ownership by 1992) were the first to start the subdivision of their communal 
lands. In 1984, there were 206 community members in Chacarillas in a position to transfer 
their land-rights ("derechos") to non-community members. By 1992, 126 "derechos" had 
changed hands mainly benefiting commercial farmers. Although no individual was permitted 
to own more than ten "derechos", J. Prohens (the largest of the table-grape producers in the 
valley) managed to purchase 19 of them. He circumvented this restriction by buying up 
further land in the maiden name of his wife. In this way, the Prohens export-company had 
bought 27 "derechos between 1985 and 1988, notionally equivalent to about 54 hectares. 
Furthermore, three other large farming groups specialising in table grape production have 
purchased a significant number of "derechos" in the former communal land of Chacarillas; 
the Zepeda, MacPherson and Chac6n Mosjos families. They altogether managed to buy 28 
further "derechos" comprising a total amount of 56 hectares. 
In parallel, in Las Tapias -the smallest agricultural community of the Guatulame river (840 
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Figure 3.5 Agricultural Communities in the River Limari CGuatulame). 
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(Source Gwynne and Meneses. 1994) 
hectares comprising 35 "derechos"), 16 "derechos" had been purchased by commercial 
farmers by 1992, 12 of which went to enlarge the Prohens' agricultural society (Gwynne and 
Meneses, 1994). 
As it can be observed, the land market has developed intensely in those two communities 
which have regularised their ownership land-rights. Since the process of sub-division in the 
remaining agricultural communities is under progress, however, further processes of land 
transfer are expected to occurred in the near future in the Guatulame section along the 
Limarf valley. It has been estimated that around 30 per cent of community members in the 
Coquimbo region have registered land titles within the communities (see Table 3.7). 
Undoubtedly, this land-market has been very much linked to the rapid expansion of land 
under the table grape and with a subsequent process of economic growth in the area. 
Although in terms of economic efficiency there are large contrasts between the new 
productive use of these lands and the historical ones there are a number of social effects that 
have to be taken into consideration. 
Table 3.7 Agricultural communities in the Guatulame Valley, 1984. 
Agricultural Members with Size 
Community Rights (Hectares) 
EITome 106 2,487 
Atunhuaico 24 4,431 
Jara 0 Laja 82 5,010 
EI Potrero 36 2,904 
Las Cardas 93 2,624 
Las Tapias 35 840 
Los Morales 89 2,250 
Chacarillas 216 2,542 
Castillo 196 7,406 
TOTAL 877 30,494 
Source: Avendano, S (1986), quoted from Gwynne and Meneses, 1994. 
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In communities that have not regularised, land markets are much less dynamic. Here, a large 
number of migrants often keep their titles in the community alive through entering share 
cropping agreements ("medieros" in both crops and/or livestock) or other types of informal 
contract with both resident members and non-members. In addition, migrants who become 
unemployed outside the region may wish to return temporarily to their community of origin 
which they consider to act as a source of employment of last resort. If all else fails, their 
membership rights allow them an entitlement to a small plot of irrigated and unirrigated land 
for subsistent cultivation and to graze a few goats on common pasture until external labour 
opportunities improve. Furthermore, many temporary migrants from these communities 
return to them at retirement age. This allows them to benefit from the lower costs of living 
in rural areas once they become dependent on a fixed pension. These processes of land 
transfer have significantly weakened the agricultural communities as a political organisation 
due to the increasing proportion of new external members (Scott, 1993). 
Therefore, the evolution of the land market in the agricultural communities has implied a 
process in which poor lands have been transferred towards more productive and efficient 
agricultural producers. In addition, a number of irreversible social impacts have occurred 
within one of the poorest segments of the country's population. 
Furthermore, it can be also concluded that the land reform programme, at least in the region, 
did little to help peasants farmers to establish stronger linkages with both their lands and with 
the different agricultural markets. Although not all of them had the possibilities for engaging 
in export-led activities (see factors considered by the export companies to allocate productive 
investment) the growing regional specialisation in export crops has resulted in rising prices 
for domestic agricultural products in the Norte Chico (Apey, 1990b). However, large 
indebtedness with both INDAP and commercial banks in addition to the lack of state support 
for increasing technical and productive efficiency very much prevented these peasants 
farmers from developing longer-terms linkages with their lands and benefiting from these 
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new markets opportunities. However, most of them continued being partially linked with 
agricultural production but through the emerging labour market -paradoxically, with some 
of them working on their previously-owned land. 
3.3.4. The Labour force 
The role of labour needs to be considered as another relevant factor in permitting the 
expansion of export-led vineyards in the Chilean countryside. Table- grape growers have 
been substantially profiting from the direct and indirect benefits related to the particular 
conditions that have affected Chilean agricultural labour since the very beginning of the 
process of sectoral transformation. 
The significantly lower costs of Chilean labour engaged in table-grape production (10 and 
8 times lower than the French and Californian ones respectively), have been an important 
factor in permitting the fast spread of export vineyards in Chile. Moreover, the suppression 
of relevant labour rights has diminished potential pressures which could have jeopardised the 
whole productive process, given the strict schedules and requirements that this export activity 
demands throughout its different stages (production, packing, domestic transport and 
shipment). Thus, the relative low cost of labour within the productive cycle and the legal 
constraints concerning labour claims could not be neglected as a significant additional 
advantage to the climatic ones in explaining the Norte Chico's table grape competitiveness 
in export markets and in international competition. 
3.3.4a Requirements of labour for export table grape production 
The demand for labour to fulfil the different requirements that table grape production 
presents has proved to be highly seasonal, and the relationship between the maximum and 
minimum demand is close to ten to one (Apey, 1989). In effect, according to the information 
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supplied by CODELPA (the second largest table grape producer in the Copiapo valley in 
1989), the demand for labour varies in accordance with the stages that the productive cycle 
of the table grape presents. Accordingly, one representative example is presented in Figure 
3.6 which shows the monthly variation in labour demand taking as a reference one of the 
most representative productive cases in the upper-Copiapo valley: The Amolana system, 
comprising 140 hectares of Sultanina grape). 
However, a more precise and representative estimation of labour demand in both the Copiapo 
and Limari valleys is presented in Table 3.8, resulting from a direct survey of producers 
which covers 35 per cent of total land devoted to export-led vineyards in both valleys (Apey 
and Barriga, 1990). 
As can be noticed, both valleys present significant similarities in the demand for labour to 
fulfil the productive cycle of export-led vineyards. Some small differences can be found, 
however, in the higher value of people permanently hired in the Limari valley. The main 
reason given by producers for explaining such a difference is the higher availability of rural 
labour in the Limarf valley compared to that of the Copiapo. Most of the expansion of 
vineyards in the Limari valley occurred principally through changes in the use of land 
previously devoted to small-scale horticultural crops (Meneses, 1990). Thus, the relatively 
high availability of local labour in the Limari valley resulted from a significant process of 
proletarianisation of former small-scale agricultural producers (due to changes in the local 
land market). This meant that labour in the Limari was at least 20 per cent cheaper than in 
the Copiapo. 
In this last valley, labour was more scarce than in the Limari due to the fact that most of the 
vineyards expanded in unpopulated areas (an expansion of the agricultural frontier). There, 
agricultural labour was historically scarce, even considering the high level of unemployment 
that the valley presented in the mid 1980s. This was because of the price crises that affected 
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Figure 3.6 Monthly Labour Demand for Export-Grape Activities in the Norte Chico. 
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Table 3.8 Labour Demand per Hectare According to Different Activities in The Productive 
Process of Export-Led Vineyards; Copiapo and Limari Valleys. 
Valley Permanent Pruning Harvest Max/Min 
Copiapo 0.3 0.9 2.6 1:9 
Limari 0.6 0.8 2.6 1:4 
Source: Direct survey by author, 1989. 
small- and medium-scale copper mining activities in the Norte Chico. As CODELPA's 
managing director said (1989), "Copiapo's labour was not culturally prepared nor interested 
to work in vineyards since they largely preferred to enjoy the freedom associated with 
independent small-scale mining activities". 
Consequently, most of the valley's producer preferred to hire agricultural labour from the 
central region (principally from Aconcagua, more than 700 kilometres south) as a 
consequence of the higher skill they presented for dealing with the different requirements that 
table-grape production demands. As a matter of fact, the same CODELPA source declared 
that they had compared the productivity in harvesting shown by both Copiapo and 
Aconcagua's labour working in their vineyards. Aconcagua labour showed a level of 
efficiency almost 50 per cent higher than that of the Copiapo (32 boxes/day and 18 
boxes/day respectively). This was one of the principal reasons in explaining why nearly 80 
per cent of agricultural labour working in Copiapo's export-led vineyards in 1989 came from 
outside the valley. 
Furthermore, due to the low levels of population and housing facilities that the Copiap6 
valley had in the areas of vineyard expansion (only 1,500 inhabitants where 55 per cent of 
vineyards were planted) vineyards which were more than 80 kilometres away from Copiap6 
city needed to be settled by a permanent labour force close to the place of production. 
Conversely, the resettling of labour by producers was not necessary in the other Norte Chico 
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valleys, since most vineyard expansion occurred throughout previously populated rural areas, 
where permanent workers did not have a problem for commuting on a daily basis. 
Undoubtedly, this was another important argument for explaining the higher cost of 
agricultural labour in the Copiap6 valley and the more intense use of technology for 
substituting permanent labour in that valley compared to the Limari (Apey, 1989). 
Concerning pruning and harvesting, both activities are highly-labour intensive. The extreme 
care that production requires in all stages from pruning to packing, in paral1el to the high 
productive standards required for satisfying final demand, has shown that specialised labour 
has become more efficient than the technology available for handling both plants and grapes. 
This aspect, in addition to the level of efficiency which table grape production has reached 
in the Norte Chico (as regards the most efficient combination of productive factors) has 
implied that the pattern of labour requirements for pruning and harvesting became practical1y 
the same in both the Copiap6 and Limari valleys. 
3.3.4b Some impacts from the cycle of labour in export table grape production 
As a result of the fast spread of new export-led vineyards in the area the dynamic of local 
population has been significantly affected by the new pattern of labour demand. 
The high level of seasonality shown by the demand for labour (concentrated in one peak of 
less than two months) has become particularly important as regards the Norte Chico's 
historical trends. In an estimation of labour demand for export-led table grape production, 
taking as a reference the information presented in Table 3.9, it is possible to roughly identify 
the number of people cyclically engaged during the most representative productive activities 
. in both valleys. 
Different important impacts can be seen in both valleys as a result of this particular 
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distribution of labour opportunities concerning table grape production: 
Table 3.9 Seasonal Estimate of Labour Demand in Export-led Vineyards (days worked per 
hectares under crop). Copiap6 and Limari Valleys. 1990. 
Valley Permanent Pruning Harvest 
Copiap6 1,232 4,004 11,254 
Limari 992 1,008 4,192 
Source: Direct survey by the author; 1989. 
a. The emergence and predominance of temporary labour (the "temporeros"): 
Despite some quantitative differences between valleys in labour demand, there exist in 
both a significant deficit between supply and demand during the harvest peak (Apey, 
1990b; Gwynne and Meneses, 1994). However, though most of the producers used to 
hire in advance the required additional labour, a large number of people is attracted by 
work expectations from the whole country (most notably from the Aconcagua valley). 
Thus, an enormous social pressure has started to alter the historical way of life of the 
small valley's villages from October to January. To give an example, the police force of 
the highest section of the Copiap6 valley surveyed 6,000 temporary people from outside 
the valley in the period October 1988-February 1989 in an area where the traditional 
local population normally totalled 1,500 inhabitants (this was the jurisdictional area of 
Villa Maria-frontera). This temporary population dynamic in the Copiap6 valley has 
undoubtedly implied dramatic pressures upon accommodation and services throughout the 
mentioned period, in an area in which export-led vineyards prevail on more than 95 per 
cent of the agricultural land use. 
b. Temporal concentration of local income and significant financial exodus from the 
productive areas. 
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According to direct surveys applied to local people in the Guatulame area of the Limari 
valley (Apey and Ortiz, 1988; Ortiz, 1990), the expansion of monocultural production has 
resulted in a seasonal concentration of local income and expenditure within about four 
months. In contrast to the previous pattern of horticultural and fruit production (in which 
several crops existed throughout the year), local income from vineyard production presents 
a similar degree of concentration to that shown in Figure 3.6. As a result of that, local 
income becomes scarce from February to October affecting the income of local families 
during that period (particularly those working in temporary labour). In addition, there are 
financial problems for most small-scale activities oriented to provide goods and services 
throughout their local hinterlands. 
Furthermore, local people showed dissatisfaction because, despite the labour opportunities 
at the end of the year, a large portion of the agricultural income is not spent in the area of 
production. It flows elsewhere together with the external seasonal workers ("temporeros"). 
c. Social impacts in the villages: 
According to the head of the public school of Guatulame village (personal interview), the 
high concentration of people in the area during the period of maximum labour demand has 
severely affected the valleys. Social problems, such as generalised school absences at the end 
of the year (children become attracted to getting some income from vineyard activities), 
massive levels of alcohol and drug consumption, mobile prostitution, high rates of adolescent 
pregnancies, have emerged. 
An interesting point to be considered has been the growing involvement of female labour in 
some of the different stages of table-grape production for export, notably in packing. This 
provides additional family incomes (ARANDA, 1993 for more details). However, there are 
fears regarding the lack in facilities they have to take care of their children whilst they are 
working. Sources related to local government in both the Copiap6 and Limari valleys, have 
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warned that children are becoming progressively semi-abandoned for long daily periods in 
their homes (Apey and Ortiz, 1989). 
The impact on local labour that the expansion in export activities has caused is complex. 
There is no doubt that labour opportunities have increased and provided an important source 
of new resources for people who have historically been living in poverty in both valleys. 
Moreover, this process has also benefited agricultural labour from outside the region. Labour 
commutes periodically through the year to areas in accordance with the requirements 
presented by stages of table-grape production. 
Conversely, the relative quiet pace in which these areas had been historically evolving has 
changed. The aggressive introduction of new socio-productive patterns as a result of the strict 
standards imposed by export-oriented businesses have induced a dramatic process of change 
in these valleys. This should necessarily be taken into account in further research and policy 
implementation. As an example, features related to the inflexibilities of the Labour Code and 
those associated with the emerging social pattern at the local level affecting both temporary 
and permanent labour. 
3.4. Concluding Remarks on the Norte Chico's Geographical Process of Change 
There is no doubt that the opening up of the Chilean economy has started to promote deep 
changes in the region of the Norte Chico. However, the deepest impacts has occurred in 
those areas where new productive capital has been provided by both trans-national and 
domestic investment, though a wider hinterland has also been very much affected. Thus, the 
upper Copiap6 valley and the Guatulame tributary of the Limari valley have become the 
central zones of a significant regional process of economic growth by producing a quarter 
of the country's total exports of table grape. This process of regional economic evolution has 
been principally triggered by private initiative and with little participation of direct state 
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intervention in the area. However, macro-economic policies, subsidies and reforms in the 
Labour Code have been important contributions for allowing productive capital to flow into 
this particular region (as well as into other areas of the country). 
From the beginning of this process of regional economic links with world markets, different 
spatial changes have transformed the historical patterns of the Norte Chico. The arrival of 
significant investments for shifting the use of land towards export-led crops; the profound 
changes in the ownership of local land, and the new trends in labour demand have become 
crucial factors for fuelling the regional process of socio-productive restructuring. 
As far as the social dynamic is concerned, however, the benefits resulting from this 
productive shift are still rather unclear. As an example, there is no doubt that the emergence 
of new productive activities has promoted new working opportunities within the region. This 
has meant an interesting new source of income for people living in an area where labour 
alternatives have been historically scarce. Moreover, specialised labour from outside the 
valleys have also been benefiting as a result of the agricultural export boom. However, for 
those people unable to become involved on a permanent basis, benefits are more unclear. For 
those living in villages and medium-sized towns in the surroundings of the productive areas 
(such as Monte Patria, Ovalle, Copiap6 and Vallenar), working in vineyards during peak 
periods has produced a periodic source of additional income which supplements urban wages. 
But for the others, especially those who sold their lands, incomes from these new labour 
opportunities has become mainly restricted to a few months. 
Unfortunately, the process of agricultural change has failed to incorporate the small- and 
medium-sized peasants to the direct benefits of export business. This has not only meant that 
they remain marginalised in the agricultural modernisation process but also that a a 
significant number of peasants have been deprived of their properties as a result of an active 
land market. 
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As regards a more aggregate evaluation of regional trends, the current process of 
socio-economic transformation is still in its early stages for permitting a judgement on the 
balance between economic benefits and social costs resulting from this experience. Since 
most of the re-investment flows are still being allocated in the expansion of vineyards in the 
region there is not enough evidence on the establishment of further backward or forward 
productive linkages, between export surplus and new intersectoral activities, which could 
revitalise and diversify the rather specialised regional economic base. In this way, these areas 
could finally evolve from a "new economic zone" to a more sustainable "development zone" 
where both inter-regional and intra-regional factors could be mutually linked (Sklair, 1987). 
At least this alternative could promote better expectations for the creation of new productive 
activities and jobs, especially for all those people who have been affected by the 
establishment of this new productive pattern in both the Copiap6 and Limari valleys. 
In this way, the government cannot continue being as absent as it was in the past. At least 
the promotion of export activities has proved that a number of social changes has occurred 
in the region which needs to be more closely monitored. The shift in the location of the local 
population has very much changed the demand for services such as public schools, health 
facilities and other infrastructure. Improvement in road quality and transport facilities for 
movement of both production and population have become determinants for allowing for 
more flexible development. Thus, the former spatial pattern developed in conjunction with 
the inward-oriented system of production needs to be realigned in order to be more 
functional with the newly emerging pattern derived from outward orientation. 
Furthermore, the government has declared its intention for moving to a second stage 
concerning the promotion of primary export products in which it is not just a rather limited 
agribusiness elite that benefits. In this respect, and at least in the Norte Chico, there is still 
a large amount of potentially attractive land for export-led activities to be developed by 
small- and medium-scale peasants on both a private and communal basis. Otherwise, for the 
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large number of local people the flourishing process of new export crops in the Norte 
Chico's desert would become little more than a mirage. 
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Chapter 4. Socio-productive Changes in a Backward Region of Traditional 
Agriculture 
Introduction 
In spite of the macroeconomic success achieved by the country, mainly as a result of the 
adoption of an outward-oriented strategy of development, not all regions have directly 
benefited from the evolution of this process. This has been the result of the differential 
capacity to attract export-led capital that the country's regions have showed in the last two 
decades. In addition, the opening of the Chilean economy has also implied that more 
competitive import goods and products (either as a result of productive efficiency or of 
subsidies) have started to be commercialised within the country. As far as agricultural 
products are concerned, significant amounts of imported grain has been coming into the 
country principally from North America and Argentina. As a result, some regions have 
experienced economic decline or stagnation compared with those characterised by export 
specialisation. Some of these regions have started to be affected by growing socio-productive 
crises as a result of the recession in their traditional economic base. This has been the case 
of the Maule region, the most representative region of traditional agriculture in the country 
("regi6n huasa de Chile"). 
However, as previously stated in Chapter 2, the Maule region presented the largest 
proportion of people living in poverty within its rural areas. Moreover, according to some 
sources [the World Bank (1994), SERPLAC of the Maule region (1994a) and (1992b), 
SECPLAC of Empedrado (1995) among others] rural poverty has tended to increase 
particularly in the western "secano" area. Two reasons stand out: the fall of local agricultural 
competitiveness with respect to cheaper import crops; and the fast expansion in area of one 
of the country's most competitive sector within international markets, forestry. The growth 
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of forestry plantations has severely affected the "secano" population as a result of demands 
for land of leading forestry companies. 
This chapter intends to give some introductory insights into the factors of socio-economic 
change in the Maule region during recent years. Most of these changes have only recently 
been perceived as a significant component of the new socio-productive pattern developing 
in the region; so far there are no aggregated surveys completed on this topic. Furthermore, 
the lack of availability of disaggregated statistical information on prices, production and 
social features make it difficult to establish accurate diagnoses at the local- and meso-scale 
levels. Therefore, the main aim of this brief analysis is to provide preliminary information 
on the regional economic base and the spatial processes which have started to emerge in the 
different areas of the Maule region. 
Much of the attention, therefore, is going to be focused on the dynamic affecting the most 
backward and poorest rural areas of the region; the southern section of the Central Valley 
-where most of the irrigated grain is grown (notably rice), and the "secano" area where most 
of the non-irrigated crops have historically been grown (notably wheat and pulses) and also 
where most forestry plantations have developed. Special attention has been directed to the 
main features of the commune of Empedrado. This is currently the commune with the largest 
proportion of land devoted to forestry plantations in the Maule region. The general 
geographical background of this last area was presented in the last section of Chapter 2. 
Moreover. these two areas have also become important due to their linkages with the 
exercise of coordination for rural development to be presented and discussed in Chapter 10. 
Finally, it is important to mention that a significant part of the information used in this 
analysis came principally from direct structured interviews carried out within the region 
during the last two years. 
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4.1. Factors Adversely Affecting Rural Activities in the Maule Region: Main Trends 
Different agricultural areas that have specialised in the production of domestic cash-crops 
have started to show some adverse trends as a result of the opening up of the Chilean 
economy. The Maule region has been one of the most severely affected by the country's 
macroeconomic shift. Lower prices for most of their traditional agricultural products, 
especially in the latest five years (e.g wheat, rice, maize, beans oil-seeds and low quality 
wines), have implied a growing process of social and political unrest among farmers. This 
has produced a number of traffic interruptions and blockages on the main national highway 
which passes through the centre of the region. Farmers have also been demonstrating against 
regional government; thousands of litres of wine were spread in front of the offices of the 
Maule regional government ("Intendencia"). In parallel, the representative of the larger 
agricultural producers (the "Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura" -SNA, has been strongly 
challenging the central government and demanding further intervention as regards traditional 
agriculture in order to tackle what he has called "the current agricultural crises". 
Even though most of these actions have been carried out by the larger regional farmers (they 
have more access to political representation), a significant number of peasants in the regional 
periphery has also experienced severe productive disruptions. These have worsened their 
social conditions. As the World Bank stated, productive problems in the region have 
contributed to the fact that between 1970 and 1980 the segment of the II secano II population 
living below the poverty line increased from 21 per cent to more than 40 per cent; income 
distribution became more skewed and food consumption of the poorest population dropped 
to levels below the standards established by the World Health Organisation for Chile (World 
Bank, 1994). 
In the present decade this process seems to be continuing. Accordingly, the regional 
government has estimated that the pace of migration from rural areas has increased during 
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recent years; rural population has decreased from 53 per cent to 40 per cent between 1970 
and the present (SERPLAC, 1994a). The Maule region has come to have the largest share 
of rural population in poverty within the country; in the centre of the "secano" area, one of 
the poorest trans-regional landscapes of Chile is located. 
According to regional government the main factors which are jeopardizing medium- and 
long-term expectations for better levels of development in the Maule region are (SERPLAC, 
1994b): 
a) the significant levels of poverty. This fact neutralises in the region the macroeconomic 
success that the national economy has been experiencing during the last decades. There 
is potential social pressure from those people in extreme poverty. 
b) the growing loss of productive competitiveness in agricultural production with respect to 
cheaper products from both external and national sources. This has caused progressively 
cheaper prices for most of the region's agricultural production. 
4.2. Main Trends of Regional Agricultural Production: The Recent Impacts from Growing 
Volumes of Import Crops 
In strong contrast with the development of a highly efficient export-led agricultural sector 
in the Norte Chico, the Region VII of Maule can be easily considered as one of the clearest 
examples of agricultural stagnation in the country. The productive regional economic-base 
is principally sustained by the agricultural and forestry sectors -28.3 per cent of the GNP and 
37.0 per cent of the regional labour force. However, with the exception of part of the Curic6 
Province (the regional northern sector) in which fruit trees have been growing for domestic 
and export purposes, agricultural production in this region is mainly devoted to growing 
traditional cash-crops. These are characterised by low levels of competitiveness even in 
comparison to national standards. Since these agricultural products have been historically 
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oriented to substitute imports, both the lower prices of new agricultural imports and the 
rising cost of labour have substantially contributed to the economic stagnation of the sector 
in this region (SERPLAC, 1994b). 
In the 1993/1994 agricultural season 46 per cent of the regional land use was devoted to 
grow grain. The most important produce was wheat accounting for about one third of the 
regional land use; rice and maize occupied 8 per cent each. Beans, chick peas and lentils 
represented 10 per cent and vineyards 11 per cent (SEREMI of Agriculture, 1995). All these 
crops together comprised two thirds of the agricultural land under use in the Maule Region 
(ODEPA, I994b). According to information provided by the SEREMI of the Maule region 
all these crops have been affected by strong variations in prices during the late five years. 
All of them got lower prices with respect to the previous season. However, the most 
significant decline has been affecting cereals. 
4.2.1. Dynamic of the most representative regional crops 
In spite of the fact that crops are an important component of the regional agricultural 
production the dynamic affecting both wheat and rice has become significant for explaining 
some socio-productive impacts within the regional landscape resulting from growing imports. 
Therefore, most of the analysis has been focused on the main trends affecting both products; 
in the case of wheat due to its significance within the regional productive pattern, and in the 
case of rice due to the relevance that this crop presents for the southern landscape of the 
Maule region where about two-thirds of the national production is grown. 
4.2.Ia The case of wheat 
Concerning the case of wheat, the most dominant regional crop (ODEPA, I994b), prices fell 
about 20 per cent in 1994 with respect to the previous year. This tendency in wheat prices, 
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however, was not just the result of a seasonal variation. From 1986 to 1995 wheat prices 
have been steadily falling. Between 1986 and 1995 the price of wheat fell 42 per cent in the 
domestic market (despite some small rise in 1989 and 1991). Meanwhile wheat imports 
(principally from the highly protected U.S. agricultural sector and from Argentina) have been 
rising. According to the Central Bank (1995), during the last two years imports of wheat 
increased by 35 per cent. If a longer time period is considered wheat imports rose from 
161,030 tons in 1991 to 697.030 tons in 1994; this last amount was equivalent to about 42 
per cent of national consumption. As a result of this cumulative trend wheat production has 
been diminishing in the region. Between 1987 and 1994 land devoted to this crop diminished 
from 95,110 to 61,970 hectares (ODEPA, 1994b). This contraction in wheat production has 
been occurring even when the government has continued applying a policy of guaranteed 
prices ("banda de precios"). 
According to the regional SEREMI of agriculture, most of the change in land use has been 
carried out by the larger producers of the Central Valley. However, most of the regional 
agricultural production corresponds to small- and medium-scale peasants -90 per cent of the 
agricultural properties are smaller than 10 hectares and 67 per cent smaller than 5 BIH. A 
significant number of small- and medium-sized holdings continue being involved in wheat 
production. The main reason suggested by the regional secretariat of agriculture is that these 
producers have been able to neutralise the negative effects of lower prices through the cost 
of their labour (they do not consider their labour as part of the costs of production). As soon 
as they produce some surplus for food and grain for seed they are satisfied. So, at least in 
this region, the contraction of prices is a problem mainly affecting large-scale commercial 
agriculture, since for the smallest-scale peasants wheat production has become the main 
self-supporting crop within their strategy of survival. 
Ironically, the lower the wheat price, the more they depend on it for food consumption. 
Although INDAP supplies technical assistance to small farmers in order to improve 
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agricultural productivity, its emphasis has been principally directed to those who have viable 
productive units under existing production conditions and cropping patterns. Thus, the 
majority of subsistence farmers is left out of INDAP's programme. Some preliminary 
estimates indicate that in this region small producers receiving INDAP assistance do not 
exceed 10 to 15 per cent of the total (World Bank, 1994). 
4.2.1b The case of rice 
Rice is currently the fourth most relevant crop in the region with respect to the ranking of 
agricultural land under use. Most rice production is concentrated in the irrigated area of the 
central valley, covering both the southern section of the Maule region and the northern part 
of the Biobio region; more precisely in the communes of Parral, Longavi and San Carlos. 
An interesting geographical feature of these lands is the fact that soils present a clay 
stratification ("tosca ") between 20 and 40 centimetres deep. As a consequence, this 
agricultural land is highly impermeable for the percolation of water. Thus, after rainfall or 
irrigation they easily saturate. As a result of this geomorphological feature these areas have 
historically been devoted to rice production; this is practically the only crop which can be 
commercially grown in this restricted agricultural area. As a paradox, the main limitation 
for agricultural production is the excessive amount of water; this happens just some few 
kilometres away from the "secano" where water is one of the main restriction for agricultural 
purposes. Practically 80 per cent of the national rice production comes from small- and 
medium-scale producers in this agricultural area. Most of them are beneficiaries of the land 
reform programme. 
According to the regional SEREMI of Agriculture (1995), rice production faced no 
significant restrictions with respect to prices and markets until the late 1980s. However most 
of the problems affecting regional producers started to appear as a consequence of the 
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growing imports of rice principally from Argentina. Rice imports were 47,040 tonnes in 
1994, 32 per cent more than the previous year (35,518 tonnes). If this amount is compared 
with the imports of 1992 (20,244 tonnes) foreign rice imports increased by 130.0 per cent 
in two years. In this same period, however, the total value of imported rice increased by 
only 88 per cent (Central Bank, 1995). Thus, imported rice has become cheaper during the 
last three years. As a result, national production has declined steadily from 1987 to 1994. 
The surface devoted to this crop fell from 25,240 hectares to 18,650 hectares (a drop of26.8 
per cent) between 1987 and 1994 (ODEPA, 1994b). 
The lower competitiveness of Chilean rice with respect to the Argentinean is principally 
explained by three main reasons (MINAGRI, 1993): 
a) Argentinean and other rice-exporting countries are able to produce two harvest a year at 
least; due to climatic reasons Chile has only one harvest. 
b) the lower quality of most of the Chilean rice production (Paddy short grain). 
c) the productivity of land devoted to rice is relatively low due to: an over-utilisation of the 
land, bad quality of seeds and low technology in production. According to some estimates 
current regional productivity reaches between 35 and 40 quintals/per hectare; the 
potential yield is estimated at about 60 quintals/hectare. 
However, there are some additional factors which are affecting small- and medium-scale 
producers. Among the most important are: a monopsonistic structure of commercialisation 
in which producers only know the final price of their production some months after they 
deliver it (due to the fact that rice-mills are concentrated in the hands of few speculative 
regional rice-traders), the lack of organisations of producers which could improve their 
bargaining power and achieve more competitive prices, and due to the lack in storage 
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infrastructure which could allow producers to maintain rice production for longer periods in 
order to sell in periods of better prices (Munoz, 1994). 
According to an interview made with the mayor of the Municipality of Parral (1995), the 
main problem affecting rice producers is related to the fact that the opening of the national 
economy was not accompanied by a diffusion of new technologies for increasing the level 
of farmers' competitiveness with respect to external competition. According to him not all 
the land devoted to rice production presented severe limitations. Some investment in 
productive infrastructure and in technological transfer might have helped local producers to 
overcome the current price crises. 
In this regard, a director of the cooperative of small-scale rice producers "Buscando 
Desarrollo" explained that they have experienced that some berry products (notably 
strawberries) have proved to be a good alternative crop for replacing low competitive rice 
production. But, no cooling plants are available for small-scale producers at least in the 
southern area of the Maule region. As a result, the few farmers which have shifted from rice 
production to this alternative crop have been significantly affected by the low prices that the 
companies pay to them for the fruit (more than ten times lower if they were compared with 
final consumer prices in domestic markets at the beginning of 1995). Nevertheless, due to 
the fact that berries need to be sold immediately after harvesting, producers are unable to 
refuse any price they are offered by both middle-men or by the plants of the main 
fruit-companies. In this regard, some potential small-scale cooling plants would contribute 
to overcome this problem of commercialisation and open up new possibilities of production 
for other farmers suffering from the rice crises; strawberry exports have been significantly 
rising during the last five years. 
According to the mayor of Parral, the scarce budget allocated by government (notably by 
INDAP) in order to improve productive conditions of the small- and medium-scale farmers 
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in these peripheral communes has become another indicator which proves the strong 
centralism which characterises the intra-regional process of budget allocation. In the 
commune of Parra144.0 per cent of the labour force directly depends the agricultural sector 
and the current agricultural crises have heavily affected the city of Parral's local economy 
- notably in the retail and service sectors. 
However, some attempts have been made by government to both improve the quality of rice 
production and to convert land use to both complementary uses or alternative productive 
activities (livestock, berries and small-scale forestry activities). No significant achievements 
have yet been obtained. Accordingly to the local economic base most of the efforts have been 
directed to improve the quality of rice production through the incorporation of more 
competitive varieties (Paddy long-grain) and to the use of better technology and other 
productive inputs (MINAGRI, 1993). These attempts by government have been sponsored 
and financed through INDAP credits. The main restrictions faced by the INDAP programme, 
however, were related to difficulties in reaching a more significant number of farmers. 
4.2.1c Other crops 
In the case of other important grains concerning regional production the general trend has 
been rather similar; that is to say higher imports and lower regional production. The case 
of maize, however, has been presenting a more complex dynamic. Despite growing imports 
(from the U.S. and Argentina) in 1994 -37 per cent and 68.5 higher than 1993 and 1991 
respectively, regional production has followed a rather erratic trend. Although their is some 
inter-annual variation in land-use under maize production the regional surface devoted to this 
crop has been fluctuating between 20,500 hectares and 17,500 during the last 5 years 
(ODEPA, 1994b). One reason which could explain this trend is the fact that maize is 
principally produced in the irrigated area of the central valley where most alternative crops 
could be usually cultivated in order to face seasonal price variations. Nevertheless, most of 
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the maize imports has been mainly affecting northern production, since productivity of this 
crop in the irrigated area of the Maule region is one of the highest in the country (SEREMI 
of Maule secretariat). 
Finally, lentils has been one of the most severely affected crops in the region but especially 
in the western area of the region in the "secano" where it used to be extensively cultivated 
by small- and medium-scale peasants as one of their main cash-crops; most of the country's 
lentil production is harvested throughout the whole of the "secano" region. Although no 
disaggregated information was available on lentil imports, regional production has been 
hardly competing with imports from Argentina and Canada (SEREMI of Agriculture). The 
low productivity of this crop in the "secano" area (see Chapter 2) have severely affected 
local producers which have been unable to compete with cheaper and better quality imports. 
As a result of this new trend, lentil regional production has plummeted. From 4,480 hectares 
devoted to this crop in the Maule region in 1987 it decreased to 2,250 in 1991 and to 1,640 
hectares in 1994. Thus, between 1987 and 1994 the regional land cultivated with lentils fell 
66,4 per cent (ODEPA, 1994b). "Secano" farmer involved in lentil production have shifted 
to wheat production as a self-supporting food crop while others have migrated (SEREMI of 
Maule secretariat, 1995). 
Although it is always difficult to analyze changes in agricultural patterns by considering 
medium-term trends (principally because of the seasonal variations in the use of land) it has 
to be considered that traditional agriculture in the Maule region has started to show some 
negative effects as a result of its structural weakness in competing with external products. 
Although the direct costs of production have diminished for most of the traditional 
agricultural products in the region, prices in the national market have plummeted 
substantially further (SERPLAC, 1994b). However, most of the negative impacts have 
principally affected small- and medium-scale farmers usually marginalised to the less 
productive lands or severely restricted in the size of their properties. The "minifundio" is 
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still one of the most distinctive features of regional land distribution and of the location of 
people in poverty. 
Conversely, some new alternative crops have started to be developed in the region as an 
alternative to the traditional ones. On the one hand, some fruit trees have begun to expand 
in the region -for apple, lemon, pears and avocado production. On the other hand, other 
horticultural crops have also expanded as with the cases of onions, peas, asparagus, broccolis 
and green peppers (ODEPA, 1994b). In most cases, however, these processes of change 
have been occurring in the most valuable irrigated lands of the central valley where the more 
efficient and capitalised commercial agriculture tends to dominate. In the meantime, as was 
reflected in the social diagnosis, rural people in the regional periphery seem to have 
continued to be involved in traditional agricultural activities even though largely for survival. 
4.3. The Expansion of the Forestry Sector and its Impact at the Local Level: General Trends 
in the "Secano" Commune of Empedrado 
The fast expansion of the forestry sector has been occurring in the whole "secano" area of 
the Costal Range. This process has shown most intensity in the regions of Bioblo and Maule 
due to the location of two of the larger forestry processing plants; Celco Arauco and Celco 
Constituci6n in the Biobio and Maule regions respectively (see Figure 4.1). Although this 
process of forestry expansion has generated benefits in aggregate macroeconomic terms, 
there have also been some significant social impacts at the local level that need to be taken 
into account. 
Therefore, the following analysis has been mainly oriented to give some insights as to the 
main trends affecting one spatial area where export-led forestry plantations have become the 
main productive resource through most of the landscape. Since this process of forestry 
expansion has become familiar to other areas of the "secano", a geographical analysis of the 
commune of Empedrado could act as a referent point for developing policies oriented to 
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Figure 4.1 
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tackle recent social problems affecting small-scale farmers. Most of the information utilized 
for this analysis has been provided by the Municipality of Empedrado -notably through a 
structured interview in January 1995 with the mayor, who had been democratically elected 
in 1992. 
4.3.1. Constraints affecting the involvement of small- and medium-scale farmers in forestry 
production 
Ironically, according to the World Bank (1994), the fast expansion of exotic forestry in the 
"secano" drylands in the last two decades has significantly affected small-scale farmers in 
two ways: 
In the first place, these populations have remained largely outside the forestry development 
process due to the problems they faced with respect to their access to the incentives offered 
by the Forest Development Law (Decree Law 701). Most of the peasants cannot commit a 
large portion of their land to long-term investments. In this respect it is worth mentioning 
that the State has allocated US$130.0 million since 1974 in subsidies for forestry plantations 
through Decree Law 701. However, only US$5.0 million (3.8 per cent) have benefited 
producers of less than 50 hectares, whilst US$23.0 million (17.7 per cent) have been directed 
to producers with less than 200 hectares. Conversely, US$102.0 million (78.5 per cent) have 
directly benefited the largest producers, mainly forestry companies associated with 
transnational capital (ODEPA, 1994c). 
Secondly, the small producer is being displaced from areas with forestry potential (practically 
the whole "secano") by large producers and forestry industries. These latter are strong 
buyers of "secano" land that is suitable not only for forestry plantations but also for livestock 
and even agriculture. The companies plant the land with pines and eucalyptus. In this way, 
forestry plantations have been growing not only in poor-quality lands (class VI and VII in 
the Chilean classification of land use) but also in more agriculturally productive areas. 
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4.3.2 Socio-geographical Impacts of the Expansion of Forestry Plantations: The Case of the 
Commune of Empedrado 
The Commune of Empedrado can be considered one of the most representative cases 
concerning the impacts resulting from the expansion of forestry activities in the country. This 
commune, located in the "secano" area of the Maule region (in the Province of Talca), has 
been almost completely covered by forestry plantations in the last twenty years. Most of 
these plantations belong to the three large forestry companies; notably to Celco (80 per cent), 
to Copihue and to Pacifico. 
The forestry sector has historically been a distinctive feature of Empedrado's economic base. 
Because of geomorphological restrictions (resulting in scarcity of water for irrigation and a 
undulating landscape with poor soils) forestry activities traditionally represented about 25 per 
cent of communal land use. The remaining area was devoted to small-scale agricultural 
production in which wheat, lentils, beans and some horticultural products were the most 
dominant crops. Forestry activities were also developed, principally by small-scale farmers. 
In 1976, 80 per cent of communal forestry plantations were owned by small-scale farmers 
whilst the remaining 20 per cent belonged to larger producers of which two thirds were 
owned by Celco (SECPLAC of Empedrado, 1994); it could be mentioned here, that Celco's 
cellulose plant in nearby Constituci6n started operating in 1976. 
However, since 1976, the structure of production has completely changed. Forestry 
plantations have dramatically expanded in the Commune during the last 20 years (principally 
since Decree Law 701 was launched in 1974). Thus, by 1994 forestry plantations had come 
to constitute 75 per cent of communal land use but now with a very different pattern of 
ownership; 80 per cent of plantations belonged to larger producers (of which two thirds 
belonged to Celco) and only 20 per cent to smaller-scale producers. As a result agricultural 
activities in Empedrado plummeted and covered only 5 per cent of the total land use. 
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As a result of this process of productive specialisation rural people started to migrate from 
the rural areas of Empedrado. According to the last population census, the communal 
population had fallen from 6,000 inhabitants in 1982 to 5,000 in 1992 (a decline of 16,6 per 
cent). However, a significant number of rural people had moved to the small town of 
Empedrado (approx. 2,600 inhabitants) from the surrounding rural areas. In 1992 Empedrado 
had concentrated 52 per cent of the communal population. Empedrado represented the first 
stage of a step by step pattern of migration; in other words the rural migrant saw Empedrado 
as the first destination before moving on to larger regional or even national cities. 
According to the mayor of Empedrado (1995), most of the people migrated as a last resort. 
The main communal problem has become the lack of permanent labour opportunities for the 
2,000 active workers, mainly living in poverty. Forestry activities do not generate significant 
labour opportunities. Most activities concerning forestry plantations are either very 
specialised or highly seasonal. The latter type of employment is mainly carried out by local 
people but the work is largely concentrated between October and April. The former type of 
employment is increasingly done by specialised labour from outside the commune. They are 
hired by middle-men ("contratistas"), principally from the largest regional towns -notably 
from Constitucion (where the Celco plant is located) or from Talca (the regional capital). 
According to the mayor, as a result of this labour pattern the situation in Empedrado in 
winter-time has become critical. The external perception of Empedrado is that it is a rich 
commune. This is mainly because outsiders have seen the fast expansion of forestry 
plantations in the area in addition to the growing and permanent traffic of heavy lorries laden 
with trunks. However, no significant benefits from forestry activities remain in the 
commune. As an example, local production taxes are paid where the industrial plants are 
located (all of them are outside the commune). In addition the residential property tax does 
not benefit Empedrado's municipal budget since forestry plantations have been exempted 
from this tax by government as a way of encouraging further investments in this export 
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sector. 
At the same time, since the boom in forestry activities heavy lorries have been continuously 
damaging local the poor communal road network. Thus, in rainy periods, traffic within the 
commune has become practically impossible for most small- and medium-sized vehicles; this 
has worsened the relative isolation of the communal. Road repairs have to be made afforded 
by either the scarce municipal budget (80 million pesos amounts about US$400,000) or by 
regionally-assigned financial resources. 
Therefore, despite the fact that Empedrado had been historically leading rural poverty 
rankings, its inhabitants could at least remain in the commune due to their involvement in 
small-scale agricultural and forestry activities. Nowadays, however, the situation has become 
much worse. Most of the inhabitants can no longer depend on agricultural activities either 
as a cash-crop or as a means of subsistence. This has increased the cost of basic foods. In 
addition the housing deficit has increased in the town of Empedrado as a result of the growth 
of population that has come from the surrounding countryside. This has implied growing 
demand for the provision of services (notably education) and for cultural and training 
activities in the village. 
As a final remark, the mayor considered that diminishing communal isolation with the rest 
of the region and with the regional and provincial governments were the main aims for the 
future. Improvements in communication with the rest of the region would undoubtedly 
facilitate labour movement with other areas and decrease local food prices for products 
coming from outside the commune. As an example, mayor estimated that improvement in 
the quality of the road connecting the town of Empedrado with the city of Constitucion 
would decrease the current travelling time from about 50 minutes to no more than 25 
minutes. 
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Nevertheless, functional isolation from regional and provincial governments have made the 
exercise of local government difficult. Since mayors became elected they have been affected 
by a growing popular pressure to deal with all communal problems, most of which have 
largely been caused by external factors. However, current linkages with regional government 
are still rather scarce although benefits have been gained from the regular visits of the 
members of the Interministerial Commission for Rural Development in matters concerning 
education, health, drinking water, housing and micro-scale horticultural production (see 
Chapter No 10). However, more regular contacts between mayors and regional 
decision-making bodies are still needed. 
4.4. Forestry Activities in the "Secano" Area: Final Remarks 
As a result of the process of expansion in forestry activities in the "secano", many of its 
small-scale farmers are selling the land either due to their lack of clear perspectives for 
continuing their traditional activities due to the fall in grain prices or because of the strong 
pressure put upon them by forestry companies engaged in an aggressive process of territorial 
expansion. The expansion of forestry plantations tends to enclose farmers which try to keep 
their lands. The geographical isolation of these small-scale farmers has become a common 
feature of this process due to the cutting of feeder roads as a result of the spread of private 
forestry plantations. However, even though the process of forest expansion has a positive 
effect from the point of view of soil conservation in eroded landscapes, from the social 
perspective the situation has been creating problems. For example: a great number of 
landless peasants; small landowners and small-scale farmers migrating to small rural towns 
or to medium-sized urban centres looking for new opportunities, which either they do not 
find or which do not match expectations. However, the aggregate socio-economic impact that 
this process generates in the whole "secano" area of the country and in the surroundings 
regional areas has not yet been quantified nor evaluated (World Bank, 1994). However, 
seems to be clear is that localised poverty shows no indications of decreasing. 
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4.5. Summary 
The opening up of the Chilean economy has affected the production of the main regional 
crops (notably grain) through increasingly lower prices obtained by the heterogeneous 
productive structure. Growing volumes of cheaper imported grains from Argentina and North 
American countries have started to harm large- medium- and small-scale producers which 
have been unable to compete successfully under the new market conditions. However, small-
and medium-scale farmers have been more severely affected due to additional factors acting 
against them. In that regard, lower levels of productivity (derived from both their spatial 
relegation to the poor soils and the use of inappropriate technologies) have proved to be 
important restrictions. Moreover, the difficult marketing conditions that they are facing in 
addition to restrictions for shifting them towards more competitive crops are among the 
principal intervening factors. As a result, a large number of peasants have started to remain 
outside the agricultural market. Alternatively, they have been either increasingly involved 
in producing subsistence crops (and gaining some income from temporary labour) or they 
have definitively moved to urban areas. In this way, the traditional agriculture of the Maule 
region has followed the patterns presented by other Latin American countries in which 
cash-crop production has started to diminish as a result of cheaper imports from the surpluses 
of developed countries (Kohlhepp, 1987). One of the most dramatic cases has recently been 
affecting Nicaragua's process of economic restructuring, due to the significant social impacts 
which the small-scale grain producers in that country have experienced as a result of cheaper 
agricultural imports, particularly from the U.S. (Spoor, 1994). 
At the same time, forestry plantations have been booming in the Maule region. The forestry 
sector has not been significantly expanding to the detriment of the traditional commercial 
farmers (they are mainly located in the irrigated Central Valley). However, the growth of 
the sector has severely affected the "secano" peasants. These have been unable either to 
neutralise the aggressive expansion of plantations over their lands or to gain substantive 
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benefits from the development of this sector in the western areas of the region. From the 
point of view of the macroeconomic scale, the forestry sector is currently contributing 
substantial financial resources to the national economy. Accordingly, the process of forestry 
expansion is supposed to continue not only through plantations of exotic varieties but also 
through the exploitation of the native forest. In this regard, even though the social impacts 
of this process seem to be still unclear for the World Bank, the case of the commune of 
Empedrado needs to be carefully considered in any serious forecast concerning the future of 
the whole "secano" population. 
Therefore, in contrast to the regional process of change experienced in some of the Norte 
Chico's valleys where the incorporation of export-oriented agricultural development has at 
least generated a more productive dynamic, the opening up of the national economy has 
proved to be adversely affecting most of the productive trends in the Maule region. Although 
forestry activities could compensate the regional agricultural crises from the macroeconomic 
perspective, they have had little impact <?n the main central area historically devoted to 
traditional agriculture. Furthermore, most of the benefits associated with forestry activities 
come from rather long-term perspectives because the productive cycle of forestry takes at 
least twenty years before the final product is obtained. Consequently, this activity does not 
fit with the requirements that small-scale farmers present for satisfying their short-term social 
needs. That is not precisely the case for the Norte Chico peasants where both competitive 
export- and domestic-led agricultural products are grown annually. Employment in the 
export-led agriculture is both grater and more regular than in the case forestry activities. 
The opening up of the economy has affected small-scale producers in both regions. However, 
expectations for more equitable development in a second stage of the outward-oriented 
development strategy (in which large -scale producers are not the only beneficiaries) seem 
to be higher in the Norte Chico than in the Maule region. In both cases, however, a more 
active role of the state cannot be absent for facilitating the necessary productive shift from 
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the exploitation of comparative advantages to the promotion of competitive advantages with 
a more equitable social structure. 
118 
Chapter 5. External Factors Affecting Agro-exporting Countries 
Introduction 
Undoubtedly the world economy is showing an intense process of restructuring where 
changes are very much related to opposing forces and interests. While geographical 
accessibility all around the earth has substantially increased as a result of transport and 
communication improvements, the significant increases in agricultural production and 
productivity has led to different sources of constraints against potential and real mobility of 
agricultural goods. However, the economies of developing countries are significantly more 
dependent on agricultural exports than advanced ones. 
Moreover, problems of overconsumption coexist with large numbers of starving people 
despite efforts to minimize this situation from different agents all around the world. 
According to the World Bank, 30 per cent of the world population has a monthly income of 
US$40 or less and are unable to participate as real actors in the world system of 
consumption. On the other hand, most industrial countries face growing surplus in 
agricultural production inducing the rise of different sources of protectionism and thus 
preventing competitive trade system and undermining the agricultural policies of developing 
countries at the global scale. 
Many economic and political external factors are in one way or another affecting the 
development trends of agro-exporting countries. The present dynamic of world agricultural 
prices and markets, the role played by some of the international organisations (notably the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank) and the complexity of different sources of 
domestic and international protectionism are perhaps the most relevant ones. Undoubtedly, 
these three external factors have become also determinant to understand the recent 
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socio-political and economic dynamic in most developing nations. 
The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to give some insights on three main external 
factors which have been currently affecting the evolution of most of the agro-exporting 
developing countries. Most of the attention is going to be focused on the main features that 
have proved to be important for the external contextualisation of the recent evolution of the 
Chilean agricultural sector since the mid-1970s. Accordingly, in the first place, some of the 
recent trends on the dynamic of the market of primary products (mainly in agriculture) are 
examined. Secondly, the role of two relevant economic organisations for the provision of 
financial funds (the IMF and the World Bank) are briefly described. These two agencies 
played an active role on the national process of economic restructuring developed since the 
1970s. Finally, some information is provided with respect to the way in which protectionist 
barriers operate. Attention will be directed to the cases of the U.S., Europe (E.E.C.) and 
Japan. These are currently the most active factors affecting the present and future evolution 
of both the domestic and external dimension of the Chilean agricultural sector. 
5.1. Production, Trade and Prices: Some Insights on Agricultural International Markets 
There is no doubt that world trade has being growing consistently during the post-war 
period, with manufacturing proving the most dynamic sector. From 1950 to the mid 1980s, 
trade in manufactures increased more than twice as fast as manufactured output accounting 
for nearly a half of the total export turnover. Trade in minerals grew at nearly the same pace 
as the growth in world output, but started to decline after 1983. During the same period 
trade in agricultural products grew more slowly than world output. Since the beginning of 
the 1980s, the share of manufactures in world trade has increased from 56 per cent to 73 per 
cent whilst that of agriculture and mining products has decelerated from 15 to 13.5 per cent 
and from 29 to 13.5 per cent respectively. It seems important to remark that between 1950 
and 1989 the share of agricultural products in world trade has declined from 46 per cent to 
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13.5 per cent (Barve, 1991). 
5.1.1. Production and world trade 
Concerning agricultural and food production, the rate of growth of both in developing 
countries just kept ahead of the rate of population growth, even though some important 
differences can be found between regions. In contrast to the successful evolution of per 
capite production of food and agricultural production in some Asian countries, Latin 
American countries -after strongly increasing per capita production in the 1970s- saw 
virtually no growth in the following decade. In the meantime, per capita agricultural and 
food production in sub-Saharan Africa countries fell markedly again in the 1980s as it did 
throughout the previous two decades, implying rapid growth of import requirements (see 
Table 5.1). 
As regards the sectoral annual growth between 1965-90, there are also some interesting 
trends between functional regions. While in most developing countries the growth of GDP 
and industry fell considerably (the South-East Asian countries were the only exception), the 
growth of agricultural production fell much less in Latin America and did not fall at all in 
sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.1 Trends in Total and per capita Agricultural and Food Production, 1961-90 (Average annual Percentage Growth) 
Agricultural production Food production 
Country group 1961-73 1973-80 1980-90 1961-90 1961-73 1973-80 1980-90 1961-90 
Total 
Developing market economies 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 3.2 2.9 2.9 I 
Latin America 2.6 3.4 2.2 2.7 3.1 3.6 2.3 3.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 1.1 2.5 2.0 2.3 1.5 2.5 2.0 
South and South-East Asia 2.5 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.1 
Asian centrally planned 4.8 3.1 4.4 4.1 4.7 3.3 4.3 4.0 
economies 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 
Developing, all 
Per capita 
Developing market economies 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.5 
Latin America -0.1 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.2 -1.8 -0.6 -0.9 -0.3 -1.5 -0.6 -0.9 
South and South-East Asia 0.1 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.1 1.2 1.1 0.8 
Asian centrally planned 2.3 1.5 3.0 2.2 2.2 1.7 2.9 2.1 
economies 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.2 0.9 
Developing, all 
Source: FAD data as available in the UNCTAD Economic Time-Series (ETS) Data Bank, quoted from Singh and Tabatabai, 1993. 
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Table 5.2 Trends in Sectoral Production Performance (1965-1990)(Average Annual 
Percentage Growth). 
GDP Industry Agriculture 
Country group 1965 1980 1965 1980 1965 1980 
-80 -90 -80 -90 -80 -90 
Low-income economies 4.8 3.9 8.0 3.7 2.4 2.6 
(excl China and India) 
Middle-income economies 6.3 2.5 6.7 2.3 3.4 2.4 
Latin America and the 6.0 1.6 6.6 1.2 3.1 1.9 
Caribbean 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 2.1 7.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 
South Asia (incl India) 3.6 5.2 4.3 6.5 2.5 3.0 
East Asia and the Pacific 7.3 7.8 10.8 10.2 3.2 4.8 
(incl China) 
Source: World Bank (1992), Table 2, pp 220-1 
Despite the significant growth of world trade in the second half of the 1980s (17 per cent 
in 1987 and 14 per cent in 1988) the share of developing countries has remained almost 
unchanged. While the total exports of advanced countries edged up from US$I,740 
billion in 1987 to US$2,030 billion dollars in 1988 (rising by US$290 billion in only one 
year), the export of developing countries rose only from US$498 billion to US$572 
billion (US$74 billion) during this period. In 1988, 73 per cent of world trade 
corresponded to manufactures as compared to 56 per cent in 1980. Thus, industrial 
manufactures became largely the main driving force in the expansion of world 
merchandise trade. In the meantime, from 1973 to the late 1980s the total share of 
developing countries in world trade stagnated at around 19 per cent (Barve, 1991). The 
main reason to explain the poor export performance of developing countries is due to 
their high specialisation on products (except oil) with the sluggish demand in world 
markets, that is to say primary commodities. 
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However, perhaps the most striking point for most of the agro-export developing 
economies is the result of recent changes in the world structure of agricultural 
production. As can be noticed in Table 5.3, provided by the World Bank, the total share 
of developing countries in the world market of beverages, foods and even raw materials 
has fallen sharply, whilst industrial market economies have been increasing their share 
in all these commodity groups, despite their higher production costs and the fall of 
international prices. 
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Table 5.3 Export Shares of Major Agricultural Commodity Groups, 1961-63, 1982-84 (%). 
Beverages Food Raw materials Total agriculture 
Country group 
1961-63 1982-84 1961-63 1982-84 1961-63 1982-84 1961-63 1982-84 
Developing countries 98.1 94.9 44.8 34.2 69.2 65.3 63.1 48.4 
Low-income countries 27.6 23.8 9.0 3.6 15.6 13.6 15.1 8.3 
Africa 19.6 15.8 1.5 0.3 6.0 4.9 6.9 3.5 
Asia 8.0 8.0 7.5 3.3 9.6 8.7 8.0 4.8 
Middle-income oil exporters 17.1 17.6 6.5 3.3 33.9 24.7 14.8 8.8 
Middle-income oil importers 53.4 53.5 29.3 27.3 19.7 27.0 33.3 31.3 
High-income oil exporters 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Industrial market economies 1.7 4.7 46.2 62.7 23.5 24.0 30.5 47.9 
East European nonmarket 0.2 0.4 8.9 3.0 7.3 10.7 6.4 3.6 
economies 
I 
Note: Data are weighted by the 1978-82 world export unit prices to permit cross-country comparisons. Beverages comprise coffee, cocoa and tea. 
Food comprises cereals, sugar, meat, pOUltry, dairy products, roots and tubers, pulses, fruits and vegetables. Raw materials comprise cotton, jute, 
rubber and tobacco 
Source: Based on FAO data, cited in World Bank, 1986, p.10. 
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5.1.2. Prices 
A clear example of the complexity of world trade is the strong contrast in demand and prices 
which affected world trade in agriculture through the last decades. Despite the fact that most 
agricultural prices have presented a long-term declining trend since the middle of this 
century, strong short -term differences can also be found in most agricultural prices in the 
mentioned period (see Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 Real Growth of Commodity Prices, 1950-84. 
(average annual percentage change) 
Commodity 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1950-84 
Total agriculture -2.92 0.00 0.01 -1.03 
Beverages -2.08 -1.26 7.46 -1.13 
Cereals -3.84 2.72 -1.31 -1.30 
Fats and oils -3.73 -0.73 -0.81 -1.29 
Raw materials -2.51 0.50 -1.72 -1.08 
Metals and minerals 0.08 6.12 -4.06 -0.09 
Note: Data are deflated by the World Bank's manufacturing unit value (MUV) index. The 
MUV index is the c.Lf. index of US dollar prices of industrial countries' manufactured 
exports to developing countries. Annual exponential growth rates were calculated using 
ordinary least-squares estimates. 
Source: World Bank, 1986. 
At the beginning of the 1970s world food production was close to the level of world food 
consumption. However, in 1973-4 a worldwide combination of bad harvests, inflationary 
macroeconomic policies, and speculative hoarding by most industrial countries led to world 
food shortages. As a response to the crisis, global food production (except in Africa) grew 
rapidly -considerably outstripping consumption and resulting in a dramatic increase in global 
stocks. World cereal stocks in 1985 were 147 per cent higher than in 1974, and amount to 
27 per cent of annual consumption (Tucker,1994). The average annual rate of decline in 
prices of commodity exports between 1980 and 1986 works out at nearly 12 per cent for 
sugar, 8 per cent for cotton, and 4.7 per cent for vegetable oils. Prices for tea and coffee 
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have been subject to wide fluctuations during this period. In 1987 alone coffee prices 
declined by 37 per cent. As a result it has been estimated that, during 1981-86, developing 
countries suffered losses on their export earnings to the extent of about US$14 billion 
(Barve, 1991). 
The evolution of agricultural prices was also stressed by the FAD Director General in his 
speech on June 1993. According to him, prices of agricultural, forestry and fishing 
commodities exported by developing countries have plummeted by 39 per cent in real terms 
since 1980. Coffee and cacao prices fell by 69 per cent whilst palm oil prices fell by 49 per 
cent and cotton and sisal by 47 per cent between 1980 and 1992. In parallel, the 
primary-export prices of developed countries fell by only 19 per cent for the same period 
(FAD, 1993). 
Moreover, different internal mechanisms within exporting countries have also been affecting 
internal prices in agriculture. In some selected countries agriculturally-based products 
presented significant differences in prices at the end of the last decade (see Table 5.5) 
5.1.3. Terms of trade 
As a consequence of such a price tendency the grow of real income in agro-exporting 
developing countries has been almost insignificant in aggregate terms. Thus, the 
improvement of purchasing power of in South Asia was moderate from 1980 to 1987, in 
Latin America it fell by 26 per cent and in Sub-Saharan Africa by 50 per cent. In contrast, 
in East Asia it rose by 45 per cent during the same period (Commonwealth secretariat, 
1991). The poor performance of countries specialising in primary commodities in world trade 
has again directed attention to the concept of terms of trade. However, it is important to bear 
in mind that there have been long discussions regarding terms of trade since the concept was 
introduced to the development literature by Raul Prebisch during the early 1950s. In fact no 
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Table 5.5 Price Comparison of Selected Commodities (Tokyo = 100). 
New York Hamburg London Paris 
Rice 36 123 48 43 
Bread 91 84 48 136 
Beef 31 35 28 35 
Beef (Imported) 96 109 88 107 
Ham 42 47 40 37 
Milk 50 44 53 55 
Sugar 53 43 48 47 
Chocolate 84 70 78 74 
Butter 44 44 36 37 
Egg 76 126 129 144 
Onion 65 54 99 38 
Cabbage 35 27 75 51 
Banana 59 59 120 113 
Tea 71 80 22 39 
Spaghetti 92 67 33 38 
Source: Economic Planning Agency (1989), modified from Hirata, et. aI., 1994, p.44. 
agreement exists on whether it is possible to find a persistent tendency for the terms of trade 
of developing countries in relation to industrial countries. Competing and conflicting 
theoretical and methodological approaches make it difficult to compare the various findings. 
As Williams (1994 pag 16) pointed out: 
"Although a persistent tendency for the terms of trade of primary commodities 
to deteriorate vis-a-vis manufactured products can not be proven, nevertheless, 
the prices of primary products are more unstable. And since 1974, with the 
exception of 1979-80, prices of many primary commodities have fallen 
steadily. In the 1980s prices of many primary commodities plummeted, 
recording the lowest levels since the end of World II. At the close of the 
decade, average commodity prices were 33 per cent lower than at the 
beginning of the 1980s. The two regions with the largest terms of trade losses 
were Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Declining terms of trade cost 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, 13 and 15 per cent respectively of 
their purchasing power in real terms relatively to 1970s. It is arguable that for 
Third World exporters with a heavy dependence on the export of specific 
commodities the international trading system has been unfavourable, not only 
in the 1980s but for most of the post-war period." 
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Table 5.6 Evolution of Terms of Trade for Selected Countries Classified by Major Primary 
Export, 1980-85. 
Bauxite/alumina producer (bauxite 78 per cent of exports, 1980) 
Jamaica 95 
Cocoa producer (cocoa 74 per cent of exports, 1980) 
Ghana 91 
Coffee producers (coffee greater than 60 per cent of exports, 1980) 
Burundi 99 
Colombia 97 
Uganda 96 
Copper producers (copper greater than 50 per cent of exports, 1980) 
Chile 79 
Zambia 72 
Cotton producers (cotton greater than 47 per cent of exports, 1980) 
Paraguay 83 
Sudan 87 
Iron ore producers (iron ore greater than 52 per cent of exports, 1980) 
Liberia 91 
Mauritania 96 
Oil producers (oil greater than 60 per cent of exports, 1980) 
Congo 95 
Mexico 98 
Nigeria 95 
Venezuela 94 
Sugar producers (sugar greater than 76 per cent of exports, 1980) 
Mauritius 78 
Countries whose principal exports are temperate agricultural products 
Argentina 88 
Uruguay 85 
Newly industrializing countries: exports dominated by manufacturers 
Hong Kong 110 
Korea 105 
Singapore 101 
Note: Figure by each country shows 1985 terms of trade index in relation to index of 100 
for 1980; figure below 100 denotes worsening terms of trade, while figure above implies 
improving terms of trade. 
Sources: World Bank 1987; Lloyds Bank Country Reports, quoted from Gwynne, 1990. 
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Thus, independently from theoretical and methodological discussions as regards terms of 
trade, an increasing gap between export and import prices has been affecting most 
agro-exporting developing countries. But in order to avoid over-generalisation, the precise 
impact very much depends on: the international evolution of prices; the level of dependency 
upon a particular commodity the country presents; and, last but not least, on the specific 
manufacturing import package which could be used as a reference for comparing the 
evolution of terms of trade. No doubt, the highly significant spread in developing nations of 
cheaper industrial and high-tech manufactured goods coming from the Asian NICs, might 
be a factor which could explain the slower pace of the worsening terms of trade for 
developing countries. 
Developing countries must not be considered any longer as a homogeneous group of nations 
even for aggregate analysis (see Table 5.6). Although most of them still remain highly 
dependent on primary exports, the available statistical information envisages a growing 
disparity between Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Eastern and East Asian nations as a 
result of their different patterns of export development. These differences have also started 
political antagonisms between developing countries, as has recently been observed in 
international political agendas related to development. As a matter of fact, as much as the 
number of nations involved in active trade around the world has increased, more complex 
has become the complete set of political and economic factors affecting the international 
process of supply and demand and the related system of international trade. 
Thus, for most agro-exporting developing countries international prices and markets have 
always been a major factor of uncertainty regarding their internal economic development 
trends. The high dependency of these traditionally small economies upon one or a small 
number of primary products has imposed on them a structural rigidity to set up long term 
development strategies due to the impact that the cyclical variation of export prices produces 
on both private and government budgets. However, the negative effect of price variations on 
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these export-oriented economies is not just the result of low or depressed international market 
prices. Periods of high international prices for the main export commodity have induced 
serious macroeconomic problems -mainly related to overexpenditure- in the medium and 
long-run. The experience suffered by the Latin American oil exporting countries after the 
1973-1974 oil boom provides an illustration. 
Therefore, despite possibility for some small exporting countries to strengthen and diversify 
exports to new markets, there are some inherent risks associated with primary commodity 
exports which have to be taken into account in any long-term socio-economic strategy of 
development. Improvements in the quality of export commodities, diversification of export 
production, and an aggressive political attitude oriented to both the opening of new 
international markets and the combating of unfair world market interference, should be seen 
as strategies for agro-exporting developing countries to follow in order to take medium- and 
long-term advantage of the contemporary dynamic of world trade. 
5.2. The Role of International Organisations in Developing Countries; the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
Developing countries are not only linked to the world economy through flows of trade. The 
current provision and availability of international financial resources for public and private 
investment should be also considered a major factor for explaining the growing number of 
developing countries actively participating in world markets. After the renegotiation of their 
foreign debt, flows of fresh capital have started to contribute substantially to the organisation 
and financing of a more open model of economic development in a number of developing 
countries. This has been one of the most important requirements to be fulfilled by developing 
economies in regard to the structural adjustment process in which many of these nations have 
been involved throughout the last two decades. Thus, either the availability or lack of capital 
for public or private investment, oriented to domestic or world markets has become a crucial 
factor for understanding a country's participation in or exclusion from the current world 
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process of capital accumulation. 
The flows of international financial and pr?ductive capital towards developing countries has 
different institutional sources: private banks, multilateral organisations, transnational 
corporations, NGGs, and direct country's loans and donations, are the most significant ones. 
Nevertheless, the potential allocation of investment or credits from these sources to any 
particular country responds to different criteria. Thus, the amount, conditions, timing and 
geographical allocation of these financial resources, used to be a result of the interplay of 
political, strategic and economic considerations, in which each institution evaluated different 
concerns in accordance with their own particular interest. However, as the governments of 
developing countries have been increasingly noticing, a number of these conditions have 
become common demands from some of the most important sources of external credit. The 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and specifically for Latin America, the Inter-
american Development Bank, have conformed a well defined international regime -the 
Washington consensus- as regards their specific demands and regulations. Since these 
international institutions deal directly with State agencies, most of the required conditions are 
mainly focused on specific policies with respect to macroeconomic objectives; the structural 
adjustment process is perhaps one of the most common examples. 
In parallel, other important sources of foreign capital for developing economies are 
transnational enterprises which used to perform in a wider scope of action if they are 
compared with the previous multilateral agencies. Although international trade used to be 
analysed in national terms, it is mainly carried out by large independent companies which 
many have sometimes surpassed the level of influences of countries. Thus, they have a 
significant capacity for manoeuvre to deal with different economic and political actors within 
and between countries. As was discussed earlier in Chapter 3, foreign investment, through 
the allocation of transnational capital in export-led productive activities, has been one of the 
most important actors in inducing developing countries to participate in a more active way 
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in world markets, since they have started to liberalise their economies. 
Although all sources of capital are relevant for developing nations' domestic budgets, it 
seems important to concentrate attention on those aspects which have been directly or 
indirectly involved in the strength and enhancement of exports from developing economies 
to world markets. Al least for most Latin American governments, the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the Inter American Development Bank, have been the most important agents to negotiate 
with as regards the current and future process of budget allocation. Whilst, in parallel to the 
growing political stability in the region, foreign investment has started to flourish, becoming 
the most important source of capital for the outward-oriented new development strategy, 
where nontraditional primary exports have started to playa crucial role. 
5.2.1. Multilateral funding agencies 
Some of the most active multilateral funding agencies -the IMF, and the World Bank- have 
become relevant for understanding the current process of economic restructuring in almost 
all Latin American countries. Some arguments have been made to minimise the role of 
multilateral agencies in the shift of some of the Latin American countries towards a more 
open free-trade economic strategy [with special mention of the Chilean case (HOJMAN, 
1994)]. However, it is important to bear in mind that in most of these nations, policies and 
actions oriented to structural adjustment processes, to stabilisation programmes, to economic 
productive conversion and to the opening of new external markets have become part of an 
integrated set of measures to be applied in long-term public policy. Government policy 
discipline, with regard to the conditions imposed by the funding agencies, is undoubtedly 
evaluated periodically, as has been agreed by all concerned. 
Therefore, even though some countries have already experienced and passed the hardest part 
of their structural adjustment process, the policy commitments they assumed at the very 
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beginning with the funding agencies have obliged them to maintain a strict programme in 
matters like deregulation, privatisation, macroeconomic stability and export promotion. The 
fulfilment of these commitments are fundamental requirements for obtaining the periodic 
payments from these agencies. An IMF member accepting an adjustment loan has to develop 
a medium-term policy framework to cover the period of the loan. As an example, one of the 
IMF loans -the Structural Adjustment Facility- is disbursed annually and linked to successes 
in meeting the macroeconomic targets agreed between borrower and lender. Thus, the real 
influence of the funding agencies upon the national economies goes far beyond the specific 
momentum in which Latin American governments decided to re-orientate their development 
strategies. 
5.2.1a The International Monetary Fund in its role in the process of economic 
restructuring in developing countries 
The IMF and the World Bank were created as a result of wartime collaboration between the 
United States and the United Kingdom on the future of the international economic system in 
the post-war world. The Fund was a concrete response to the perceived international 
monetary problems of the 1930s and the demand of post-war economic reconstruction. With 
the presence of 44 nations the Bretton Wood Conference established the liberal international 
economic regime of the post-war era. The main objective was to set up an international 
economic order that would prevent another political and economic collapse. From these 
origins, the IMF was designed to perform three important roles in the international monetary 
system: 
a) To regulate the financial relations of its members with respect to exchange rates and 
balance of payments restrictions. 
b) To provide financial assistance to members experiencing balance of payments difficulties 
through acting as a lender of last resort to countries with chronic structural payments 
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problems. The regulatory and financial roles were closely entwined with access to the 
Fund's resources being made dependent on following the code of conduct devised by the 
Fund. 
c) To act as a consultative organ, by creating a climate in which governments were to be 
persuaded to dismantle exchange controls and to permit free trade and the free movement 
of capital. 
Since then, the IMF has become one of the most important actors in the context of the 
international political economy of money and finance. At the beginning of 1993 the IMF 
comprised 175 countries, and its role in the provision of financial resources to its members 
has mainly evolved in response to pressures from the developing economies and changes in 
the international monetary system. The enlarged membership of the IMF after the fall of 
Socialist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe (the Fund has given a central role in 
assisting these countries in the transition to capitalism) has implied that lending to Europe 
has increased dramatically as can be observed in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 Total Fund Credits and Loans Outstanding. 
Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 
World 24,644.9 23,290.2 16,668.3 17,846.0 
Industrial countries - - - -
Developing countries 24,644.9 23,290.2 16,668.3 17,746.0 
Africa 6,172.9 5,749.3 5,882.7 5,722.7 
Asia 5,378.8 3,609.0 5,030.8 5,958.2 
Europe 905.5 917.1 3,464.6 6,644.9 
Middle East 196.8 154.1 155.2 407.0 
Western Hemisphere 11,909.9 12,869.8 12,134.9 11,013.2 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics February 1993, 
quoted from Williams, 1994. 
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Thus, the IMF transition from an agency principally oriented to short-term stabilisation 
measures to one with an interest in growth and development started at the end of the 1970s 
and intensified in the 1980s. It developed an extended role in the provision of finance to 
developing countries and spearheaded a change in international development policy. In return 
for its loans it urged debtor states to follow market-oriented policies. This is stated in the 
Articles of Agreement which make it clear that among the main aims of the IMF in 
providing financial assistance are: a) the maintenance of an open world economy, b) the 
provision of full employment and c) the development of productive resources in the domestic 
economy. In this regard according to Williams, IMF policies are based on the assumption 
that: 
liThe free and unrestricted movement of goods and services across national 
boundaries increases the welfare of individual nations and the world economy as a 
whole. Perfect competition and the operation of the laws of comparative advantages 
according to this approach ensure gains from trade for all countries. Liberalisation 
of foreign exchange facilities is concomitant on trade liberalisation and guarantees the 
flow of scarce foreign exchange to the most efficient sectors of the economy. These 
underlying assumptions provide the rationale on which the economic programmes of 
the Fund are constructed II (Williams, 1994 pag 71). 
Thus, the main belief is that the free and unobstructed operation of market forces provides 
the best alternative for economic recovery and growth. It is the market rather than 
governments which ensures the more efficient allocation of resources. According to this 
ideological guideline the IMF articulates its basic principle of conditionality to the provision 
of loans. Although the Fund does ~ot apply an identical treatment to the different receiving 
countries, the main goal of the Fund's macroeconomic policies are rectification of the 
payments imbalance and reduction of inflation. Additional important subsidiary goals 
consider the promotion of growth and the continued maintenance of the debt service 
payment. Developing countries have recently been the major borrowers from the Fund and 
the price of access to resources was the application of the IMF stabilisation policies. It is 
important to consider that the medium- and long-term Development Strategy established by 
the military regime in Chile in 1977 practically reproduced the previous quotation with 
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respect to its regional development assumptions for development. 
In the short term, the IMF's adjustment programmes for many developing countries have 
invariably included: 
a) A large devaluation of the domestic currency. 
b) A reduction in the budget deficit by cutting consumer subsidies and many other social 
expenditures. 
c) A reduction in government borrowing by placing limits on government borrowing from 
the Central Bank and ceilings on external borrowing. 
d) An increase in interest rates to raise domestic saving. 
e) a reduction of the money supply. 
In addition to these short-term financial measures the IMF, often in association with the 
World Bank, also proposes other major policy changes to affect resource allocation in the 
medium and long-terms. Thus, the liberalisation of foreign trade through the reduction of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers; the deregulation and liberalisation of prices, are also suggested. 
Furthermore, policy measures in favour of: the production of export crops over food for 
domestic consumption or manufacturing; private sector economic activity over public, 
para statal or cooperative production; and the allocation of resources by market forces rather 
than directly by the government are also strongly encouraged (Singh, 1993). 
However, an interesting feature which has arisen in recent times with respect to the 
restructuring process that affects developing countries is the growing and closer collaboration 
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between the IMF and the World Bank, to the extent that this cooperation has affected the 
orientation of both institutions. The Bank began to place greater emphasis on market-oriented 
reforms whilst the Fund has taken more interest in development (Summer, 1988 quoted by 
Williams, 1994). 
5.2.1b The World Bank and its role in the economic restructuring of developing countries 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) -better known as the 
World Bank- was created at the same time as the IMP, on July 1944. Whilst the IMP was 
initially oriented to provide funds for short-term balance of payments relief, the main role 
of the World Bank was directed to provide longer-term finance for the development of 
productive resources. The main objective of the Bank is to assist poor countries to accelerate 
economic growth and reduce poverty through channelling financial aid from the developed 
world to developing nations. Its membership grew from 38 to 160 between 1946 and 1992, 
and nowadays the World Bank is the leading international agency involved in the promotion 
of economic development. It has become the single largest provider of credit to developing 
countries. 
The World Bank has evolved significantly since it was created, particularly as regards the 
main guidelines it has followed to focus its lending policy. Between 1949 and 1973 (while 
the Bank experienced a financial and organisational expansion from the original IBRD to the 
World Bank Group) its main development concern was focused on the promotion of 
industrialisation. Between 1973 and 1979, the Bank expanded its lending given an additional 
emphasis on flows to the rural sector. Since the creation of the Structural Adjustment Loan 
(SAL) in 1980, it has been characterised by adjustment lending and by the greater role of 
programme lending. 
The SAL was created as a response to the deteriorating balance of payments position of a 
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number of developing economies. It reflected the desire of the top management of the Bank 
(it was created at the final stage of the MacNamara presidency) to exert greater control over 
the policy environment of Bank lending and to persuade countries to implement policy 
reforms. Initially, the SALs were concentrated in a country designated to receive a series of 
loans, of 12 to 18 months duration over a 3 to 5 year period. However, due to the deep 
crises faced by most developing economies since 1982, it was accepted that adjustment 
lending could be allocated for longer periods. Furthermore, the Bank shifted the burden of 
adjustment lending to Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECAL), which started to represent a high 
proportion of its lending as is observed in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 IBRD and IDA Adjustment Lending. 
SAL SECAL 
Year Volume Percentage Volume Percentage 
1989 1,825.7 18 4,615.5 27 
1990 1,434.0 17 5,534.6 25 
1991 2,238.9 21 3,432.5 25 
1992 3,159.8 26 2,687.5 22 
Source: World Bank, Annual Reports 1989-1992, quoted from Williams, 1994. 
The alternative on whether to use SAL or SECAL depended on the perceived operational 
effectiveness of both instruments concerning the particular programme of adjustment 
followed by the borrower country. According to Please, 1986 (quoted by Williams, 1994) 
the World Bank adjustment programmes has three interrelated components: 
a) A financial programme designed to monitor and exert discipline over the level of 
aggregate demand for goods and services. 
b) An external borrowing programme to monitor and discipline the extent to which the 
supply of goods and services should be augmented from abroad in the light of 
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creditworthiness considerations. 
c) A programme of structural adjustment measures designed to monitor and discipline the 
use to which resources are put. 
Structural adjustment measures in developing countries have gone far beyond the changes 
at the sectoral or sub-sectoral level. Since these former initiatives were considered as an 
insufficient instrument for achieving satisfactory policy changes, the Bank's structural 
adjustment lending-programme initiated a wide ranging dialogue over most areas of economic 
policy in the borrowing country. Thus, developing countries started to be pushed to perform 
deep macroeconomic changes since the 1980s in order to qualify for the Bank loans. As a 
result similar adjustment symptoms started to appear, since most of these countries obtained 
loans upon similar bases of conditionalities. In this regard, Williams, 1994 presented the 
typical adjustment programme of the Bank; it covers the following measures: 
a) External trade: measures include devaluation, removal of quantitative restrictions, tariff 
cuts and improved export incentives. 
b) Resource mobilisation: measures include interest rate adjustment, tax or budget reforms, 
cost recovery systems for public enterprises and greater control over the level and 
administration of external borrowing. 
c) Efficient use of resources: including the reduction or elimination of food subsidies, the 
restructuring and rationalisation of state marketing boards, changes in public expenditure, 
e.g. a shift away from government building to agriculture, health and education, and 
measures to improve energy efficiency. 
d) Institutional reforms: including privatisation of publicly-owned companies, increased 
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efficiency for public enterprises and a better targeted support for agriculture and industry 
programmes to improve project evaluation and the management of public enterprises. 
However, the specific application of this package depends on a number of factors concerning 
the borrower country's domestic conditions. As an example, the social, economic and 
political envirorunent of the borrower country has to be taken into account in order to 
identify the particular conditions upon which the lending programme is being settled. As an 
example, Table 5.9 shows a typical structural adjustment package identified from the analysis 
of seven IMF stabilisation programmes and from seven World Bank programmes. 
The first column shows the type of reform pursued and the next two columns indicate how 
many of these seven packages contained that reform. 
Concerning this point, the previous diagnosis the Bank has on the borrower country used to 
be deep enough to identify in advance the policy conditionality upon which the loan would 
be allocated. As can be noticed in a group of different developing countries (see Table 5.10), 
the sources for conditionalities imposed upon them by the Bank for qualifying for SALs 
and/or SECALs could vary substantially depending on their macroeconomic features. 
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Table 5.9 World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Packages. 
Element of Structural Adjustment Package World Bank IMF 
Remove import quotas/cut tariffs 6 7 
Improve export incentives 6 6 
Revise exchange rate policy 2 5 
Reform budget/taxes 5 6 
Reform interest rates 2 7 
Strengthen management of external borrowing 5 6 
Reform public enterprise resource use 5 6 
Revise current expenditure 2 7 
Strengthen financial and capital markets 2 1 
Reprioritize investments 6 3 
Revise agricultural prices 6 5 
Revise energy prices 5 6 
Introduce energy conservation measures 3 2 
Develop indigenous energy sources 3 3 
Revise industry incentive system 4 3 
Strengthen capacity for public investment 4 2 
Increase efficiency of public enterprises 6 1 
Improve support for agriculture 6 2 
Improve support for industry 4 0 
Source: Griffiths-Jones, 1988, quoted in Clark and Davies, 1991. 
As can be clearly observed, most of the pressures were focused on trade policies, though the 
orientation of public enterprises and public expenditure proved to be also important fields 
of concern for Bank lending. 
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Table 5.10 The Structure of Conditionality. 
Sub- Highly Other 
Saharan indebted developing AllIS 
Item African countries countries countries 
countries (b) (c) 
(a) 
Fiscal policy 8 11 15 11 
Budget and public expenditures 12 9 10 10 
Public enterprises 19 17 12 16 
Financial Sector 4 13 13 11 
Exchange rate 4 2 0 2 
Trade policy 25 32 25 28 
Industrial policy 7 2 2 3 
Energy policy 1 3 15 6 
Agricultural policy 17 1 2 2 
Other 2 1 2 2 
(a) Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia 
(b) Chile, Columbia, Cote d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco and the Philippines 
(c) Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey 
Source: IMF/IBRD Development Committee, Problems and Issues in Structural Adjustment 
(1990) based on an analysis of 51 SALS and SECALS in 15 developing countries, quoted 
from Williams, 1994. 
Thus, the World Bank has become the leading international agency concerned with the 
promotion of economic growth. It is the single largest provider of credit to developing 
countries. As a result, the resources flowing out of the severely-indebted nations to pay for 
the debt (total debt service) they incurred during the 1970s amounted to 7.1 per cent of GNP 
in 1989 (World Bank, 1989 quoted by Clark, 1991). 
Accordingly, most of the pressure has been focused on the redirection of the macroeconomic 
policies followed by developing countries. The main reason has been the belief that most of 
the socio-economic crises emerged from poor economic management. According to Clark 
(1991), the perception held by most of the international organisations involved in credit is 
that a number of developing countries are: squandering their financial resources; maintaining 
high subsidies and bloated civil services; not cutting spending when it is clear they need to; 
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putting all their money into recurrent as opposed to capital spending and neglecting the need 
to correct budget deficits. However, on the opposite side, the u.s. alone maintains a greater 
budget deficit then every single developing country combined. In this regard, a wider 
comparison between developing and developed countries is presented in Table 5.11. 
Ironically, the IMF and the World Bank is used by the most powerful developed nations to 
impose financial discipline and liberal economic policies on the developing world, but no 
mechanism exists which forces the rich countries to play by the rules they set for others. 
This fact clearly reflects the unequal power structure of a stratified international society 
(Williams, 1994). 
Table 5.11 Expenditure between Developing and Developed Countries (%). 
Budget Items Developing Countries Developed Countries 
Subsidies 6 per cent GDP 18 per cent GDP 
Public sector wages 2.4 per cent GDP 4 per cent GDP 
Social spending 8 per cent of government 56 per cent of government 
budget budget 
Capital spending 16 per cent of government 6 per cent of government 
budget budget 
Total government spending 26 per cent GDP (all Less 29 per cent GDP 
Developed Countries) 
Budget deficits 4.8 per cent (excluding 5.1 per cent 
India & China) 
• ouree: J, Clark, 1991, p .17. 
5.3. Protectionism in International Agricultural Markets 
Protectionism, as a concept, presents a wide variety of meaning in the current literature on 
development studies. In general, protectionism refers to a set of measures applied by most 
of the countries to stimulate and protect the development of a specific area of the economy 
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from internal and/or external competition. However, due to the fact that protective measures 
have been used around the world on different economic sectors and for different reasons 
(either for developing relatively weak sectors in less advanced nations or conversely. for 
restricting world production of demand-surplus goods) the concept of protectionism has 
become a rather ambiguous concept due to the wide range of hidden ideological and 
theoretical meanings by which it can be approached. Therefore, the following analysis is 
focused only on the agricultural sector. Protectionism is defined as any measure or specific 
set of policies acting against the free flow of agricultural products in world trade (external 
protectionism), and as measures that the State use to stimulate production of otherwise 
non-attractive commodities (domestic protectionism). 
There seems to be no distinction between countries in terms of their political attitude towards 
the present sources of interference in world trade. Most of them agree that barriers ought 
to be removed, though they behave otherwise in the day-to-day process of international trade. 
The review of protectionism in advanced countries showed that, on average, trade barriers 
tend to be higher on agricultural products than on manufactured, and within manufacturing 
products tends to be concentrated in a few sectors. In contrast, developing countries protect 
their manufacturing activities much more than the agricultural and their barriers are both 
more widespread and more variable (Balassa, 1989). Most countries, regardless of their level 
of development, protect and subsidise their agriculture. This behaviour is caused by opposite 
reasons. While in more advanced countries the problem of food is one of plenty, in the 
developing world there is not enough for everybody. 
From a general point of view, protectionism in world agricultural production can be 
understood as the combined result of three main factors: a) advanced countries' domestic 
policies, b) developing countries' domestic policies, and c) all existing world-trade 
regulations acting against the free bilateral and multilateral process of supply and demand. 
However, even though the first two sets of policies might be taken as one combined factor, 
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the strong differences between the interest of both groups make it difficult to understand and 
justify them with the same economic, social and political arguments. 
Thus, while advanced countries set up domestic policies to defend highly efficient producers 
in one of the economy's smallest sectors (in terms of production and occupied labour) most 
developing countries' policies are directed to stimulate production in a crucial group of 
activities taking into account sensitive aspects like food security, labour opportunities and 
primary export revenues. Moreover, in order to be consistent with the growing political 
expectations of a more open world-trade system, most of the protective policies of 
developing countries are oriented to help their export sectors overcome the serious handicaps 
that they have in competing in the world against the large firms of the more developed 
export economies. Thus, in the area of natural resources the major industrialised countries 
are strongly pressing for liberalisation in developing countries and for the elimination of 
export control. Agricultural support policies in the United States, the European Union, and 
Japan, for example, protect the income of domestic farmers by using different instruments 
such as price support and direct payments (Williams, 1994). 
Furthermore, free trade theory states that protectionist measures -such as domestic policies, 
tariffs, quotas, exclusionary specifications, embargoes or any other sort of regulation-
reduce of the international division of labour and tend to decrease global wealth. They are 
blamed as perpetuating production in uneconomic areas and as preventing maximum 
economies of scale and efficiency. It is claimed that this results in a lower standard of living 
for the people of the protected country, since protectionist measures mean more expensive 
goods or services. Thus, inefficient, uncompetitive domestic economic activities are allowed 
to survive. But surprisingly, even the main world political advocate of such principles are 
completely unable to behave in accordance with theory. This is indicated by the following 
quotation from the World Bank: 
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"In the United States, the government pays fanners not to grow grain; in the 
European community, fanners are paid high prices even if they produce excessive 
amounts. In Japan rice fanners receive three time the world price for their crop; they 
grow so much that some of it has to be sold as animal feed at half of the world price. 
In 1985, farmers in the E.C. received 18 US cents a pound for sugar that was then 
sold on the world market for 5 cents a pound; at the same time, the E.C. imported 
sugar at 18 cents a pound. Milk prices are kept high in nearly every industrial 
country, and surpluses are the result; Canadian will pay up to eight times the price 
of a cow for the right to sell that cow's milk at the government support price. The 
United States subsidises irrigation and land clearing projects and then pays farmers 
not to use the land for growing crops"(World Bank Report, 1986 pag 110). 
5.3.1. Protectionist policies in the agricultural sector of some advanced countries 
Undoubtedly, the previous contradiction between theoretical, political and empirical facts are 
relevant features to be taken into consideration as long as they provide useful arguments for 
developing countries to negotiate upon more realistic terms in future international discussions 
on agricultural trade. Moreover, it also seems important to go beyond these descriptive facts 
in an attempt to explaining the reasons and the mechanisms currently used by the most 
relevant actors in agricultural world production and trade; that is to say, the United State of 
America, the European Union and Japan. At least. the U.S. and the E.U. have traditionally 
been the two most important destinations for exports from developing countries. This pattern 
fully corresponds to the destiny of Chilean agricultural exports. 
Surprisingly, the main explanatory arguments given by the World Bank to understand the 
agricultural supportive policies for industrial countries also correspond to the main concerns 
which developing nations have regarding their rural areas; "to stabilize and increase fanners' 
income and slow the migration of people out of the sector"(World Bank, 1986). 
In any case, the main reason to understand why protectionism occurs is because even though 
population and consumption have increased. agricultural production has grown faster. Much 
of the global agricultural overproduction and depressed markets have resulted from 
government subsidies. especially in industrial countries. In 1986 nearly 48 per cent of 
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developing countries' agricultural exports to industrial nations were affected by non-tariff 
barriers (Tucker, 1993-8). 
5.3.1a Some U.S protective agricultural domestic polices 
The highly protective domestic policy of the U.S. is not only explained by the fall of 
agricultural world market prices (as a result of large surpluses) but also as a way to combat 
the heavily-subsidised E.U. exports. Moreover, U.S. domestic consumption is growing 
roughly by about 1 per cent a year, while cereal consumption (as an example) is growing by 
about 3.5 per cent a year in developing countries. Thus, according to some estimates, 
developing countries could become the most important source of future demand for U.S. 
food exports. So, the U.S. current expenditure in farm subsidies and the concomitant surplus 
production may find ready markets in the future. This optimistic forecast, however, presents 
a deep contrast with the latest problems that the U.S. agricultural sector has been facing 
since the beginning of the 1980s. The value of U.S. agricultural exports fell 40 per cent 
between its peak in 1981 (US$43 billion) and its trough in 1986 (US$26 billion). As a result, 
200,000 American farms went out of business during this period. In 1986, the farm credit 
system was strained by debt and the federal government farm-programmes spent US$31 
billion, more than US$13,OOO for each American farmer. Even though there were some 
improvements in exports at the end of the 1980s, they were still were 15 per cent below the 
level achieved in 1981. In that decade, the real net farm-income was lower than in any of 
the previous four. (Tucker, 1994a). 
Most of the U.S. agricultural policies have been established as temporary ones. Nowadays 
about 80 per cent of American farmers take part in a voluntary price support scheme for 
products such as wheat, cotton and rice. The main aim of U.S. programmes is to protect 
farm income and support prices by using a wide range of policy tools directed to: raise 
domestic prices, facilitate production, enhance export and divert acreage away from excess 
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production of commodities. As world prices have fallen, budgetary expenditure has increased 
sharply (Tucker, 1994a ). 
In addition to these policies, the U.S. government has set up an active programme oriented 
to encourage and boost agricultural exports through the provision of assistance to the 
exporter. In this task, through the Eximbank, the government has attempted to provide a 
mechanism to compensate exporters for some of the failings of private markets. As a 
negotiating tool, a mixed credit war chest was established in the late 1980s to assist with 
capital goods sales. This small fund is used to match what are perceived as unfair credit 
offers by competing export credit agencies of industrial countries. Thus, the emphasis of the 
Eximbank has shifted away from providing substantial credits for export sales for those 
developing countries which desire to buy U.S. goods, and focuses instead on subsidised 
credits to neutralise the selected sales of other industrial countries. 
The other important mechanism oriented to assist agricultural exports was the creation of the 
Export Enhancement Programme (EEP) at the end of the 1980s. One of its main aims was 
to fight heavily subsidised Ee agricultural exports. However, the EEP has been extending 
its role and now gives the federal government greater control over the market for and supply 
of agricultural commodities. Through the EEP system the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
compensates exporters of agricultural commodities by giving them government-owned 
products to meet the difference between world prices and the generally higher U.S. prices. 
EEP sales had reached US$8.9 billion at the end of 1989, and the market value of EEP 
bonus awards was US$2.6 billion, of which US$I.8 billion went for wheat sales; 77 per cent 
went to the former USSR, China, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco. Moreover, the government 
payed an export subsidy to shippers as a way of encouraging them to sell some agricultural 
products to selected markets. A sum of US$I,3oo million a year has been directed to this 
subsidy on the basis of around US$20 per tonne. The fanners were also offered to be payed 
by the government to keep additional acreage out of production; by the mid-1980s, more 
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than 27.5 per cent of farmers had already agreed. Table 5.12 illustrates total value of US 
agricultural production in 1986. Thus, with the combined effect of all these policies and 
subsidies the U.S. could also build a strong platform to improve its negotiating leverage for 
the Uruguay round, much to the detriment of the poorest agro-exporting countries (Tucker, 
1994b; Tucker, 1994a; Moyes, 1987). 
Table 5.12 US Agricultural Production Subsidy Equivalents, 1986. 
Value of Value of US policy Production 
production to producer subsidy equivalent 
($ billions) ($ billions) (% of production) 
Wheat 9.2 5.8 63 
Com 20.4 10.1 50 
Rice 1.5 1.1 72 
Sorghum 2.2 1.1 49 
Barley 1.4 1.0 76 
Oats 0.5 0.1 16 
Soya bean 9.4 1.2 13 
Dairy 17.6 10.4 59 
Sugar 1.7 1.4 83 
Beef and Veal 20.9 2.4 12 
Pork 9.5 0.7 8 
Poultry 8.9 1.5 17 
Total 103.0 36.9 36 
Note: State subsidies included. 
Source: USDA, Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Government 
Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-86, quoted in Tucker, 1994a, p.115. 
5.3.1b Some protectionist policies of the European Union (EU) in agricultural markets 
There is no agreement yet on whether the establishment of the single market and full 
economic integration between E.U. members in 1992 should be seen as an effective 
contribution to the opening of the world economy. The concept of a single market is founded 
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on the belief that the E. U. needs to make a quantum leap in productivity and competitiveness 
if it is to compete effectively with other trading countries and blocs. In fact, the E. U. is not 
self-contained since it is the largest importer of agricultural products in the world, and 60 
per cent of these imports come from developing countries. But, in the meantime, the E.U. 
is the second largest exporter of agricultural products many of which -as the cases of with 
sugar, cereals, dairy products and meat- are also grown and consumed in developing 
countries. Thus, the E.U. is not only an effective instrument of 12 countries to combat the 
traditional competitiveness of U.S. and Japanese products but also those of a number of 
developing countries. 
Current E. U. trade in agricultural products is principally determined by classical trade policy 
instruments such as tariffs and quotas, and by a number of internal instruments which 
influence consumption, production and storage. Perhaps the main instrument is the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which regulates the vast majority of products grown within the 
E. C.. The CAP includes different market intervention systems depending on the product. In 
addition, there are a number of exceptions to trade regulations, either for particular products 
and/or for countries. The CAP had a stormy origin in trying to compromise between 
different interests due to the fact that the agricultural policies of member countries differed 
markedly. As a result of that, the same food had different prices in the region, and since the 
price of food affects wages, it also affected industrial competitiveness between countries. 
According to Moyes (1987), the main aims to set up the CAP as a regulatory instrument 
were: 
a) To improve food security as a form of insurance against war, weather or pest. This aim 
led to the objective of greater self-sufficiency, achieved through higher agricultural 
productivity. 
b) To maintain jobs on the land, preferably on family farms. 
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c) To ensure a "fair standard of living for the agricultural community". 
d) To stabilise markets 
e) To keep consumer foods prices stable and reasonable. 
As the basic aims of all countries taking part in CAP policies are oriented to market unity, 
community preferences and common financial responsibility, it could be said that the basic 
role of the CAP is one of protection. With the exceptions of alcohol and potatoes, the 
markets from all commodities produced within the E. U. are in one way or another regulated 
by Common Market organisations, in which the yearly decision on prices taken by the 
Council of Ministers is of major relevance. According to Schrader (1994), the highly 
differentiated and complex market instrument for agricultural products can be separated into 
four broad categories: 
a) Internal price support combined with external protection by levies and/or customs duties 
for: most cereals; sugar; milk; beef and veal; pork; some fruits and vegetables; table 
wines and seafoods. They cover more than 70 per cent of total agricultural production. 
Increasing levels of self-sufficiency, as a logical consequence of the support system, have 
shifted the E. U. from a net importer to a net exporter of most basic food commodities. 
b) Internal price support for producers and liberal trade, that is deficiency payment systems, 
which make up the difference between producers' and consumers' price, with low prices 
for consumers or for the processing industry of olive oil, some oilseeds, tobacco, mutton 
and raisins. They cover about 3 per cent of agricultural production. 
c) External protection alone for flowers, wine (other than table wine), other fruits and 
vegetables, eggs and poultry. It covers about 25 per cent of agricultural production. This 
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category -external protection as the only protective instrument- is relevant in the case of 
certain fruits and vegetables for which no internal intervention system exists. The 
customs duties on these products varies (between 4 per cent and 21 per cent), depending 
on the season and on the processing stage of the commodity in question. 
d) Flat-rate aid based on acreage or output for durum wheat, cottonseed, flaxseed and 
hempseed, hops, silk worms, seeds and dehydrated fodder. It covers about 1 per cent of 
production. It has virtually the same effects on trade as deficiency payment system and 
is mainly oriented towards import substitution. The number of commodities covered by 
this policy has expanded since the founding of the E.E.C., mostly as a consequence of 
the entry of Mediterranean countries which grew products that are of minor importance 
to the old member countries. 
At present, the E.U. is a customs union with a common external tariff, a Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and some jointly administered non-tariff trade barriers. Most of 
the protectionist measures applied by the E. U. against exports from developing countries 
have shifted from tariff to non-tariff barriers. The non-tariff barriers is a rather complicated 
system of special measures which sometimes, just by its own complexity, tends to discourage 
agricultural exports from some developing countries as it is almost impossible for producers 
in those countries to fulfil all the requirements. Most of the more important non-tariff 
barriers consist in voluntary export restraints, licensing and quotas, E. U. surveillance, 
antidumping procedures, technical regulations and standards, public procurement or 
minimum prices. Other more specific non-tariff trade barriers still remain the responsibility 
of member governments, but these are (according to the rules) only implemented with the 
consent of the Brussels administration (Hiemenz, 1994). 
As a result of all these interrelated protective mechanisms, non-Eo U. members (especially 
developing countries) have been expressing much concern about the future of agricultural 
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production and world trade for agricultural commodities. Thus, various studies stressing the 
positive effects of E. U. integration on economic growth, structural change and import 
demand could not dissipate the fear that the E.C. would be tempted to shift parts of the 
adjustment burden to developing countries by building a "fortress Europe" (Langhammer, 
1994). 
5.3.1c Agricultural Protectionist Policies from Japan 
In spite of the fact that Japan has been continuously liberalising its imports policies since the 
late 1960s, this does not mean that import to this country are completely free from 
protectionist barriers. Even though overt and formal quantitative restrictions are few, some 
particular sectors remain heavily protected; agriculture is the most important case. At the end 
of the 1980s, the estimated ad valorem equivalent of quantitative restrictions for agriculture 
was as high as 48.5 per cent, much higher than in the other major industrial countries 
(except for petroleum and related products in France). Government regulations have a visible 
effect on some agricultural products like rice (largely the most protected crop), wheat, beef, 
sugar and dairy products. 
The main domestic policies protecting agricultural production are directed to rice crops. 
After the severe food shortages suffered after the Second World War, price supports have 
been the main means for achieving self-sufficiency in rice, which was reached around 1960. 
Although land under rice has progressively fallen, rice still accounted for one-third of total 
agricultural income in 1985 and was grown on 2.3 million hectares or 40 per cent of total 
farmland. The Food Agency, which administers production and domestic and international 
trade in rice, consistently allowed price increase for rice higher than the national average (in 
the last decade Japanese nominal rice protection was estimated at 235 per cent). As a result 
of that the price of rice in Japan became four to twelve times higher than the international 
price. Wheat and barley are substitutes for rice and they are also under the control of the 
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Food Agency receiving government fixed prices much higher than international ones. 
Other types of direct and indirect subsidies such as direct payment, input cost reduction and 
general services are also important. As an example, in 1988 the budget of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery was 9.8 per cent of total Japanese central government 
expenditure. Of this, roughly 80 per cent was spent on the agricultural sector to improve 
productivity and expand production, to achieve price stability and income support, to 
improve farmers' welfare and to rationalise distribution channels. There are three main 
reasons given to explain the purposes of agricultural protectionism: a) food security, b) fairer 
rural-urban income distribution and c) to help the sectoral adjustment process. Thus, the core 
of Japanese protectionism lies in agriculture, and the imposition of these measures and 
barriers is probably the largest single practice to adversely affect the market opportunity of 
developing countries. Although this country does not subsidise major agricultural 
commodities for export, extensive domestic protectionism seriously reduces or denies their 
import, thereby contributing to the decline in international food prices (Hirata, et. aI, 1994; 
Yamazawa, et. al 1994). 
5.3.2 Agricultural protectionism: concluding remarks 
The protective measures affecting agricultural world production have different causes and 
most of the countries involved in agricultural trade have imposed strong policies to protect 
their interests in the first instance. The E.U. and the U.S. have traditionally been the two 
most important destinations for food products from developing countries, and access to these 
markets has provided an avenue for encouraging them to apply a number of domestic policies 
oriented to achieve a better integration into the international division of labour. Moreover, 
it is possible to say that agricultural protection and export subsidies in the developed 
countries adversely affect the agricultural exports of the developing countries, even though 
they could lower the cost of food imports for several of these nations. 
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Even though substantial explicit progress has been made in the search for a free agricultural 
trade system in all the different international forums (notably in the Cairns Group of the 
GATT), there is still little hope for agro-exporting developing countries to effectively 
participate in a more egalitarian trading system. According to figures of the last F AO 
Conference held in Rome in 1993, the OECD estimated that consumers and tax-payers of 
the industrialised countries transferred to the agricultural sector US$354 billion in 1992. This 
sum, higher than in 1991, was two and a half times the total amount of developing countries' 
incomes coming from their agricultural, fishing and forestry exports. Moreover, net transfers 
to agricultural producers in the OEeD also increased, accounting, for US$179 billion in 
1992. 
However, the existing protectionist trade policies towards developing countries have become 
very complex. In the meantime all countries are evolving in such a different way, that it does 
not seem possible to analyze the agricultural world-trading system in the simple context of 
North-South economic relationships, as long as most of the external policies are affecting 
them in such a completely different way. As a result of this, a number of countries are 
directing their political and international relations to establish economic alliances between 
nations, regardless of their level of development and other functional links. This is leading 
towards a new sort of multinuclear world-trading system in which former "political enemies" 
have suddenly become new economic allies. 
Thus, the emergence of complex economic and political linkages inside a growing number 
of traditional and new trading blocs, with protection at their borders, seems to be a strong 
argument acting against the effectiveness of most of the free-trade theoretical assumptions 
(see Table 5.13). According to the World Bank (1992), 41.4 per cent of world trade in 1988 
occurred inside the existing powerful trade blocs. The E.U.'s link with Eastern Europe and 
U.S.lCanada links with Mexico would take this up to nearly 50 per cent. Moreover, the IMF 
estimates that 71 per cent of the E. U. 's and EFTA's exports are within their borders, 31 per 
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cent of Japan's and East Asia's within theirs, and 42 per cent of NAFTA's within their 
members. Eighty per cent of Mexico's exports go to the U.S., whereas Africa sends 95 per 
cent of its exports beyond the continent (Lang and Hines, 1993). However, besides the three 
super-blocs there are other smaller and emerging trading blocs -as with APEC and 
MERCOSUR- which can become important actors in future trade concerning international 
agricultural markets (see Table 5.14). 
Table 5.13 Share of Regional Trading Schemes in Intra-regional Exports and World Exports, 
1990 
Scheme Share in intra-
regional exportsll 
Australia-New Zealand closer 7.6 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
European Community 60.4 
European Free Trade Area 28.2 
Canada-US Free Trade Area 34.0 
Association of South East Asian 18.6 
Nations 
Andean Pact 4.6 
Central American Common Market 14.8 
Latin American Free Trade 10.6 
Area/Latin American Integration 
Association 
Economic Community of West 6.0 
African States 
Preferential Trade Area for Eastern 8.5 
and Southern Africa 
IlIntra-regional exports as percentage of the region's total exports 
bRegion's exports as percentage of total world exports 
Share in total world 
exportsb 
1.5 
41.4 
6.8 
15.8 
4.3 
0.9 
0.1 
3.4 
0.6 
0.2 
Source: de Meio and Panagariya, 1992, quoted from Lang and Hines, 1993. 
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Table 5.14 Various Trading Blocs and Their Members (Up to 1992). 
Trade Bloc Members When Founded 
Andean Pact Bolivia, Chile (now left), 1969 
Columbia, Ecuador. Peru, 
Venezuela 
Asia-Pacific Economic Australia, Canada, China, Hong first met 1989; 
Co-operation (APEC) Kong, New Zealand, Japan, secretariat 1992 
Korea. Taiwan, USA + 6 
ASEAN countries 
Association of SE Asian Brunei. Indonesia, Malaysia, 1991 
Nations (ASEAN) Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
Central American Costa Rica (1962-92), first agreed 1961; 
Common Market (CACM) EI Salvador, Honduras (1961-76), new agreement 1992 
Guatemala, Nicaragua 
East African Community Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 1967-77 
(EAC) 
European Community Belgium, Denmark, Eire, France, first signed 1957; 
(EC) Germany, Greece, Italy, new agreements 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, 1987 and 1993 
UK 
European Economic Area EC + EFTA 1992 
(EEA) 
European Free Trade Area Austria, Finland, Leichtenstein, 1960 
(EFTA) Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
North American Free Canada, Mexico, USA 1992 initial signing 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
Southern Cone Common Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 1992 
Market Treaty (Mercosur) Uruguay 
Source: Lang and Hines, 1993, p.43. 
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Finally, protectionist measures with respect to agricultural production cannot be judged 
equally without considering the very large differences between countries; as an example, the 
average subsidy per cow in the Dutch industry equal the Colombian per capita income. 
Moreover, most of the existing direct or indirect barriers affecting international trade of 
primary products are imposed by developed countries acting on their own (as with the cases 
of the U. S. and Japan) or by creating corporative constraints (as with the case of the E. U. 's 
Common Agricultural Policy). According to the World Bank (1990), nearly one third of the 
agricultural exports of developing countries are directly affected by non-tariff barriers 
relating to health, safety measures, custom valuations procedures, among others. These 
constraints affecting world trade represent one of the most serious challenges to be faced by 
developing countries in future agendas, in which the Uruguay Round of the Gatt has put 
some hope for the future. 
Conversely, in a number of transitional developing economies in Latin America, subsidies 
have been used as a key tool towards a process of productive conversion from highly 
protected inward-oriented strategies to the search for a more open, diversified and 
competitive productive system within world markets. However, most of the current direct 
or indirect ways of protectionism in Latin American economies are almost insignificant if 
they are compared with both those that existed before the import-substituting phase of 
development and those currently applied by more advanced countries. 
5.4. Summary 
As a result of recent political and economic restructuring -(the collapse of the Soviet-style 
socialism and the subsequent spread of a world-wide capitalist economic systems) linkages 
among nations has increased significantly. However, the new international division of 
production is still being affected by an increasing number of interfering factors. Most 
multilateral declarations strongly advocate and encourage a free trade system within a more 
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open economic world. However, facts show that efforts, especially from advanced countries, 
are still inconsistent. 
However, regardless of different kinds of constraints acting against the fluidity of world 
markets, primary resources (especially agricultural products) have become an additional 
source of problems for most developing economies. By falling from 31 per cent to 20 per 
cent in the share of global trade, less developed economies have little chance to influence the 
progressive and steadily fall of primary export prices and the related deterioration of terms 
of trade. Therefore, even if these countries could become part of new trade agreement and 
reach otherwise neglected markets, this effort would not necessarily imply significant 
changes in prices in primary export markets. This is partly because trade policies in the 
U.S., Europe and Japan continue continued preventing export growth from more competitive 
agricultural producers. 
Other additional factors are also important for future trends in world-market prices. As a 
result of a growing number of developing countries undergoing structural adjustment 
(through which exports are fostered), primary exports are expected to rise in the future and, 
consequently, prices to fall. So, paradoxically, while economic organisations are pushing 
developing countries to increase exports, the most advanced nations push in the opposite 
way. 
A great deal of attention is being focused by different countries in different regions on 
establishing selective trade agreements among them in order to secure markets for their 
products. However, most of the time these economic alliances not only define medium- and 
long-term trading and investment opportunities for the participant members, but also place 
barriers on participating nations from establishing trade and investment linkages with 
competitors and third parties. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a 
clear example showing both the potentialities and restrictions for Mexican enterprises. 
160 
Surprisingly, many Latin American economies are pushing to join the U.S., Canada and 
Mexico in NAFTA, notably Chile, despite their explicit attitude for a less regulated 
world-trade system. In this regard, even though Chile could have better expectations for 
reaching wider markets, some adverse effects could also start to arise. The growing level of 
imports of cereals from the U.S. and Canada needs to be seriously considered with respect 
to some potential internal impacts resulting from a more open trade agreement with NAFTA 
members (for impacts on cereal farmers in the Maule region, see Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, the growing number of economic trade agreements has also contributed to the 
emergence of contradictory political disputes among these nations in their competition for 
existing markets. Indeed, this is not an exclusive feature of developing countries as the 
continued negotiations between advanced nations show. 
Thus, contradictions anse especially when countries advocate the fall of all existing 
regulatory mechanisms but, at the same time, participate in a rather complex net of exclusive 
economic links. Their excuse is that they are creating new groups to defend the freedom of 
world trade. Nevertheless, the flow of transnational capital has begun to become so relevant 
that very often it has passed in quantitative terms the existing trade between nations. 
Therefore, the growing linkages among different actors concerning present world economic 
trends has been generating a rather diffuse and complex system of alliances where particular 
nation-states are becoming less independent to deal with their international economic 
behaviour. 
"The international system is not to any appreciable extent a society united by 
common rules, but simply an aggregate of separate societies each pursuing its own 
purposes, and linked with one another in ways that are essentially ad hoc, unstable 
and transitory" (Nardin, 1983 quoted by Williams, 1994 pag 216). 
Accordingly, in addition to world prices it seems that geopolitics have largely become the 
main arena for the establishment of all future economic trends. 
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Chapter 6. Imperatives and Restrictions for a State-led Rural Development 
Strategy in Chile 
Introduction 
The regional development approach that the former military government advocated when the 
process of economic restructuring started can be summarised in the following official 
assumption, as included in its long-term regional and social policies: 
"The exploitation of the country's main resources (export-led primary 
activities) should produce, by itself, an increase in regional population by 
depopulating the main centres of urban concentration. This will, in turn, 
increase regional economic specialisation and once a productive regional 
infrastructure has been developed, it will constitute the main factor to induce 
a more even resettlement of the country's population among the different 
regions" (ODEPLAN, 1976). 
Thus, the government acted according to the belief that the regional development process (the 
neutralisation and reversion of a very concentrated pattern of national development) had to 
be the direct and spontaneous consequence of the free allocation of productive resources in 
both sectoral and spatial terms. This was because most of the activities in which the country 
was supposed to have comparative advantage were located far away from the main national 
centre of urban and economic agglomeration (the capital city of Santiago). Thus, the search 
for economic efficiency was encouraged through fostering a better use of all regional 
productive resources, especially the use of labour. Consequently and according to 
ODEPLAN, "the exploitation of new export-led primary activities would provide new 
working opportunities in the countryside, bringing to these people full access to a 
humanitarian development. Hence, extreme poverty, which is often prevalent in rural areas 
would be finally eradicated, as a result of the equalisation of these people's basic living 
conditions in reference to urban areas (ODEPLAN, 1976). 
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Accordingl y, there were two main consequences derived from these arguments (characterised 
by a non-active and "neutral" role of the state), in all regards to sectoral and territorial 
policies. First, most of the former sectoral and regional approaches to development (created 
and followed by the two previous governments from the mid 1960s), and oriented to 
discriminate in favour of regions and against the country's growing centralism, came to an 
end in 1978 as a result of the implementation, by the Planning Office, of the initial 
assumption of regional development (Boisier, 1978). Secondly, no significant corrective social 
and economic measures, policies and programmes, which could jeopardize both the free 
allocation of productive resources and the quest for maximum economic efficiency, were to 
be expected from the government. 
As a result of that, therefore, from the beginning of the period in the mid-1970s in which 
nontraditional exports started to transform a significant share of the Chilean rural 
environment, to the beginning of the 1990s in which Aylwin regime started to implement 
some corrective measures concerning social justice in the countryside, no significant policies 
were established in order to minimize the deep social consequences that the opening of the 
Chilean economy produces in the countryside. The high rate of sectoral and regional 
economic growth achieved during the period became an additional argument that the military 
government held for justifying no interfering measures which could have put at risk the 
expansion of the export-oriented agricultural process. 
However, when Aylwin's democratic government came to power in 1990, economic growth, 
social equity and environmental sustainability were declared as the main general principles 
for the orientation of future policies. 
The commitment that the government had to continue with the strengthening of primary 
exports, as a way of maintaining or even increasing the country's rate of economic growth, 
did not face major problems. Both domestic and foreign investment remained substantial in 
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traditional and non-traditional export activities (Gwynne 1994). The long-and medium-term 
agreements between the Pinochet regime and the international economic agencies (IMF, 
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank) were also assumed by the new 
government. From the macroeconomic perspective, there were no significant shortages of 
financial resources for public expenditure, since multilateral loans not only continued flowing 
into the country but even increased in pace. 
In parallel, the government also encouraged an early political compromise with private sector 
entrepreneurs in order to maintain the same general rules that operated before the political 
regime changed. As Silva (1993) pointed up, this commitment eliminated many fears among 
agrarian entrepreneurs. President Aylwin strongly stated in a speech to a conference on 
foreign investment: 
"The democratic government does not want to go back to a state bases pattern 
of development. On the contrary, the government will stimulate private 
initiative, interfering as little as possible with market decisions ... Fortunately, 
the ideologisation and polarisation existing in the past in Chile on this matter 
have been overcome" (EI Mercurio, 23 May 1990). 
However, in April 1990, the chairman of the "Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura" (National 
Association of Agriculture), Jorge Prado, had already made public his satisfaction (EI 
Mercurio, 22 April 1990) with the continuation of free-market policies, stressing the "mutual 
understanding" existing in this respect between the landowner organisations and the 
government (Silva, 1993). As result of that, both private investment and production in 
mining, fishing, forestry and agricultural activities, continued flourishing without any sort of 
government restriction. Moreover, as an example of continuity the government -under an 
international loan- started an ambitious irrigation programme oriented to improve the security 
of water availability and to convert dry land to irrigation on a surface of roughly half-million 
hectares in the potentially most productive areas of the country. 
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The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to present some insight into the main productive 
and social imperatives that the Aylwin's government had to face in order to develop its rural 
policies, and secondly, the main source of restrictions for rural policies are also presented, 
taking principally into account some of the most important institutional, social, financial and 
political constraints acting against of integrated rural development attempts. Nevertheless, 
these themes cannot be considered the only relevant factors influencing the government's 
view and actions concerning rural development policies. However, they strongly influenced 
the interministerial strategy for rural development discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. 
6.1. The New Internal Context for Rural Development 
However, in spite of the successful period of economic growth shown by the Chilean 
economy since, the whole economic strategy started to face some medium-term difficulties 
as a result of both external and internal factors. Whereas the national economy has been 
growing by 6.4 per cent a year throughout the 1990s (1990-93), one of its main export 
engines, the agricultural sector, has been growing rather less -4 per cent a year; forecasts 
from the Business Monitor International give sectoral growth rates in agriculture of 1.0 per 
cent and 1.6 per cent for 1994 and 1995 respectively (Table 6.1).The low elasticity of 
demand for agricultural and primary-based exports in international markets, new sources of 
protectionism imposed by the governments of advanced countries's markets, and the fall in 
world agricultural prices due to growing external competition can be mentioned among the 
external factors. The successful process of export promotion through the exploitation of the 
factor-driven comparative advantages strategy of production (Porter, 1990), seems to be 
reaching its final stages. Increasing costs of labour, irrigation and land, pressures on 
infrastructure facilities (roads and ports), and technical and entrepreneurial skill shortages in 
some regions of the country, have been progressively increasing the costs of export-led 
agriculture production in comparison to the boom years of the 1980s. Thus, the comparative 
fall in agribusiness profitability has been an important factor to understand the lower pace 
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Table 6.1 Sectoral Gross Domestic Product, 1989-1995. 
(bn pesos; 1986 constant prices) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993(p) 1994(0 1995(0 
Agriculture & forestry 321 348 356 370 374 378 384 
% change 2.6 8.5 2.3 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.6 
Fishing 51 48 53 58 59 65 65 
% change 12.2 -5.1 9.5 10.5 1.5 10.2 0.0 
Mining 404 396 417 424 426 428 434 
% change 9.6 -1.9 5.3 1.5 0.6 0.5 1.4 
Manufacturing 776 781 825 916 949 996 1046 
% change 10.9 0.5 5.7 11.0 3.6 5.0 5.0 
Electricity, gas & water 99 98 121 149 156 164 172 
% change -2.8 -1.7 24.1 22.6 5.2 5.0 4.9 
Construction 227 237 246 278 317 332 355 
% change 17.2 4.5 3.8 12.8 14.0 4.7 6.9 
Commerce, tourism 635 667 708 807 878 917 990 
% change 12.6 5.1 6.2 14.0 8.7 4.4 8.0 
Transport 293 312 342 391 422 447 483 
% change 13.5 6.4 9.6 14.2 7.9 6.0 8.0 
Financial services 562 581 630 700 750 788 835 
% change 13.9 3.4 8.4 11.1 7.1 5.0 6.0 
Home ownership 203 208 213 216 221 225 230 
% change 1.7 2.6 2.0 1.6 2.5 1.8 2.2 
Personal services* 335 345 357 370 385 400 420 
% change 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.0 5.0 
Public administration 147 150 152 156 159 162 165 
% change -0.3 1.4 1.4 3.0 1.5 1.9 1.9 
(other calculations)** 255 265 285 354 402 443 482 
TOTALGDP 4,308 4,436 4,705 5,189 5,498 5,745 6,061 
% Change 10.2 3.0 6.1 10.3 6.0 4.5 5.5 
*Includes Education and Health hIncludes VAT, Import duties, less 6ank charges 
Source: Chilean Central Bank, including provisional figures (p) and BMI forecasts (f); quoted from Gwynne, 1994. 
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of sectoral expansion in agriculture. This puts at risk the sustainability of the current 
socio-economic strategy of development for the medium and long term. 
However, as regards social aims, the new government had less room for manoeuvre in its 
task for diminishing the high levels of poverty the country had when it came to power. 
According to official statistics, 40 per cent of the Chilean population was living in poverty 
in 1990, more than one half of which lived in rural areas (see Chapter 2). Undoubtedly, after 
a long period of socio-political repression, a new democratic government could not avoid but 
to face this fact as one of the most urgent socio-political problems of the short term. In fact, 
a more explicit an active attitude against poverty could be easily considered as one of the 
most important features of the new role of Chilean State. 
6.2. Imperatives for Rural Policies 
Without neglecting the close relationship between rural poverty and agricultural production, L 
it is important to bear in mind that relevant features related to mining and fishing activities 
are also strongly contributing to lower Chile's rural standard of living. Small-scale 
agriculture, mining and fishing activities have been historically associated with poverty, not 
only because of comparative lower conditions of rural productivity levels, but also due to L 
their marginal functional linkages - as regards the main domestic and export markets, 
geographical isolation, and last but not least, due to culturally-based behavioural differences 
towards risk, economic efficiency and capital accumulation in the small-scale sector 
(Schurman, 1992). 
Agribusiness entrepreneurs have been largely arguing that infrastructure shortages -mainly 
feeder road, ports and irrigation schemes- have become a major factor preventing potentially 
higher levels of productive investment and sectoral growth. According to official figures, 
Chile has a total road network of almost 80,000 kilometres, of which 24,000 km constitute 
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the basic structural system as it concentrates more than 90 per cent of normal vehicle flow. 
However, only 12,000 km. of this system has been paved of which 28 per cent is in bad 
conditions (Ministry of Transport, 1994). As an example, these shortages have been adversely 
affecting the forestry sector in the mid-south regions of Chile. The Bioblo Region, the most 
important forestry region of the country has a road network of 11,561 km, of which only 489 
km are currently paved. Most of the remaining kilometres have been declared in bad 
condition. Regarding irrigation, agricultural production in areas of cyclical water shortage has 
become adversely affected by supply restrictions and conflicts over water rights. 
From a geographical perspective, the dynamic of rural areas comprises several inter-related 
factors among which agricultural production is only one of the important ones. Thus, in 
addition to the whole package of sectoral actions to be implemented through the Ministry of 
Agriculture and its constituent parts, a close process of policy coordination with other public 
institutions, (as well as with relevant private-sector organisations) becomes unavoidable in 
an attempt to raise the level of development in the complex Chilean countryside. 
6.2.1. Productive imperatives for rural policy actions 
Since the Great Depression, Chile has not been an agricultural export country until the latest 
1970s. Before the 1970s, most of the country's productive efforts were largely devoted to the 
strengthening of mining exports (especially after the nitrate crises during the first quarter of 
the century), and to the development of a process of import substitute industrialisation. 
Furthermore, some authors (Barraclough, 1972), (Bengoa, 1983), (Ortega, 1987), (Auty, 
1993), have argued that until the 1960s, the agricultural sector in Chile was not only 
comparatively discriminated against but almost completely neglected. Public expenditure for 
economic development was principally directed to support the process of industrialisation. 
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Thus, Chile became a food importing country, notably importing grain, dairy products and • l 
meat (The country exported between US$30 and US$40 million at the end of the 1930s in 
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agricultural products, while its imports did not surpass US$25 million. However, in the 
mid-1960s Chile continued exporting the same US$30-$40 million but its agricultural imports 
reached up to US$200 million, equivalent to almost one third of the country's total export 
revenues (Chonchol, 1970). 
Historically, both export-oriented mining and lSI have largely organised their own 
geographical systems throughout the country according to their particular efficiency 
requirements (Massey, 1984; Apey, 1987). Unfortunately, neither of these systems 
functionally fit with that of export-led agriculture. The mining socio-geographical system has 
been mainly developed in desert areas, non-productive for agriculture. The traditional 
inward-oriented productive system has rather privileged an inter-urban connective 
organisation in which the country's largest city of Santiago has historically been acting as the 
main centripetal node (Gwynne, 1982). As a result of this, between San Antonio and 
Concepci6nITalcahuano no important ports or associated transverse roads were available for 
agricultural export. This corresponds to 400 kilometres of the most productive Chilean land 
for agriculture. So, increased transport costs for the shipping of agricultural products to 
international markets, is not only preventing a faster development of agricultural and forestry 
exports, but is also becoming a source of political conflict between entrepreneurial sectors 
and the government. 
Moreover, the productive shift from domestic to export-led agricultural production has 
substantially increased the potential yield per hectare in most regions of the country. 
Meanwhile, dry and marginal lands formerly with little possibility to produce for domestic 
markets, have become potentially profitable as they can be cultivated for export-oriented 
crops. As a result of this, in 1994 the Chilean government decided to allocate about US$450 
million to continue with a national irrigation plan which will raise to 18 per cent the 
proportion of the country's land that will be irrigated (MINAGRI, 1993). 
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Therefore, additional intersectoral measures have to be considered in order to maximise the 
socio-productive impacts expected from the implementation process of the different irrigation 
projects. Otherwise, increases in export production would probably worsen the current 
infrastructural bottlenecks. In this way, the government has the great chance for using the 
different irrigation projects as an engine for the implementation of integrated rural 
development programmes in different regions. If not, the irrigation programme could easily 
become a determinant factor in increasing the process of social exclusion in the countryside. 
6.2.2. Social Imperatives for Rural Policy Actions 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the real resources that the government had to act against the 
main causes of rural poverty in the Chilean countryside were scarce. Since rural poverty was 
considered the result of a complex combination of different institutional factors, the room for 
manoeuvre that the government had in order to increase the standard of living of the rural 
population through a rather diminished state was quite limited. In strong contrast to the 
growth oriented neo-liberal approach of development used by the former government, in 
which the free allocation of productive resources was considered the best means of improving 
the level of development in rural areas, poverty in the countryside was seen as a 
multifactorial socio-geographical problem, in which solutions lied far beyond single 
productive measures. 
However, actions directed to minimise the level of rural poverty were unavoidable, especially 
since they were an important part of the strong political commitment the government had 
made in its electoral campaign. This was part of the strategy that the government presented 
in order to reduce the social costs that had resulted from the application of the former 
economic model of development. Thus, in addition to the traditional rural development 
problems most Latin American countries present, the government had to face a rather new 
source of problems. These were related to the direct and indirect social impacts that had 
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resulted from the economic stabilisation programme, the structural adjustment process 
recommended by the IMF, and from the country's experience of restructuring that had started 
in the mid-1970s. 
Therefore, the main problems that the new policies had to face were: 
a) in a large portion of the Chilean countryside it was still possible to find the classical 
problems related to low density populated areas. The geographical dispersion of small 
rural communities was imposing severe problems in terms of the accessibility to 
education, health and to social services, electricity and sewerage facilities of many rural 
dwellers. The lack of main and secondary roads and the resulting transport and 
communication deficiencies constituted not only a problem in itself but also made the 
provision of improved social services more difficult. As a matter of fact, the network of 
the country's secondary roads comprises a total of 56,000 kilometres, of which only 2 per 
cent is presently paved and 64 per cent is in very bad condition (Ministry of Transport, 
1994). These marginalised geographical regions not only showed a lower standard of 
living but also presented significant disadvantages for being effectively incorporated into 
the active regional process of capital accumulation. 2 
b) Whilst the primary sector was positively shifting their activities towards export-led 
production, changes in the mode of production and an active land market process 
(motivated by the expansion of capital intensive export crops), induced a fast 
proletarianisation of an important sector of the rural labour force (Table 6.2). According 
to official figures, more than a half of the small and medium size peasants ("parceleros") 
lost or left their plots of land during the crises of the 1970 and 1980s (Berdegue, 1993). 
Thus, a large group of landless peasants started to increase the pressure on the labour 
market, the provision of housing and social services throughout the agricultural zone of 
production. So, low wages (as late as 1986, real agricultural wages still had not surpassed 
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their 1965 levels (Baharan, 1992), rural out-migration, high rates of rural, 
unemployment, and the strong seasonal shape in the labour demand curve (Apey, 1988 
and 1990), became relevant factors for the emergence of a new pattern of rural poverty 
in the Chilean countryside that the government could not avoid to confront. 
Table 6.2 Size of Chilean Agricultural Wage-Labour Force during Three Decades 
Agricultural Wage-Labour Force 1964-65 1975-76 1986-87 
Permanent 208,000 161,000 120,000 
Temporary 147,000 198,000 300,000 
Source: Gomez and Echenique (1988, 64); original data, Censos Agropecuarios INE, 1986-
87; quoted from Barhan, 1992. 
c) The active participation of the state in order to lead a facilitate a productive 
conversion process in some non competitive rural areas resulted unavoidable. At the same 
time as rural areas with significant comparative advantages benefited from their 
integration to world markets, there were others that, conversely, experienced a steady 
process of productive and social crises since they were unable to either export or compete 
with cheaper food imports coming from other countries. The deep crises affecting an 
extensive rice and oil-oriented productive area in the Maule region have become a clear 
example of lower competitiveness in the context of increasing exports of Argentinean rice 
and U. S. cereal. 
d) Even if the strong contrast in productivity levels between domestic and export agriculture 
are considered, the main problems to be overcome in order to raise the standard of living 
of the most disadvantaged producers are not necessarily related to the rise in land 
productivity. The high number of peasants with no legal tittle to land, the extreme 
fragmentation of land in the minifundia system (which comprise roughly 175.000 rural 
families), the close association in the country between rural poverty and bad land quality, 
difficulties in the process of commercialisation and distortions in prices due to the 
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seasonal concentration of production, need to be considered in any attempt to improve the 
income levels of rural population. If not, some small producer have the paradoxical risk 
of obtaining decreasing marginal yields while they increase the level of production (see 
Chapter 4). As the smallest grain producers know well, the more wheat they sell in the 
summer, the lower the price they obtain because a rather monopsonistic wheat market. 
Lack of storage facilities and urgent cash needs for servicing different loans constitute the 
main reasons they have to sell production during the period of maximum production and 
lowest prices. The process of land deterioration in the minifundia system is a clear result 
of over-utilisation and could be mentioned as another example of progressive 
environmental damage resulting from increasing production. 
Even though several other problems could be added to this rather short diagnosis, two main 
conclusions clearly arise from it. Firstly, most of these problems and constraints affecting 
both productive and social conditions in the poorest rural areas could not be solved simply 
by the strengthening of sectoral economic growth. Secondly, it seems clear that in order to 
ensure a certain level of success in the task of improving development levels in rural areas, 
an intersectoral an integrated strategy promoted by the State could not be avoided. 
6.3. Main Restrictions for Rural Development Policies 
In spite of the fact that both politicians and technocrats who joined the new democratic 
government had in advance a well defined set of aims and objectives for action in the rural 
sector, the whole strategy defined to combat the social and productive problems of the rural 
sector was affected from the very beginning by a wide range of political, institutional, social 
and financial constraints. 
6.3.1. Political constraints 
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The lack of feasibility for the implementation of legal reforms to allow the modernisation of 
the State has undoubtedly been the main reason in preventing institutional changes in favour 
of the application of rural programmes. Due to the fact that the Aylwin coalition government 
did not get enough political support from the Chilean Parliament, it became extremely 
difficult for them to implement institutional changes and to reform the legal restrictions 
inherited from the previous government. According to the Constitution of the military 
government of 1980, a full Senate consisted of 38 elected senators and 9 designated senators 
in 1990. The method of election was, and still is, "binominal"; that is to say, each political 
coalition or independent party has to put up two candidates for each of the 13 regions, half 
region or electoral district. The two most popular candidates should win. However, if they 
both come from the same electoral list, that particular coalition or party must have two thirds 
of the vote, double that of the next coalition or party, for them both to be elected. Otherwise, 
the second place will go to the second most popular political grouping or party. This makes 
it extremely difficult for a party to sweep the board in any constituency. 
With respect to the 9 designated senators, they were chosen by Pinochet from some of his 
closest collaborators, and were considered as being highly sympathetic to the spirit of the 
1980 constitution. In order to pass any constitutional reform in the senate, the Aylwin 
government required a two-thirds majority. So, the constitution of the Senate, which included 
9 designated senators and 16 senators from the centre-right coalition (against constitutional 
reforms), made it extremely difficult to achieve constitutional change proposed by the Aylwin 
government (see Table 6.3). 
The few legal changes achieved by the Aylwin government concerning rural institutionality, 
came as a result of long and intense political negotiation with the right-wing opposition in 
Parliament. These included: the reform of INDAP's legal institutionality; the reconstruction 
of the Office for Agricultural Studies and Polices-ODEPA in 1993; and the final approval of 
a new Regional and Municipal Law. Thus, it was necessary to have long parliamentary 
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debates in order to achieve difficult political compromises and the implementation of 
institutional reforms. This proved to be one of the most difficult barriers to be overcomed, 
not only for the agricultural institutions but also for all the other ministries. 
Table 6.3 Composition of Chile's Congress in 1990. 
Political Party & Grouping Senate 
PRO-AYLWIN 22 
Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC) 13 
Partido por la Democracia (PPD) 4 
Partido Radical (PR) 2 
Partido Socialista (Almeyda) 1 
Other Parties 2 
CENTRE-RIGHT OPPOSITION 
Renovacion Nacional (RN) 6 
Union Democrata Independiente (UDI) 2 
Independents * 8 
Non-elected 9 
TOTAL 47 
*Five of these Independents subsequently joined with RN 
Source: Gwynne, 1994. 
6.3.2. Institutional Constraints 
Chamber of Deputies 
72 
38 
17 
5 
6 
6 
29 
11 
8 
-
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Institutional barriers in the public sector played an even more restrictive role than the scarcity 
of financial resources in the process of policy implementation at both the intra-sectoral and 
inter-sectoral level. Moreover, legal constraints preventing the formation of social and 
productive rural organisations and the lack of democratic political representatives at the local 
level, were also major restrictions to the process of participation of rural people. Generally 
speaking, the main institutional barriers affecting the implementation of rural polices were: 
176 
a) legal institutional restrictions in implementing rural development programmes. In order to 
avoid the risk of the "politisation" of the main public body in charge of agricultural 
policies for small-and medium-size farmers, the constitution of INDAP (National 
Institute for Agricultural Development), was changed in the last month of the Pinochet 
regime. From then until mid-1993, the most powerful technical institution created to act 
against rural poverty was by law relegated to the marginal role of providing credits and 
technological transfer (through private agencies) to the country's peasants. Furthermore, 
even though there is not necessary a direct correlation between the number of officials 
and state efficiency, INDAP's staff diminished from 4,000 to 1,000 persons between 1973 
and 1979 (Cruz, 1993). Thus, attempts to develop: special programmes oriented to the 
rebuilding of social organisations in the rural sector; to improve technical training; or in 
any way to recover the former and active role INDAP played since the 1960s in rural 
polices were completely neglected due to these constitutional changes. 
b) the existing institutionality did not allow, (and still does not), the implementation of any" 
rural-oriented social programme to peasants who do not own a plot of rural land. 
Although the number of landless peasants increased substantially since the late 1970s, they 
were unable to benefit from the new social programmes oriented towards peasants, even 
if landless rural families continued being related to the rural landscape through the 
provision of jobs, education, health, and other social services. Thus, near 280.000 
landless workers living in poverty in rural areas at the beginning of the 199Os, could not 
gain access to the institutionalised rural poverty programmes. 
c) legal restrictions on the rapid access to bi-and multi-organisational government 
programmes, due to inflexibilities in the public budgetary system. Institutional barriers 
imposed by the Comptroller General's Office ("Contraloria General de la Republica") to 
finance multi-institutional programmes, prevented the formalisation of a number of public 
programmes in the rural sector. The impossibility of channelling resources towards a rural 
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housing subsidy (from the Ministry of Housing) in combination with INDAP, was one of 
the clearest institutional restrictions on the feasibility of a new bi-organisational budget 
allocation (via the Ministry of Housing and Agriculture) oriented to rural development 
(INDAP is part of the Ministry of Agriculture). 
d) difficulties to channel bi-directional flows of information between government institutions 
and the rural people due to the lack of democratisation on the local level 
("municipalidades"). The permanence of non-democratic authorities at the local level 
-"alcaldes" (mayors) appointed by the former government until 1992, acted as a real 
bottleneck in preventing the effective process of participation of rural people regarding 
the orientation of policies, programmes and budget allocation. It has to be said that the 
need for an effective process of democratic participation at the local administrative levels 
was one of the most important explicit aims throughout Aylwin's political campaign. 
e) incompatibility between the need for multifactorial integrated programmes and projects 
versus the sectoral allocation of the State budget. Even though some progress has been 
achieved in the formulation of some integrated development programmes at the regional 
• level, most of them do not properly reach the implementation stage. The main reason is 
that although programmes could be identified in accordance with a combined 
multi-institutional criteria, the allocation of financial resources comes as a result of the 
success of each participating institution in the process of evaluation of their particular 
projects. The non approval of any of the presented projects largely prevents the 
synergetic effect of integrated development efforts. 
6.3.3. Social organisation constraints 
The low level of social and productive organisations in the rural population was and still is 
a major restriction for the implementation of new social polices in the countryside, and also 
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for the improvement of productive and marketing practices. Three major reasons could be 
used to explain this fact: 
a) the high level of geographical dispersion in the poorest rural areas (Coquimbo, Araucania 
and Maule Regions), has strongly affected the development of collective activities 
oriented to increase the level of people's participation in the whole process of rural 
development. Since the government decided to sustain their rural programmes on a 
collective rather than a personal basis, this aspect became a significant constraint for the 
application of new social polices, such as the FOSIS' s programmes (Social Investment and 
Solidarity Fund). 
b) the lack of peasant productive and social organisations has detrimentally affected the 
possibility of collective action to increase their bargaining power or for obtaining 
eventual economies of scale from better productive and marketing practices. The 
destruction of peasant organisations was systematically carried out by the military regime 
in the countryside since 1973. Numbering 280.000 members in 1973, the agricultural 
trade unions's members diminished to 28.162 by 1984 (Ortega, 1987), while the total 
number of peasants cooperatives fell from 300 hundred to 70 between the same year and 
1982 (Cruz, 1993). 
c) the undemocratic way in which local government was organised (the municipal or 
communal government), seriously prevented a close participative relationship between 
the people and local administrators. Thus, in parallel to the lack of effective municipal 
participation, a number of social programmes oriented by the government to the rural 
people, did not receive the required support from the municipality due to political 
antagonism. 
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6.3.4. Financial Constraints 
As a common feature of most developing countries, the lack of financial resources in regard 
to all development imperatives is one of the most difficult constraints to deal with during the 
periodic process of budget allocation. Paradoxically, most of the Chilean budgetary 
constraints did not strictly apply to the lack of financial resources -as the achievement of a 
government surplus through the 1990s shows. One of the main reasons has been the need to 
maintain a strict macroeconomic equilibrium, a requirement largely imposed by the IMF, and 
World Bank in order to proceed with the periodic reimbursement of their long-term loans. 
As an example of budgetary discipline throughout the latest years, the Ministry of Finance 
has even refused the allocation of resources to social programmes coming from external 
donations, in order to prevent a rises on the inflation rate derived from public 
over-expenditure. As result of that, rural programmes and projects which did not present a 
relatively high degree of economic benefit were unlikely to succeed in both: the annual 
process of ministerial budget allocation; and in the centralised periodic process of sectoral 
project evaluation. Not surprisingly, the Minister of Finance soon was seen as one of the 
most difficult obstacles to be overcome for obtaining financial support for social development 
purposes in the countryside. 
6.4. Summary 
Therefore, the new democratic government aimed to implement a more socially-oriented rural 
development strategy. The complexity of socio-productive needs and demands, on the one 
hand, and the heterogeneous and inflexible constraints the government had to face, on the 
other, very much affected the possibilities for implementing effective and innovative policy 
instruments. Regarding the most urgent social requirements, the government faced strong 
impediments to allocate resources in rural projects and programmes which presented low rates 
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of economic benefits. This was a result of macroeconomic adjustment requirements agreed 
with the International Monetary Fund (throughout the 1980s), and of conditions imposed by 
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for having access to their 
long-term loans (see Chapter 5). 
Moreover, political and institutional barriers became active constraints for allowing the 
implementation of new integrated social programmes in the countryside, as a way of 
overcoming shortages of particular sectoral budgets. This aspect became significant, 
especially since the size of the Chilean State was largely diminished throughout the military 
regime, implying that a higher level of public efficiency had to be pursued by all means. 
Actions in favour of the growing number of landless rural families were also made difficult 
by unremoved legal barriers, and last but not least, by the lack of productive and 
organisational channels, particularly at the local government level. 
However, in parallel to the intense processes of political negotiation, the government was 
progressively removing some of these barriers after some positive legal reforms. Regarding 
the government's aims for both increasing the opportunity of the people's participation in the 
development process, and promoting functional deconcentration of government (in order to 
improve its public efficiency) two constitutional reforms were passed. This is going to be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
a) the new municipal code (Ley Organica Constitucional de Municipalidades No 19.130) 
approved in March 1992, and; 
b) the new regional code (Ley Organica de Gobierno Interior) approved in October 1992. 
These two laws become one of the most useful instruments, for both the more 
socially-oriented policies of the Chilean government, and for increasing the power of the 
people -at the local and regional level- in determining their priorities for development. 
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Chapter 7. Some Features of the New Regional Institutional Framework 
Introduction 
The new regional and municipal code approved by the Aylwin government in 1992 became 
a significant instrument for improving both the operation of the State and the people's 
possibilities of participation within a more democratic style of development. First, the new 
regional administrative system permitted the substantial improvement in the efficiency of the 
public sector as a result of the State's higher degree of territorial and functional 
deconcentration (the relationship of the State towards the regions). Second, the new municipal 
code devolved to the people their rights (deprived by the military government) to elect local 
authorities. In parallel, it has improved both the system of social and political participation 
at the local level, and the municipal representation inside the regional government -since 
municipal councillors choose the regional council in their respective region. (Thus, the people 
in the region have potentially a closer relationship with the State). 
These innovations in the administrative-institutional framework have become also a new 
source of hope for promoting both deconcentration and decentralisation in the country's 
historical battle against the highly centralised demographic, economic and political pattern of 
development. This has been explicitly assumed by the last four different governments. 
The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to present some of the main characteristics of the 
reformed regional administration as a potential instrument for a more decentralised strategy 
of rural development both at the regional and local levels. In order to achieve this, some 
-
general features concerning the country's uneven pattern of development are given. These 
features are an important argument for a better understanding of the traditional centralised 
and "urban-biased" process of public expenditure which Chile has presented throughout, at 
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least, the last 50 years. Some insights as regards regional government are also given, putting 
most of the attention on the main changes that local government (municipalities) has 
experienced since its new regulatory law, particularly regarding personnel, finance, and 
channels of community participation. This is an important background for a better 
understanding of the regionally-based experience of development implemented by the regional 
government of Maule; that exercise is presented in Chapter 10. 
7.1. Geographical Background: The Uneven Spatial Pattern of Development in Chile 
One of the main problems that the State has for administering the nation results from the 
particular geographical shape which characterises the Chilean territory. A continental length 
of nearly 4,280 kilometres long, with an average width of only 180 kilometres including 
severe morphological and climatic barriers, have historically made it extremely difficult for 
the internal process of social, economic and political integration. Moreover, the geographical 
distribution of output that has resulted from import substitution has exacerbated the rather 
unbalanced distribution of Chilean population, largely represented by the urban primacy 
pattern of the urban hierarchy (Hernandez, 1983), (Ortiz, 1983), (Gwynne, 1980). 
Thus, with a population of 4.23 million people, Santiago's capital city accounts for 34 per 
cent of the Chilean total which in the last population census reached 13.2 millions. The city 
of Santiago, together with the other two larger conurbations of the country 
-Concepci6n/Talcahuano and Valparalso/Viiia del Mar- grouped the 54 per cent of the 
Chilean total. The early and intense process of rural to urban migration throughout the last 
50 years has implied that Chile has become one of the most highly urbanised countries in 
Latin America. The 81.7 per cent of the country's inhabitants were classified as urban in the 
latest population census of 1992. 
As regards economic features, the country continues showing a highly concentrated pattern 
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of development. In effect, two independent studies show the Santiago Metropolitan Region 
generating more than 40 per cent of GNP in 1992. According to the Central Bank/Ministry 
of Planning estimation, 40.1 per cent of GNP originated from this region in 1992, while 
CIEPLAN estimated this share at 46.7 per cent for the same year. The following two most 
important regions (Biobio and Valparaiso) contributed 8.8 per cent and 8,1 per cent of GNP 
respectively. 
As a result of this unbalanced socio-geographical pattern of development, the government 
budget has had paradoxical pressures placed upon it. There have been urgent investment 
demands for improving the low level of socio-productive integration of some under-populated 
and marginal regions. Secondly, there have been the demands of growing agglomeration 
diseconomies (as regards socio-productive and environmental problems) resulting from the 
high level of spatial disfunctionalities affecting the over-populated city of Santiago. As an 
example, a number of rural municipalities surrounding the biggest urban agglomeration of 
Chile have been increasingly spending significant shares of their investment budget in solving 
direct and indirect environmental problems, notably concerning water pollution, because of 
the impressively fast expansion of the capital city. • Furthermore, most of Santiago's 
neighbouring rural areas have been deprived by law of the possibility of growing horticultural 
products, due to the high level of pollution that their irrigation waters present. 
Chile has always been a unitary country characterised by a strong centralist tradition. Since 
its first constitution in 1833, power has been firmly held by the national executive, while 
local government has largely acted as an agent of the central level. This particular 
bureaucratic structure of the country has been principally inherited from colonial times. 
Throughout this period, a high level of centralisation was the most convenient functional 
organisation regarding the dominating interest of the Spanish Crown. However, after 
independence, most former Spanish colonies still maintained the same government structure, 
since they -as new emerging states- needed to consol idate the territorial unity of the country. 
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For this purpose, a centralised State was an useful instrument (Irarrazaval, 1990). 
Moreover, Chile can be considered a rather homogeneous cultural territory, especially if it 
is compared with its northern Peruvian and Bolivian neighbours. Excepting Germans colonists 
in the rural areas of the southern Los Lagos region, most immigrants that have come to stay 
in Chile are living in urban areas showing a non-defined pattern of spatial segregation. As 
a result of this, no important regionalism can be identified throughout the regions of the 
country, excepting some territorial vindication reclaimed by the ethnic minorities of the 
Mapuches in the Araucanfa region. Therefore, all processes of administrative division have 
been the result of rather technocratic and voluntary exercises with little influence coming 
from cultural or ethnic pressures. (BOISIER, 1992). Paradoxically, in a period in which the 
world geo-political dynamic has been characterised by deep processes of atomization, 
resulting from strong regionalistic vindications, recent Chilean governments have been 
expending significant efforts to achieve higher levels of deconcentration throughout the 
country. Increasing the level of people's identification with their own particular region has 
not been an easy task, and most people still recognise the different country's administrative 
regions by single numbers (Galilea, 1994). 
The high level of urbanisation that the country presents, the extreme concentration of most 
of its population in some few rather dysfunctional cities, accompanied by a highly centralised 
government, have been directly and indirectly acting against the interest of the rural areas, 
especially as far as the allocation of social investment is concerned. As an example, during 
the 1980s, 46 per cent of national investment in public infrastructure, housing and urbanism 
was allocated to the Metropolitan Region of Santiago. Meanwhile the five less favoured 
regions, with regard to the same indicator, received altogether only 26 per cent of total 
investment. These regions (VI, VII, VIII, IX and X), the more highly ruralised of Chile, 
grouped 77 per cent of the country's rural population (Daher, 1991), and 99 of the 113 rural 
communes (87 per cent) classified as poor (MINAGRI, 1992). 
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However, in spite of these adverse socio-geographical features for regional and rural 
development, the new regional and municipal laws have become a new source of hope in the 
search for a less bureaucratic and more participative pattern of regional development. 
7.2. New Regional Institutional Framework for Intra-regional Development 
In the last process of regionalisation (institutionalised in the Constitution of 1980) the country 
was divided into thirteen administrative regions which constitute the basic territorial units for 
the administration of the state. Each region is headed by a centrally-appointed official called 
the" Intendente" , who has the responsibility for heading the regional government. He/she is 
not only the President's regional representative, but also has the duty of formulating, 
coordinating and carrying out policies, programmes and projects for the development of the 
region. The regions are themselves divided into 51 provinces (Provincial Government), each 
of them headed by a centrally-appointed official the "gobernador" (governor). Finally, at the 
sub-provincial level, the whole country is covered by a total of 335 communes ("comunas"), 
being the only administrative unit whose head "alcalde" (mayor) is appointed by elections. 
7.2.1. The Municipal Government: general background 
Under Pinochet' s military regime (1973-1990), local government was radically reformed. The 
democratic system of local government was completely abolished, and elected mayors were 
replaced by government-appointed executive heads, and elected councils were replaced by 
corporativist bodies, known as "Consejos de Desarrollo Comunal" (CODECOs), which 
comprised approved business and professional interests. The entire public administration was 
integrated even more closely into a vertical command structure and central government 
control over municipal affairs was intensified through a 1975 municipal code. 
However, throughout the Pinochet government, a significant reorganisation and 
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deconcentration of service delivery responsibilities took place which would have far-reaching 
and lasting consequences for local government. Administrative innovations (principally 
concerning the creation of new communes and provinces within the pre-existing hierarchy of 
Regions, Provinces and Communes) were introduced in the 1980 constitution. The executive 
heads of each tier was appointed by central government, and their functional responsibilities 
were more clearly defined. 
Under this new arrangement, local government became primarily responsible for social 
expenditure as regards primary health, basic education and social welfare. Formerly, primary 
health and primary education were centrally driven by the respective ministries. As a way to 
finance these new responsibilities, municipalities were assigned new sources of local revenue 
and a mechanism for redistributing financial resources from richer to poorer municipalities 
("Fondo Comun Municipal") was introduced. However, these processes of administrative 
change also had a component of social control. In an attempt to consolidate the rather 
segregated spatial pattern of social groups in the capital city of Santiago, a combined process 
of increasing the numbers of municipalities in its urban area (from 16 to 32) together with 
a forced resettlement of squatter groups brought more socially homogeneous intra-urban 
municipalities. As a result of this, the social polarization was highlighted by the growing 
disparities in the per capita expenditure of different municipalities within the Santiago 
Metropolitan Area (Nickson, 1994). 
7.2.2. The Democratisation of local government 
These regional administrative bodies, the municipalities, have recently become very 
important tools for the implementation of more decentralised and democratic development 
programmes. Considering the municipal level, a constitutional reform passed in November 
1991 granted legal autonomy to local government for the first time in Chilean history. This 
reform was incorporated in a new municipal code (Ley Organica Constitucional de 
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Municipalidades) No 19,130 of March 1992, following which the first democratic elections 
of municipal officers for 20 years were held in June 1992. In this way, the democratisation 
of the local government increased the interactive relationships between the demand of the 
people and the democratically appointed communal authorities. 
7.2.3. Reforms at the regional level 
As regards the regional level, in October 1992 a reinforced organisation of regional 
government was approved by Parliament, with powers to coordinate the regional operations 
of line ministries ("Secretarios Regionales Ministeriales"-SEREMIs) , and to manage the 
regional development investment fund (FNDR). Each regional government comprises the 
presidentially-appointed "intendente" and a regional council ("consejo regional"), whose 
members are elected by municipal council members. SEREMIs are required to allocate part 
of their ministerial budget in regional projects and to qualify projects for the FNDR. They 
also have the supervisory and guiding role over other ministerial public services and over 
municipalities in all matters related to their sector. They are coordinated by the "intendente" 
in the form of a regional cabinet. The regional "intendente" is advised, concerning planning 
and the distribution of regional investment funds, by the regional secretary of planning and 
coordination (SERPLAC), which retain a relationship of accountability to the central planning 
ministry (where the most significant sectoral projects are evaluated), acting also for 
municipalities as the gatekeeper for the funding of local investment projects. This charge is 
occupied by the correspondent regional SEREMI of the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation 
(MIDEPLAN). 
Despite the fact that the allocation of the national budget still remains highly centralised, as 
a result of these recent institutional changes, both regional and municipal governments have 
got higher degrees of freedom for identifying and financing projects, according to their own 
development strategies. From the political point of view, the new regional authorities have 
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undoubtedly become a more democratic and representative political element, after more than 
one and a half decades in which the most important regional authorities belonged to the 
highest ranks of the armed forces. 
7.2.4. Municipal institutionality and participatory channels 
Without doubt, one of the most ambitious institutional reforms pursued by the Aylwin 
government since it came to power was the municipal reform oriented to give local people 
the chance to democratically elect the political authorities at the municipal level. This obeyed 
the desire of permitting higher levels of popular participation in the new democratic period, 
and ended the power of politically-appointed local authorities that prevented the country's 
process of democratic reconstruction, for more than one half of the period of Aylwin's 
government. However, even though the interest of the Aylwin administration to reinforce 
local government has been significant, there are important differences between municipalities 
which prevent development with the same effectiveness, in the different regions of the 
country. 
7.2.4a Size of population 
Municipalities are very heterogeneous in size and number of inhabitants. In 1991, 197 of the 
335 municipalities ( 59 per cent of the total) had less than 20,000 inhabitants. Of these, 89 
municipalities had populations between 20,000 - 10,000,55 had between 10,000 - 5,000, and 
a further S3 municipalities had populations of less than S ,000 inhabitants. A group of IS9 
municipalities were classified as eminently rural (more than 50 per cent of their population 
living in rural areas), 60 municipalities were characterised as mixed, and the remaining 
municipalities were considered as urban. It has to be mentioned that the capital city of 
Santiago is the only one urban centre which has more than one municipality; currently, 
Santiago has been divided into 32 intra-urban municipalities. 
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As it is going to be discussed later on in this chapter, the population size of municipalities 
is also an important feature as far as the election of their council members is concerned. 
7.2.4b Personnel 
In 1992 there were 94,503 municipal employees in the country of which 22,000 corresponded 
to permanent staff. More than the half of total employees (58 per cent), were education staff, 
23 per cent corresponded to the permanent administrative staff, 9 per cent were enrolled in 
health duties, 7 per cent were doing miscellaneous duties and 3 per cent was temporary 
administrative staff. A large proportion of municipal employees were recruited during the 
military regime and protected by the 1989 Administrative Statute (it guarantees them almost 
total job security for the future to avoid a political backlash). This administrative protection 
has provided job security to often under-qualified staff recruited throughout the military 
regIme. 
These aspects have become a serious impediment to improve efficiency at the local level, 
since municipalities are tightly regulated regarding staff levels and staff structure. The 
municipal code in combination with the Administrative Statute limits overall numbers in three 
ways and these limits are severely controlled by the Comptroller General's Office, to which 
any new appointment must be reported. Firstly, no municipality may spend more than 35 per 
cent of its own income on payments to staff (teachers and health workers are excluded since 
they are regulated by their own specific statutes). Secondly, each municipality has a fixed 
permitted limit on its permanent staff level (1 permanent staff for each 500 inhabitants of the 
respective commune). This restriction meant that 53 municipalities with less than 5,000 
inhabitants are allowed to have a maximum 10 permanent staff. Conversely, the Municipality 
of Santiago has more than 1,000. Thirdly, only three administrative posts can be appointed 
directly by the mayor. Undoubtedly, this restriction very much prevents mayor's possibilities 
of recruiting a team. 
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The 1992 municipal code empowered municipalities to offer and pay for their own basic 
training or to organize it by agreement with outside bodies. For most municipalities, 
especially for the smaller ones, there have been significant disincentives from making training 
provision. Budgetary shortages, small numbers of staff, low expectancies for hierarchical 
promotion, among other reasons, have very much prevented the technical improvement of a 
number of municipal staff throughout the country. 
However, as a way to improve municipal management and to prevent the waste of the 
municipal's financial resources, the government has launched a $20 million pesos pilot 
programme in 25 municipalities between 1994-96, in order to improve the level of municipal 
management in some selected communes (SUBDERE, 1993). 
7.2.4c Financial sources 
The municipal budget to be spent by local government has been increasing substantially as 
a results of the latest legal reforms, and also due to the central government's aim to improve 
decentralised social programmes. The share of municipal expenditure regarding total public 
expenditure rose from an average of2.8 per cent during the period 1977-1979 to 7.3 per cent 
during 1987-1991. In 1991, this share was 8.0 per cent (11.3 per cent if education and health 
is included) (Nickson, 1994). In 1994, the municipal system is expected to administrate 
US$634 billion (roughly US$1,500 million), equivalent to 13 per cent of total public 
expenditure. This has implied a rise of 10 per cent in comparison to 1993 and of 38 per cent 
if it is compared to 1989. 
The municipal budget comes from two sources. Most of the financial resources (89 per cent 
of the total according to a 1985-1991 average) is generated from within the municipal system. 
The main sources are: 
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a) a residential property tax ("impuesto territorial "), payed by all properties located within 
communal boundaries. It is levied at 2 per cent of the fiscal value of property. 
b) different municipal licenses ("patentes municipales"), paid to have access to the right for 
exercising commercial, industrial, and professional activities, levied at 0.5 per cent of the 
declared value of the assets. Unfortunately, this system tends to act against some 
regional municipalities, since liability is based on the geographical location of the main 
office's permanent labour force. Thus, a large group of small-size municipalities with 
large-scale mining, forestry and fishing industries, or fruit-packing installations, which 
employ little permanent labour and/or large number of temporary workers are 
discriminated against by this system, since they are unable to benefit from these 
particular licences. Moreover, a number of these small-rural municipalities have to spend 
significant amounts of resources and time in maintaining and repairing communal 
infrastructure severely affected from intensive use. One example is municipalities with 
mines (Vicuna and San Jose de Maipo are two examples). These municipalities do not 
receive direct benefits (or very small) from the exploitation of mining ores located in their 
territories but they have to be constantly repairing the secondary road network that is 
adversely affected by the trans-communal transport of heavy lorries loaded with ore (an 
additional example related to forestry activities was already presented in Chapter 4). 
Conversely, this taxation system greatly favours the most wealthy municipalities 
(Santiago, Providencia and Las Condes), where the headquarters of the largest industrial, 
commercial, productive and retailing companies are spatially concentrated. 
c) vehicle road taxes ("permiso de circulaci6n"), are entirely collected by municipalities, 
even though payment is not restricted to the municipality of residence of the vehicle 
owner. 
As a result of the significant contrasts in municipality size, however, the major source of 
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local government income is the municipal equalisation fund -"Fondo Comun Municipal" 
(FCM), centrally administered by the Ministry of the Interior. It derives its resources from 
different sources: 60 per cent of the proceeds from a); 50 per cent of the proceeds from b); 
and 65 per cent of the proceeds from b) collected by the wealthy Municipalities of 
Providencia and Las Condes, and 45 per cent of the proceeds collected by the Municipality 
of Santiago. The aggregate origin of this fund is shown in Table 7.1. At the end of the 
1980s, 30 per cent of total municipal revenue was subject to redistribution through the 
"Fondo Comun Municipal" (SUBDERE, 1992). 
Table 7.1 Aggregate Origin of the Municipal Equalisation Fund. 1992 (%). 
Categories % 
Residential Property Tax (IT) 70 
Vehicle Road Tax (PC) 20 
Municipal Licences (PM) 5 
Central Government Grant 5 
Source: Constructed by author from Nickson, 1994. 
The redistribution of most of FCM resources (90 per cent) between all municipalities operates 
according to the following mechanism: 10 per cent is distributed in equal parts between all 
municipalities; 20 per cent in proportion to the amount of population of each commune; 30 
per cent in proportion to the number of properties exempt from IT in each municipality; and 
40 per cent in inverse proportion to the locally-generated per capita revenue of each 
municipality. The remaining 10 per cent is distributed on a discretional basis to selected 
municipalities in order to solve common deficits. The FCM is the main source of resources 
for most municipalities, of which 70 per cent have become net beneficiaries from its 
operation. It has to be mentioned that, as a result of the implementation of this redistributive 
system, in 1985/86 it narrowed the ratio between per capita expenditure of the three richest 
municipalities in Santiago and that of the three poorest, from 10: 1 to 5: 1. 
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However, only some few large municipalities have enough resources for investment. Most 
others heavily rely on centrally controlled grants which are earmarked for specific investment 
purposes (throughout 1985-91, only 11 per cent of total municipal income came from the 
central government). Therefore, small municipalities experience enormous shortages in funds 
to implement development programmes, especially the rural. Rural municipalities have been 
currently suffering from an increasing process of intra-regional centralisation in the allocation 
of regional resources (regional capital-biased), and from budget shortages resulting from the 
lack of skilled personnel capable of successfully applying for the different central funds, 
through the existing processes of project formulation. Municipalities have limited financial 
autonomy and they are not allowed to create any new source of revenue without the approval 
of the central government. 
The municipalities must keep separate budgets for education and health and these accounts 
have to be submitted to the Comptroller General's Office on a quarterly basis. In 1991, 85 
per cent of municipal spending on education derived from a central government earmarked 
transfer ("unidad de subvenci6n educacional"), while 12 per cent was paid for out of general 
municipal revenue. Primary-and secondary-education responsibilities were gradually 
transferred to local governments from 1979-86. Health primary care was also gradually 
transferred to local governments throughout 1979-86. In the same year of 1991, 25 per cent 
of the total spending was paid for out of general municipal revenues, while the remainder was 
assumed by the central government. 
7.2.4.d. Channels for community participation 
The participation of the people at the communal, municipal or local level can be considered 
at two different levels: 
First, people can express their opinion, regarding the local process of management or local 
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government, through the political system. According to the last municipal reform, Chilean 
government comprises a mayor ("alcalde") and a deliberative political body or municipal 
council ("concejo municipal"). All these municipal members are elected for a four year term 
with the possibility of immediate re-election. However, the mayor is not directly elected but 
usually heads the list of the winning party for council seats. If the top candidate gains a 
minimum of 35 per cent of the vote, he/she becomes directly elected as major. However, if 
the top candidate gains less than 35 per cent of the vote, the mayor is elected indirectly by 
the council members from among themselves. The mayor convenes and presides over council 
meetings, while several key official posts (municipal secretary, secretary of planning and 
coordination and community development secretary) are legally required to service both the 
council and the major. Council members (concejales) are elected according to an open party 
list system, varying between a minimum of six members in the 300 municipalities with less 
than 70,000 electors, eight members in the 29 municipalities in between 70,000 and 150,000 
electors, and finally 10 council members in the only five municipalities accounting more than 
150,000 electors (ValparaIso, Viiia del Mar, Santiago, La Florida and Concepci6n) 
(SUBDERE,1992). 
Secondly, people can also get involved in local participation through the neighbourhood 
association system ("juntas de vecinos"), which in 1992 comprised 27,400 community 
organisations nation-wide, with a combined membership of over 2,7 million (SUBDERE, 
1992). According to the 1968 law which officially recognized the existence of neighbourhood 
associations, these organisations were intensively developed throughout the country during 
the Allende government between 1970-73. Due to the weakness of the municipal system at 
that time, these organisations developed much closer direct political links with ministries and 
other state bodies responsible for the delivery of local services, rather than with the 
communal administrative system. Thus, the neighbourhood associations soon became highly 
politicised and political clientelism was one important feature within the communal process 
of social participation. However, after the military coup of 1973, community participation 
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was rapidly depoliticized through violent state repression. Instead of direct elections, in 1977 
the military regime set up an electoral mechanism through which the leadership of all 
neighbourhood associations would be chosen by the provincial governor from a list of nine 
candidates proposed by the mayor. 
The new 1992 municipal code was rather oriented to democratize the corporativist and 
exclusionary tradition of community participation propagated by the military regime through 
the CODECOs. One of its aims was to promote the role of the neighbourhood association, 
while avoiding the politically divisive form that it had assumed during Allende's government. 
Neighbourhood associations have also become an important part of local government's 
administrative system. In addition to the elected council ("concejales "), each municipality has 
an economic and social community council ("Consejo Econ6mico y Social Comunal"- CES). 
It is composed by representatives of neighbourhood associations (40 percent), leaders of 
different interest groups such as educational, professional, trade unions, cultural and sport 
groups (30 per cent). Varying between 10 to 30 members, depending on the number of 
inhabitants, these community councils are chaired by the mayor and fulfil and advisory role. 
They have the right to be consulted on municipal accounts and local development plans. Each 
municipal administration has also a community development division whose prime function 
is to promote centrally-financed community projects in liaison with the Economic and Social 
Community Council- CES and regional authorities. People can be consulted on specific 
matters through plebiscites. These may be held on specific investment projects either at the 
request of either 15 per cent of the electorate or the mayor. However, the result of the 
plebiscite is binding only if more than half of the municipal electorate vote (Nickson, 1994). 
7.3. Concluding Remarks 
Undoubtedly, from the very beginning of the Aylwin government, major institutional reforms 
at the regional level were seen as essential and urgent to improve the effectiveness of public 
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action and, thereby, to overcome both geographical socio-productive disparities and 
socio-political institutional constraints. Thus, the recent reforms in both the regional and 
municipal codes became a starting point for more active and participative programmes 
concerning both government bodies and community organisations. However, there are still 
some restrictions that have to be considered. 
Firstly, the traditional pattern of Chile's high level of centralism can not be easily changed 
even with the intensive application of the institutional reforms. Even though Chilean regions 
now have higher degrees of freedom in formulating and financing their own development 
strategies, it is still extremely difficult to reverse the strong geographical concentration of 
public expenditure that Chile has had over the last decades. More than 80 per cent of public 
expenditure has been channelled into the Metropolitan Region of Santiago throughout the late 
1970 and 1980 (Boisier,1983). 
Therefore, despite the fact that some efforts have been made in increasing regional budgets, 
there are still factors playing against higher levels of decentralisation in regard to the 
regional policy-making process. According to the national constitution, the "Intendente" is 
the central government's representative in his/her respective region, but is not necessarily the 
representative of that region in central government. This distinction becomes important 
especially during budgetary discussions in which central and regional interests might become 
opposed. Furthermore, this distinction is also important when the "intendente" -following 
instructions from the Ministry of the Interior- has to impose her/his authority over the 
demands of regionally-based organisations. In such cases, the "intendente" has to act in the 
name of the president and not on his own or on behalf of the region. 
Furthermore, as far as decentralisation in public policy-making is concerned, the real 
opportunities that regional government has for formulating and implementing its own 
independent programmes are limited. Most political and budgetary decisions of the central 
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government are not possible to be effectively transferred to the regional level. The only set 
of policy-decisions which can be taken at the regional level are the social ones (principally 
concerning primary education and health). With respect to other sectors of government, the 
regional government can as maximum administer programmes of centralised ministries (as 
happens with regard to macro-economic, agriculture, justice, and public-work policies). The 
resulting restrictions still constitute a significant barrier to regionally-based development 
programmes throughout the country. 
Secondly, most of the regional development constraints and barriers tend to worsen as soon 
as they are analysed at the local or municipal level. According to the previous municipal 
analysis, there exist significant institutionalised differences in both budget and staff 
availability between the "comunas" throughout the country. This aspect undoubtedly imposes 
tremendous difficulties for the smallest municipalities when they have to allocate resources 
in development programmes. Although the municipal process of resource distribution, 
(according to the existing proportionality between communal population and financial/human 
resources, could be considered rather equitable), it should be noted that most of the less 
populated communes are rural. As it was mentioned before most of the rural communes have 
been classified as poor by different social surveys (see Chapter 2). This implies, at least from 
the ethical point of view, that additional public efforts ought to be made in these areas as a 
consequence of their larger social requirements. Furthermore, if it is also considered that in 
Chile rural municipalities are in geographical terms larger than the rest, it is clear that 
physical accessibility becomes an additional barrier for both people's access to municipal 
services, and for municipal staff to get in contact with the communal reality. However, in 
the process of municipal-fund redistribution the communal size is not taken into consideration, 
only the population size. 
Thus, even though the new municipal code has improved substantially the possibilities of 
more decentralised and democratic local governments, there are still significant problem for 
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poor municipalities especially for those in the poorest regions. Regional government also 
tends to discriminate against the poorest rural communes. In the last meeting of mayors that 
head the poorest rural municipalities in the Maule Region (Cauquenes, November 1993), it 
was declared that the intra-regional concentration of public expenditure in the regional capital 
was becoming worse than that at the national level. Thus, deep ruptures with central 
government do not appear convenient alternative for less developed communes, especially 
when they have to make comparatively higher levels of social investment. Thus, additional 
flows of investment from the central level need to be explored as a complementary and 
corrective measure. 
However, decentralisation in the formulation of diagnosis and policy needs to be encouraged 
at the regional and local level, not only for raising the level of popular participation but also 
for avoiding adverse results from the application of nation-wide development policies. As an 
example the improvement of secondary roads in one of the poorest rural regions -the 
Araucania, very much interfered with the use of animal-powered local transport, because 
animals could not walk (in the rubble) without hurting their feet. Excesses of technocracy in 
the planning process very much prevent the possibility of satisfying simple popular needs, as 
will also be seen in Chapter 10 in which an experience of popular participation implemented 
by CIDER is going to be presented. 
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Chapter 8. The Interministerial Commission for Rural Development: a 
Potential Instrument for Development 
Introduction 
From the theoretical point of view it seems to be clear that urban and rural processes cannot 
be easily isolated from each other without the risk of misunderstanding the holistic dynamic 
of space. However, from the policy-making perspective some distinctions cannot be avoided 
in order to facilitate the implementation of specific programmes, especially if one takes into 
consideration the structural public inflexibilities that the country's institutionality presents (see 
Chapter 6). 
The following arguments and policy propositions in favour of rural areas come as a result of 
the Aylwin's government interest in using all existing institutional means to combat the level 
of poverty that the country presented when it assumed power. One of these institutional 
bodies was the Interministerial Commission for Rural Development - CIDER, created by the 
previous military government in 1986 together with other interministerial commissions -the 
National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA) and the National Commission for 
Irrigation (CNR). Whereas the last two commissions were relatively successful in their 
process of administrative evolution (at least both got financial independence from the public 
budgetary system and they became well-defined institutional bodies with their own stafO, 
CIDER was always a nebulous embryonic body within the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MINAGRI), with neither staff nor a specific budget to identify, implement and control any 
particular developmental strategy for rural areas. 
However, in spite of all the institutional disadvantages, the Aylwin government decided not 
to abolish the law through which CIDER was originally created. Conversely, ministers 
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realised that the legal articles of CIDER's code had nothing which could be considered as 
being against the interest of the new government. So, as a result of an agreement reached in 
the first CIDER meeting at the ministerial level in mid-1990, it was decided to continue 
working with CIDER, even though it was not clear how it should be re-organised 
(MINAGRI, 1990). One reason was the fact that this commission was not explicitly 
considered in Aylwin's political programme. But, due to the fact that all the country's laws 
came under parliamentary control, the Minister of Agriculture (CIDER's head) was soon 
asked to inform the Chamber of Deputies agricultural commission about the actions in favour 
of rural areas carried out through CIDER. This can be considered the turning point as regards 
as the evolution of the Commission for Rural Development. After that, the Minister of 
Agriculture decided to assume the role of head of the commission in a more active way and 
to reinforce its linkages with other ministries by forming an active interministerial advisory 
group. Its main task was to advise him and other ministers concerning the identification of 
coordinated actions in favour of rural areas. 
Since then, CIDER has appeared as an interesting instrument for public policy, especially 
since it has not required an investment budget due to the fact that it was principally defined 
as a coordinating body for public policy. During most of the Aylwin period CIDER worked 
not only for facilitating greater coordination in rural areas, but also for improving its 
effectiveness as a public body. As a result of CIDER's successes and failures, the CIDER 
law was reformed in February 1994. The law incorporated some institutional changes and 
explained its duties within the new Frei government which started in March 1994 (see 
Chapter 10). 
The main aim of this chapter is to present and describe some characteristics and the recent 
evolution of the Interministerial Commission for Rural Development -CIDER, especially in 
terms of its potentialities for becoming a valuable instrument for policy coordination towards 
rural areas, taking into consideration the new and diminished role of the Chilean State. In 
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order to do this, the chapter is divided in three parts. First, a brief background regarding its 
origin, institutional composition and general evaluatory remarks during the military regime 
is presented. Secondly, some arguments considered by Aylwin's government which finally 
contributed to maintain CIDER in exercise throughout its constitutional period are exposed. 
Finally, some references are given in order to understand the organisation, aims and 
contextualisation of CIDER's Coordination Programme for Rural Development -CPRD, 
presented in the next chapter. This analysis intends to introduce the following two chapters 
in which it is going to be introduced the policy proposition for rural areas developed by 
CIDER's members and some of the preliminary results obtained until the beginning of 1994. 
8.1. The Interministerial Commission for Rural Development: a general institutional 
background under the military government 
The Interministerial Commission for Rural Development, whose main objective was to assist 
the President of the Republic as regard rural development, was officially created through the 
Ministry of Agriculture's Decree No 55, the 13 of June 1986. 
In creating this commission, the government firstly appealed to the very first article of the 
Chilean Constitution, which explicitly guarantees equal opportunities and possibilities for 
development for all Chileans living throughout the national territory. In order to achieve this 
aim, the government decided that, firstly, some specific policies in favour of rural areas 
should be identified. Secondly, it was deemed necessary to have a centralised body for 
gathering the public and private information concerning rural activities in the country. Given 
that there was not any public body responsible to deal exclusively with rural matters, the 
government considered the possibility of creating a commission in charge of the formulation, 
unification and implementation of all policies that the government considered necessary, in 
order to improve the quality of life for those people who lived and worked in rural areas. 
(MINAGRI, 1986). 
202 
8.1.1. Conformation of the commission 
According to the original Decree No 55 of 1986, the Interministerial Commission for Rural 
Development had ministerial rank, and was able to act at the highest political level of 
decision-making. It comprised nine Ministers of State and two Vice-Ministers. It was decided 
to be permanently headed by the Minister of Agriculture. 
Permanent members: 
- Minister of Agriculture ( President ). 
- Minister of Planning and Cooperation. 
- Minister of Public Works. 
- Minister of Education. 
- Minister of Health. 
- Minister of Housing. 
- Minister of Transport and Communication. 
- Minister of National Territory. 
- Minister of Mining. 
- Vice-Minister of Regional and Administrative Development. 
- Vice-Minister of Fishing. 
The commission I s Decree established also the creation of one technical advisory committee 
("Comite Tecnico Asesor") comprised by one official representative of each respective 
minister and vice-minister appointed to the commission. The main role of this committee was 
to assist the ministers, by proposing measures, actions and policies which could be 
implemented for reaching the commission's objectives. The commission also has an executive 
secretary ("Secretario Ejecutivo") whose role was to act as a direct adviser to the Minister 
of Agriculture (in its role as head of the commission). The executive secretary was the head 
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of the "Comite Tecnico Asesor", and was also in charge of the coordination between this 
committee and the ministerial commission. The Decree No 55 assigned the role of executive 
secretary to the head of INDAP (National Institute for Agricultural Development), the largest 
body in the Ministry of Agriculture. 
8.1.2. Objectives of the commission 
Strictly speaking, Decree No 55 did not establish specific or clearly-defined actions to be 
regularly developed by the commission, but instead it principally considered some general 
aims to be fulfilled. Thus, actions from the commission were expected to be directed to the 
following general aims: 
a) to improve the general environment of rural areas in order to raise the quality of life of 
the people living in the countryside, whatever their activity. 
b) to reinforce the social and productive values of rural areas in order to stop and reverse the 
rural de-population process. 
c) to improve the utilisation of the country's natural resources, by rationally raising the 
productive level of the agricultural, mining and fishing sectors. 
8.1.3. General evaluatory remarks of the military regime period 
It needs to be mentioned that the commission was not provided with any specific budget to 
develop its actions, so it did not have an executive role. As is especially remarked in its 
Decree, the implementation of any specific policy, measure or action identified by the 
commission had to be financed and executed by the corresponding ministry, public or private 
organisation. Therefore, it became extremely difficult to evaluate the outcome of a public 
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body which presented a rather wide and general set of aims but did not identify actors to deal 
with particular actions. As INDAP reported in 1990, the respective ministries continued 
allocating their budget according to their own sectoral criteria. No significant special 
programmes came about as a result of inter-institutional agreement inside the Commission for 
Rural Development. The explanations which INDAP pointed-out were (INDAP, 1990): 
a) it proved extremely difficult for the ministries to redirect financial resources in order to 
assume new inter-institutional agreement established, due to their long-term financial 
compromises established with international economic organisations. 
b) since a significant amount of ministerial decision-making for project-implementation was 
done as a result of regionally-based programmes (the case of primary education and health 
were a clear examples of that), it became extremely difficult for ministers to promise in 
advance both central and regional funds. 
c) it became extremely difficult to re-direct the strongly urban-biased process of 
intra-regional allocation of resources obtained from the FNDR (regional fund for regional 
development) . 
However, perhaps the clearest argument for explaining the limited role played by the 
commission during the latter stages of the military regime, was the contradiction between the 
commission's concerns and objectives, and the real possibilities the government had to deal 
with them. 
In effect, the first contradiction arises as soon as it is considered that it was very difficult for 
the government to take effective measures in favour of the rural areas, considering the 
subsidiary role of the state that the government strongly and explicitly advocated. Most of the 
measures which could have been identified for fulfilling the commission's objectives, would 
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have demanded an active and participatory role of government by discriminating in favour 
of rural areas. This was always explicitly neglected. 
Secondly, as has already been analysed in previous chapters, deep changes in a large portion 
of Chile's countryside was one of the important outcomes that resulted from the adoption of 
the liberal economic model implemented by the military regime. Many of the problems the 
government was trying to overcome were significantly worsened due to the implementation 
of their export-oriented economic strategy, especially as regard rural depopulation and 
urbanisation (Apey, 1987). 
However, in spite of the fact that the government strongly believed that deep changes in the 
productive sectors were the best solutions for long-term spatial development (ODEPLAN, 
1976), they were also aware that as a result of this process, the rural depopulation dynamic 
increased significantly in pace, especially in those agricultural areas that shifted earliest to 
export-led growth. Pressure through migration was put upon medium-scale towns (as regards 
demand for employment, housing and social services). However what worried the government 
most was the geo-political implications of a depopulated countryside, especially when the 
government was advocating a "national security doctrine", in which the occupancy of empty 
spaces became a paramount aim (ODEPLAN,1976). 
It is worth pointing out that a deep tension with the Argentinean military government over 
border issues before and during the Falklands/Malvinas war very much encouraged the 
military government to use geo-political arguments to contextualise internal affairs. The 
relationship between both empty spaces and the doctrine of national security sustained 
additional State policies: for example, the construction of the "Carretera Austral" through the 
Aisen Region (an expensive road in one of the less populated and more 
geographically-isolated southern areas of the country); a colonisation programme in the 
archipelago of the same region (but without a physical and functional connection to the 
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prevlous project); and the demographic policy followed by the military regime 
(encouragement of a higher birth rate and the suppression of the State's birth control 
programmes) (ODEPLAN, 1976). 
8.2. Institutional and Political Context for CIDER's Programme for Rural Development 
Once the Minister of Agriculture of the Aylwin government decided in 1991 to re-start 
CIDER, one of his first measures was to create a new technical advisory committee ("Comite 
Tecnico Asesor" -CT A). In parallel, he appointed a deputy Executive Secretary instead of the 
head of INDAP, due to the fact that the latter was at the time heading an emergency 
commission for the coordination of public policies oriented to the alleviation of 
socio-productive problems coming as a result of a severe drought affecting the central and 
northern regions of the country for three years. After that, the CTA had to meet on a regular 
basis in order to advise the ministerial committee and to propose to them concrete measures 
which would favour rural areas. 
8.2.1. Institutional context for coordination in rural policies 
From the very beginning it was not easy to link desirability and feasibility as regards CTA 
propositions for rural areas. One important reason was the fact that, even though there was 
a consensus that the government had to perform an active and permanent role in the 
policy-making process concerning the rural environment, it was clear enough that there were 
concrete facts acting against the way in which the two previous democratic governments had 
approached rural problems. It is worth mentioning that a significant number of Aylwin's 
cabinet members played an active technical and political role in the governments of Frei and 
Allende between 1964 and 1973. During that period the State strongly intervened rural areas. 
At the beginning of the Aylwin administration, however, the concrete possibilities that the 
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State had for intervening directly in rural areas had seriously diminished. Three reasons for 
this were: 
a) Most of those enterprises; infrastructure and land previously owned by the State had been 
transferred to the private sector. 
b) The State had been deprived of most of its potential instruments for benefiting particular 
rural groups. Thus, the use of discretional policy instruments like support prices, 
differential dollar values for import and export goods, and differential tariffs and barriers 
for import would have been considered out of context. 
c) The Aylwin government did not re-start the land reform programme brought to a close by 
the previous military regime. So, the possibility of considering land redistribution to 
alleviate the problems of homeless peasants (through any sort of land expropriation) was 
completely avoided from the very beginning by the Aylwin government. No new edition, 
reformulation, or revival of the land reform was contemplated, as this was considered a 
closed chapter (Kay, 1993). Undoubtedly, any attempt from the State oriented to 
redistribute private land would jeopardize the credibility in the government as regards its 
intentions of maintaining the private sector as the main engine of the national economy 
(Scott, 1993). Furthermore, because the size of the State had been severely diminished, 
it is was no longer feasible to think of large development programmes all around the 
country as in the past. Restrictions of personnel and finance, as well as the new regional 
administrative system, did not permit such policy alternatives. 
An additional significant point was that CIDER did not have the right to handle financial 
resources, nor could it directly implement projects. This strongly affected the potential for 
satisfying the demands for fast results and the implementation of specific programmes. 
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All these arguments, therefore, strongly limited CIDER scope of action. However, any policy 
proposition had to considered not only these factors but also the constraints already described 
in a previous chapter. Therefore, it is clear that one of the only possibilities CIDER had to 
achieve some concrete result in rural development was through the search for a better level 
of public efficiency. Coordination was eventually the only available instrument. 
8.2.2. The political argument 
It needs to be mentioned, however, that in addition to economic, social, and ethical 
arguments used by CIDER in order to adopt a more active instance in favour of rural areas, 
there was also a strong political reason for establishing a closer policy relationship with the 
countryside. With the exception of northern mining regions, most of Aylwin's electoral 
opposition was principally based in rural areas. In fact in the first democratic parliamentary 
election to re-open the National Congress, most of the senators and deputies of the opposition 
were elected in rural electoral districts. Thus, excepting two, all 59 communes where the 
Democratic Coalition of the "Concertaci6n" obtained under 40% of political support in the 
1989 parliamentary election, were classified as rural. No doubt, all the unelected "alcaldes" 
played an important pre-electionary role in achieving these results, since they were the main 
articulative instrument between the community and the authoritarian State. 
Therefore, from the very beginning of the Aylwin government it was important to neutralise 
or even to reverse electoral support for the opposition. The strength of social policy and the 
re-opening of different sources of popular participation was thought of as effective and 
democratic means to achieve this. This aspect was particularly important as regards the 
electoral future of the Democratic Coalition of the "Concertaci6n" in rural areas, especially 
due to the upcoming following municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections. As regards 
municipal elections the relevance was even more significant. It needs to be remembered that 
(as was explained in Chapter 7), regardless of the lower population totals that the countryside 
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had, all rural communes were to elect 6 council members ("concejales"). Accordingly, rural 
populations were to be highly over-represented as regards the proportion of" concej ales " they 
elected at both regional and national levels. Even though the percentage of registered electors 
coming from the 100 most rural communes reached only 9,5 per cent of the national total, 
they had the chance to elect 34 per cent the "concejales". Moreover, the "concejales" elected 
the regional council (MINAGRI, 1990). Hence, the rural electorate proved important for the 
political sustainability of the Coalition Government of the "Concertaci6n". 
8.2.3 The search by the Technical Advisory Committee (CTA) for policy coordination: 
short-term requirements 
As a result of the first CT A meetings it was clear that coordination was a task to be targeted 
in formulating future policies. Furthermore, there was an urgent need for improving both the 
conceptual language used by the different ministerial bodies and the level of knowledge of 
their particular ministerial actions towards rural areas. This proved to be one of the earliest 
problems to be resolved for improving the public capability to operate in an integrated way. 
Some problems to be overcome were: 
a) Significant differences on the concept of rurality. Although the division between rural and 
urban population is officially determined by the National Institute of Statistics (lNE), 
different ministries used their own criteria for the categorisation of rurality. As a matter 
of fact, the Ministry of Agriculture followed the INE criteria (any settlement with less 
than 60 houses and a population of below 301 inhabitants should be considered rural). 
However, in the meantime the Ministry of Housing had its own criteria of rurality (towns 
with less than 5.000 inhabitants), and the same happened with the Ministry of Health 
(settlements with less than 3.000 people are considered rural). Although to be concerned 
about these differences in population might be considered as excessively technical it 
became an important aspect to be considered in policy making, since these differences 
created significant gaps in the socio-geographical coverage of interministerial 
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programmes. 
b) There was a generalised dis information as regards programmes, projects and actions that 
benefited rural areas being implemented by other ministries. Moreover, as a result of the 
new possibility of regionally-based development programmes, there were some 
interinstitutional initiatives developed at the regional level which were not always known 
by central government. As a result of this, there were some duplicated intra-ministerial 
initiatives and efforts by regional and central levels of government (as occurred in some 
regional social housing programmes). Conversely, some regional programmes could have 
achieved more resources if they had been known about at the central level. 
c) There was not enough intraministerial centralisation as regards information on rural 
initiatives and on specific agreements with other public bodies. Due to institutional 
complexity in some ministries (they comprise a range of semi-independent units), it was 
difficult to get information and to coordinate different initiatives related, in one way or 
another, to actions in rural areas developed by institutions such as INDAP, CONAF or 
SAG. 
Two important decisions came as a result of these problems. In the first place it was decided 
that the members of the CTA should become the official ministerial representative of rural 
matters (with the logical exemption of the Ministry of Agriculture). Secondly, it was decided 
to centralise in the Ministry of Agriculture all information concerning interministerial 
initiatives (programmes, projects, agreement, etc.) related to rural areas and to keep them 
as up to date as possible; this initiative was later an important aspect within the proposition 
for CIDER institutional reorganisation. 
However, the establishment of specific aims and objectives in an interinstitutional programme 
whose main policy instrument was coordination was not easy. Most of the experience related 
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to specific development programmes or projects usually operated within well-defined 
budgetary margins. In that way, therefore, the availability of funds was the main measure for 
contextualising the length and scope of any potential programme. In the case of CIDER, 
however, any proposition of action had to be related to the capacity of the ministries to act 
together, in accordance with some agreed objectives, but using only their own ministerial 
budgets. 
In this context, it was difficult to identify specific tasks and to evaluate CIDER's results. This 
was especially important due to the fact that CIDER did not have an operational role, and nor 
did it have a mechanism to oblige the internal bodies of ministries to act in accordance with 
any of their initial agreements (that was important as regards the possibility of controlling the 
development of the different programmes). Therefore, from the very beginning all CIDER 
responsibilities had to be evaluated in accordance with whether or not the level and capacity 
of the different ministries to act together, in benefiting rural areas, was finally increased. But, 
the operational responsibility continued lying in each ministry. 
8.3. Composition of CIDER's Short- and Medium-Term Coordination Programme for Rural 
Development (CPRD) 
It is worth pointing out that the forthcoming proposition of public coordination for rural 
development was presented principally as a guideline for the allocation of public resources 
of an important sector of the government involved in rural policy rather than as a compulsory 
plan to be developed throughout a specific period of time, 
8.3.1. Organisation of the CPRD 
The CPRD, prepared by the CTA and unanimously approved by CIDER ministries on 
January 29th, 1992 is divided in four sections: 
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Section 1: Priorities for Public Programmes According to Communal Poverty Rankings. 
This is oriented to the identification and hierarchisation of the main socio-geographical areas 
of rural poverty by using, in an aggregated way, the most recent available social surveys. 
The main objective of this section was not only to identify and rank the poorest rural areas 
throughout the country, but also to adopt a common standard in the use of such information. 
This provided a referential framework for identifying common priorities to be taken into 
consideration in both the allocation of ministerial resources and in the identification of 
interministerial programmes. Moreover, because most of the social variables utilised by the 
surveys to rank rural poverty are known (see Chapter 2), the redirection and focalisation of 
ad-hoc programmes could largely contribute to diminish poverty in these areas. 
Section 2: Compilation of Financial Instruments Specifically Available for Rural Areas. 
Description of existing public financial instruments (programmes and subsidies) being carried 
out, specifically identified to directly benefit rural socio-productive activities. Among the 
arguments for gathering this information was the generalised ignorance of both potential 
beneficiaries and public bodies on available programmes for rural areas. Whilst some FOSIS 
social programmes were unable to fully allocate their annual budget in 1990-91 (confidential 
information to be discussed later) there were a number of poor rural communes which did 
not present any project at all. 
Section 3: Institutional Organisation for the Interministerial Commission for Rural 
Development. 
Identification of an institutional proposition oriented to make CIDER a more well-defined 
State instrument in charge of integrated rural policies at both central and regional levels. It 
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has to be mentioned that the proposition at the regional level was very much inspired by a 
pilot experience carried out in coordination with the regional government of the Maule 
Region. This regional commission was launched by the Ministry of Agriculture in mid 1990 
before the CTA proposition of establishing regional CIDERs had been approved by ministers. 
Section 4: Intersectoral Programmes for Rural Areas Identified and Implemented Through 
the CT A Between May and December 1991. 
Identification and implementation of different bi and multi-ministerial short-and medium-term 
socio-productive programmes. The main objective of this proposition was to receive and 
increase the ministry'S support (mainly by receiving financial funds) of several integrated 
programmes identified among the members of the CTA throughout the six months in which 
the proposition of the CPRD was prepared. 
8.4. Aims and Contextualisation of the CPRD 
There were two main goals in the application of the CPRD. 
In the first place, one goal was to transform CIDER into a powerful public instrument for 
policy-making, taking into account the new characteristics (and restrictions) of a smaller State 
within a free-market economy. Through the systematic search for higher levels of horizontal 
coordination, the State can start to have a strong role, as regards actions oriented to face 
development problems, without resorting to inflexible and mostly unsuccessful means that 
were used in the past in orthodox centrally-planned economies. 
Secondly, although it is generally agreed within public bodies that higher levels of 
institutional coordination should be permanently pursued, there are not always the specific 
means available to operationalise greater coordination. Moreover, as the early CIDER 
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experience showed, it became extremely difficult to achieve concrete policy coordination 
without defining in advance specific guidelines for the programme. Thus, the establishment 
of common priorities for integrated actions in accordance with those of were used as a 
minimum framework for identifying interinstitutional short-and medium-term projects at both 
the central and regional level. 
In this way, in addition to CIDER's proposed priorities for coordination, it was suggested that 
most of the existing trans-regional special programmes (with their own budgets) directed to 
rural areas could be used also as a guideline for both the definition of the regional strategies 
of development and for the regional process of budget allocation. Some potential benefits as 
regards this possibility were: 
First, it is expected to involve the participation of regional and local governments in the 
implementation of most of the externally-financed programmes within the region, thus 
avoiding as much as possible the implementation of isolated development projects, carried out 
principally by external expertise. A better level of involvement between externally-funded 
special projects and the regional process of policy-making would also permit to a certain 
extent the continuation of some of these projects after their original funds were finished. This 
is because additional funds oriented to the extension in scope and time of those projects could 
be also obtained from the traditional process of regional budget allocation. Thus, a dialectical 
process of mutual empowerment is expected to occur between both external programmes and 
regional development strategies, as a result of this financial interaction. 
Second, taking into consideration the variety of landscapes that Chile presents due to its 
length, it has been very difficult to succeed in nation-wide development programmes. A 
classical example of that was the implementation in the 1960s of a national programme for 
school building by following the central-region construction standard. As a result of that, 
people in northern regions were constantly suffering due to warm weather while in southern 
215 
areas the problem was the opposite. However, using these trans-regional programmes as a 
general guideline, regional governments were more likely to succeed in the identification of 
policy, programmes and projects based on local characteristics. This aspect becomes 
particularly important in Chile since there is a strong association between different degraded 
regional landscapes and the poor people living on them (the Altiplano region, the semi-arid 
inter fluvial systems and the central and southern coastal-range dry-lands are the main 
examples of highly differentiated geographical environments where poverty is a common 
social feature (see Chapter 2). 
After the CPRD was approved, the National Forestry Plan and The National Plan Against 
Desertification, both partially financed by FAD funds, become two examples of 
multi-institutional programmes for rural areas sharing CIDER's criteria for being linked with 
regional and local governments. 
Third, the proposition of specific intersectoral programmes oriented to neutralise as much 
as possible the State's institutional barriers (mentioned in an early chapter) was also one of 
the main aims in inspiring the CPRD. Although CIDER was not a well known public body 
within the Aylwin government, the closeness of CTA members to their respective ministers 
become an invaluable opportunity to propose to them some concrete intersectoral programmes 
to be implemented in the near future. Moreover, since ministers have a higher hierarchical 
position than regional "intendentes", CIDER ministers could have a direct way to gain access 
to regional authorities for discussing and linking central and regional initiatives. 
Finally, the forthcoming proposition of a regionally-based CIDER organisation was one of 
the earliest government attempts in intensively using the new regional and municipal 
institutionality for inducing popular participation in the identification of ways to orientate 
rural development policies towards the countryside. Moreover, working together with 
regional governments permitted CIDER to shift from being a purely coordinating central level 
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body to implementing specific projects, as a result of applying to regionally-based 
(deconcentrated) budgets. 
8.5. Summary 
Despite the weakness of CIDER instruments for the implementation of rural policies, it 
proved possible to reduce this constraint through an initial agreement between its members 
oriented to find the way to mobilise the resources of each ministry. However, since better 
coordination was the only initial instrument available for operationalising CIDER, strong 
efforts were made to establish common guidelines of mutual interest for joint actions on rural 
areas. In this regard, the initial intention of incorporating regional government into CIDER's 
actions improved expectations concerning the implementation of programmes within a 
framework of higher levels of popular participation. 
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Chapter 9. CIDER's Programme of Coordination For Rural Development: 
an Inter-institutional Strategy to Orient Short- and 
Medium-term Public Policies 
Introduction 
One important consideration to bear in mind is that CIDER's Coordination Programme for 
Rural Development (CPRD) was conceived as a twofold instrument. In the first place, one 
objective was for it to become an up-date source of information on rural matters which could 
be used by public bodies involved in rural policy making. Thus, the identification of the main 
geographical areas of rural poverty and the compilation of current financial programmes and 
instruments specifically focused to benefit rural people could be mentioned as the main tasks 
in order to identify joint short-term initiatives. Secondly, an other objective was to identify 
and propose institutional frameworks to facilitate the implementation of common initiatives 
among the different public bodies. 
Accordingly, CPRD's objectives were oriented to both short and medium-terms perspectives. 
However, some of these actions considered in the medium-term proposal were specifically 
directed to reinforce CIDER's institutionality. This last objective was considered one of the 
principal means for facilitating the achievement of long-term aims as regards 
inter-institutional policies for the rural sector. 
This chapter is oriented to present and discuss the main proposals of the CPRD in order to 
increase the potential of government to improve the effectiveness of public actions in rural 
areas. Since the CIDER's main aim was to achieve continuity regarding public policies 
benefiting the countryside, short-term actions had to be taken as the very first efforts in 
identifying initial axes for ministerial coordination. As is going to be discussed later, 
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short-term actions are expected to be regularly identified on an annual basis, especially in the 
period before the government's budget is allocated (August-September) -see Institutional 
Organisation of CIDER. Undoubtedly, the identification of common axes regarding 
interministerial actions tended to facilitate the fulfilment of the rather general, and mostly 
vague, aim of public coordination. 
9.1. Priorities for Public Programmes According to Communal Poverty Rankings 
Taking into account that the government was very much committed to tackle poverty, one of 
the first of CIDER's public coordination axes proposed through the CPRD was precisely that 
of rural poverty. As has been discussed in earlier chapters, however, poverty in general and 
rural poverty in particular are largely spread throughout the country. Because of that, to 
tackle poverty as a general aim was extremely difficult considering that: CIDER had no 
budget for direct investment; and because of the difficulties involved in attracting and 
re-directing different sources of public funds to alleviate poverty. So, the identification of 
socio-geographical variables would facilitate the decision on where to concentrate additional 
government efforts. 
Accordingly, the first aim of CIDER's CPRD was oriented to facilitate the decision-making 
process of all bodies involved in the allocation of resources in rural areas. In that way, rural 
poverty was proposed as one of the main axes of coordination for government. In order to 
do so, CIDER produced an aggregate diagnosis of rural poverty at the communal level whose 
main objectives were: 
a) to identify, classify and rank the poorest rural communes of the country by considering 
recent social indicators (for more details see chapter 2 on Poverty in Chile); and 
b) to set up an agreement among the different public bodies related to CIDER in order to use 
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such information as a minimum spatial reference to focus both ministerial and interministerial 
measures, programmes and policies to face extreme poverty. 
However, in addition to the final outcome of the spatial distribution of 113 rural communes 
in poverty, a brief analysis of the allocation of budgets from CIDER's ministries concerning 
a random selection of 46 communes in poverty was also included. According to information 
from the Ministry of Planning -MIDEPLAN, 13 per cent of these administrative units (6) 
presented no projects at all, and 20 per cent (9) had only one project approved to be financed 
starting from 1991. 
Thus, the combined information on the spatial distribution of rural poverty, the availability 
of different social indicators concerning poverty and clear evidence showing the lack of public 
investment in most of these areas, became the basis for arguments for additional efforts to 
be made in favour of the most disadvantaged rural areas of the country. However, as these 
efforts were deemed as high priority to gain funds from ministerial budgets for rural areas, 
no additional financial resources were necessarily needed. 
9.2. Complementary Referential Axes for Public Coordination 
As CIDER's technical advisory committee ("Comite Tecnico Asesor" -CTA) was defining 
the basis of the CPRD, some members started to discuss some additional axes for 
coordination to be followed in the near future. In fact, the identification of rural areas in 
poverty as the most important axis of coordination for future combined actions, did not 
constrain the identification of additional areas in which different ministries could develop new 
programmes as a result of potential policy alliances. 
As a result of that, three additional main thematic axes started to be identified from 1992 
onwards. These axes were: 
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9.2.1. Socio-productive measures towards small-and medium-scale fishing and mining 
activities 
In general terms, the main problems affecting small-and medium-scale activities could be 
divided in two groups: 
a) these directly linked with production in these sectors, 
b) these elements involved in the locality and environment in which these activities developed. 
While the first group of problems was being faced through the use of particular sectoral 
resources, the remaining problems proved to be difficult to be solved from these same 
sources, especially since the Ministry of Mining nor the Sub-secretary of Fishing did not have . 
the means to solve problems related to housing, or land titles. Fishermen located in the 
shoreline were unable to claim titles on that lands. The same constrain applied to the 
small-scale miners due to their high level of spatial mobility. 
In order to overcome, or at least to minimize these constraints, an intersectoral group 
consisting of the Ministries of Mining, Housing, National Territory, Public Works and the 
Sub-secretary of Fishing started the identification of initial agreements directed to overcome 
legal constraints (regarding land titles) in order to permit the access of these social groups 
to the existing subsidies in rural housing offered by the Ministry of Housing. In addition, the 
Ministry of Public Work and the Sub-secretary of Fishing started combined actions in order 
to allocate resources in basic infrastructure in small-fishing villages located in the poorest 
rural communes identified by CIDER'S priority areas for public actions. 
9.2.2. Expansion of the socio-productive geographical frontier in areas of high economic 
potential but low population density (The Guaitecas Archipielago in Aisen and the 
desertic area of The Pampa del Tamarugal) 
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In order to tackle the uneven pattern of distribution that the Chilean population presents and 
also to facilitate a progressive and steady process of economic growth, the government 
(through the Ministry of National Territory which is in charge of administrating the public 
territory) defined two main initiatives to increase and reorganize population in two areas 
presenting high productive potential in fishing (nearly 60 thousand hectares of Aisen's 
shoreline) and in early-growth agricultural products (Pampa del Tamarugal). Potentially 
successful results from both initiatives, however, were thought to be increased as a 
consequence of combined policy attempts. This was especially the case a legal framework 
which encouraged interministerial collaboration existed. This allowed special subsidies for 
public investment in infrastructure and in transport costs to be made. Investment in these 
areas were to be mainly focused on places where there was already an interest from the 
private sector to use land and water resources. 
Accordingly, the Ministry of National Territory started to coordinate further actions for the 
identification of combined policies in areas in which the results of cost-benefit analysis for 
production were positive. After preliminary agreement at the central level between the 
Ministries of National Territory, Agriculture, Transport and Communication, Public Works 
and the Sub-secretary of Fishing, most of the work was developed by the respective regional 
governments (Aisen and Tarapaca), coordinating with central government through of 
CIDER's CTA correspondent members. 
9.2.3. The National Plan for Irrigation 1991-onwards 
Aylwin's government decided to increase substantially public investment in irrigation 
infrastructure through the Ministry of Public Works. Most attention was placed in facilitating 
the access of small- and medium-sized producers so that they could gain benefits from both 
new schemes of irrigation and improvements in the security of water availability on their 
plots. Although investment in irrigation schemes was to be made by the beneficiaries on a 
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long-term basis, the programme offered a subsidy to these small-farmers which could be 
benefited by the irrigation programme offered by INDAP-FOSIS in relation to Decree Law 
18,450. That was because most beneficiaries taking advantage of Decree Law were 
principally the owners of the largest plots. Conversely, small-holders were unable to obtain 
benefits for it due to difficulties in succeeding with respect to the application procedure. 
Technical difficulties to elaborate cost-benefit evaluations very much prevented small-scale 
poor producers to gain access to the subsidy. Difficulties concerning land titles also became 
a major factor of failure. These constraints progressively proved to be a major factor in 
explaining an active but uneven land market, especially in those areas which experienced 
increasing land value after the shift from dry to newly-irrigated lands. In some areas of 
benefited by new irrigation in the Pencahue commune the value of land rose ten times. 
Without the intention of marginalising producers of any size, the irrigation plan was explicitly 
designed to increase the chance of benefiting small- and medium-sized producers. Additional 
mechanisms coordinated through the National Commission for Irrigation -CNR were: 
a} those oriented to facilitate the access of these producers to the subsidy defined in Decree 
Law 18,450 -principally by extending the use of the subsidy to finance also the project 
formulation. 
b} those oriented to reduce the possibility of the beneficiaries selling their lands. c} training 
in irrigation and technical assistance for the incorporation of new crops recommended by 
different organisations within the Ministry of Agriculture (lNIA and INDAP). 
Between 1986 and 1989, the last period of the military regime, benefits from Decree Law 
18,440 applied to 877 projects covering 302,697 hectares. Between 1990 and 1993, the 
number of projects rose to 33,481 on a surface of215,383 hectares (ODEPA, 1994a). Thus, 
it can be seen that small-scale producers benefited much more during the democratic 
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government of Aylwin. 
The global project valued at nearly US$498.3 million, contemplated benefitting 482,900 
hectares (190,726 hectares of new irrigated areas and 292,174 hectares of improved 
irrigation), and 41,407 rural properties located in ten of the thirteen regions of the country. 
All along this territory there were still a number of constraints to be solved in order to 
facilitate the incorporation of a number of producers to the benefits associated with irrigation. 
Accordingly, CIDER's CTA realised that this ambitious plan of small- medium- and 
large-scale irrigation schemes was an interesting opportunity to become a major axis for 
interministerial coordination at the national scale. In particular, it gave the chance for 
additional programmes to those driven by the Ministries of Public Works and Agriculture. 
Accordingly, new demand for housing, education, services, and other social requirements 
could be tackled through a coordinative process of intersectoral local planning. This focused 
public investment and subsidies such as these oriented to rural housing) in areas which would 
benefit from investment in irrigation. Lack of infrastructure, especially in communications, 
would become an even more serious constraint in affecting the cost and mobility of both 
people and production. Thus, to anticipate actions on the newly-irrigated areas was 
considered a good chance for improving public coordination. 
Therefore, after a proposal from the Ministry of Public Works the National Plan for 
Irrigation became one of the most ambitious axes for intersectoral coordination among 
CIDER's members. Concrete actions oriented to the implementation of programmes, 
however, were to be principally carried out by regional governments, according to the 
schedule the specific projects presented. Accordingly, the very first experience of cooperate 
actions were planned in combination with the Maule's regional government due to the fact 
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that the first irrigation project was to be completed in that region. The core 53 km long 
Pencahue's irrigation canal was expected to provide new irrigation for 430 plots covering a 
total surface of 11,200 hectares of previously dry land. In order to facilitate actions in the 
area, the Minister of Agriculture, and the regional "Intendente" agreed in sponsoring a pilot 
experience of a regional CIDER, as a means to formalize a new institutional body to 
coordinate actions in the rural areas of the region. 
9.3. Diffusion of Information on Financial Instruments Available for Rural Development 
The need to improve the efficiency of the state as regards combined programmes towards 
poor rural areas was not only seen as a matter of providing additional financial resources but 
also as a better use of existing ones. Thus, the coordination of sectoral resources was seen 
as increasing the effectiveness of public actions in poor rural areas. In addition, the diffusion 
of the different financial instruments and subsidies could be used by the beneficiaries was 
vital due to the way in which most of the programmes directed to the people were organized 
(through application of beneficiaries rather than through direct subsidies). 
However, the lack of knowledge of most CIDER members regarding current programmes 
directed to the rural sector by other ministries soon became a significant barrier for the 
materialization of new joint interministerial attempts. Surprisingly, some ministries were not 
even aware that some of their policies were principally defined for rural people (small-scale 
mining and fishing programmes). This was illustrated by the fact that other ministries 
believed that rural policies were only part of the Ministry of Agriculture'S duties. In addition, 
CIDER'S members claimed that, although recognising the urgent need for rural people to 
improve their social conditions, some programmes were unable to fully allocate their budgets. 
This was due to both lack of information of all the potential possibilities and to the difficulties 
that most poor people (often illiterate) had to negotiate the application process (e.g. subsidies 
for small irrigation projects, for rural housing, and for benefiting from FOSIS programmes, 
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were considered among the most significant examples). Needless to say, this ignorance was 
also shared by most of the smallest rural municipalities. 
9.3.1. Proposition for sharing information 
Thus, in a collective attempt to increase the level of information concerning the means 
available to facilitate both public and private efforts to combat rural poverty, CIDER's 
members agreed to start gathering, publishing and distributing information about the 
instruments for rural development of the different public bodies. 
As a result of that agreement the second part of the CPRD was gathering the most relevant 
instruments specifically directed to rural people, available at that time. The main outcome 
was the collection and classification of most of the existing programmes, agreements, laws, 
credits, and subsidies which could be potentially used for rural development purposes by 
public bodies (at the central and regional levels) and by the beneficiaries. 
Accordingly, the information published considered: 
- Institution in charge of the operation of the instrument. 
- The target group. 
- Period of operation. 
- Estimation of beneficiaries. 
- Spatial coverage. 
- Available resources. 
- Characteristics of the instrument. 
9.3.2. Main outcomes 
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As result of this search, a total number of 33 financial instruments specifically benefiting 
rural areas were found and published in the very first attempt. In general terms, the 
orientation was as follows: 
10 to the agricultural sector including forestry activities. 
9 to education and training activities. 
5 to small- and medium-scale mining activities. 
3 to small-scale fishing activities. 
2 to the solution of land property problems. 
1 to financing productive projects for indigenous groups. 
1 to small-scale rural industries. 
1 to rural housing. 
1 to rural transport. 
However, this directory was not thought to be a final outcome of all public instruments 
currently available to be used in rural areas. Furthermore, the number of instruments that 
benefitted rural areas could be significantly increased if other nationwide programmes were 
taken into consideration. 
CIDER's policy proposition was a first step in gathering all available means of assistance for 
different sectors of government, municipalities, NGOs, universities, and other organisations 
in order to set up specific rural development programmes. It was also necessary to considered 
instruments made available by the private sector. CIDER'S secretariat decided to assume the 
responsibility involved in both publication and diffusion of information. 
It was proposed that CIDER should become a permanent body of inter-institutional contact 
as regards rural matters in order to allow different ministries to have permanent contact for 
facilitating the identification of multisectoral programmes. The agreement among the 
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corresponding ministries to joint efforts and integrated programmes oriented to solve 
problems related to the ownership of land to allow small-scale farmers, miners and fishermen 
to gain access to rural housing subsidies, and the intensification of combined programmes, 
particularly in those poor rural communes with scarce ministerial attention. 
9.4. Contextualisation for Rural Development 
In order to complement this initiative, however, an additional effort was made to widen the 
scope to which policies could be focused to benefit rural population. In this way, it was 
thought that in order to increase rural development, complementary fields of attention to 
isolated productive measures were needed to be considered to carry out wider combined 
actions. Thus, CIDER proposed four main levels of concern to contextualise their 
programmes towards rural development: 
a) Productive level: this level considers actions in all fields directly or indirectly involved 
with improvements in rural production, storage, transport and commercialisation of 
small-, medium- and large scale production. Combined efforts with the private sector 
were to be highly encouraged. 
b) Socio-cultural level: this level of concern is oriented to facilitate rural population to 
maintain, to exercise and to develop their personal and cultural values. So, 
encouragement and the provision of means to improve the access of all rural inhabitants 
to cultural, recreational, educational, sporting, religious and tourist activities were 
considered important. 
c) Spatial level: this level focuses on the geographical characteristics of the country for the 
orientation of combined policies. Thus, the expansion of the agricultural frontier in areas 
of high potential in both the south and north was identified. It was hoped to facilitate the 
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allocation of private capital in mining and fishing activities in areas presenting problems 
of infrastructure and land titles. Combined programmes with the private sector were 
considered a good means to set up rational programmes in order to populate and utilize 
available natural resources in those areas. Thus, the relocation of rural villages in 
association with the requirements of new patterns of spatial organisation would improve 
chaotic settlement patterns in the Aisen region. These patterns have been responsible for 
irreversible environmental damages in this highly productive but rather fragile landscape. 
To reduce the high rate of depopulation associated with push factors from rural areas was 
also a matter of concern. 
d) Institutional and participatory level: this level of concern intends to orient public actions 
to rebuild, encourage and promote the development of different mechanisms of social 
organisation in the countryside that had been very much neglected during the military 
regime. As a result of that it was expected to increase the level of popular participation 
in the future. Moreover, this level also included proposals by the government in relation 
to the organisation of the state in matters concerning rural processes. Flexibility, 
feedback and control stages for applying and evaluating the different policy attempts were 
considered highly necessary. 
This wider scope to face rural development implied the creation of additional new efforts for 
increasing the variety of instruments to be used in this field of concern. Finally, it was 
intended to make clear that to increase rural development was a combined responsibility. It 
was impossible to be only assumed by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
9.S. New Institutional Organisation for the Interministerial Commission for Rural 
Development 
The military regime did not only discontinue some earlier attempts at rural development (the 
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ending of the land reform process started by the Frei and Allende governments is one 
example) but also did not set up any significant organisation to tackle rural poverty. The 
Aylwin government did not have any significant public body upon which to base a strategy 
to confront the main factors affecting most of the rural inhabitants. There was a need to 
overcome institutional shortcomings in order to confront social, productive and infrastructural 
matters. It was necessary to develop new innovative policies for tackling the association of 
complex socio-productive and environmental problems. The challenge, however, was also 
related to the identification of new and wider perspectives to approach rural development as 
a way of overcoming the limited scope which the military regime had advocated. The military 
regime had regarded development as being an automatic consequence of higher levels of 
economic growth, through trickle-down effects (see Chapter 6). 
Therefore, it was considered extremely important to generate some suggestions for improving 
the potential effectiveness of CIDER, regarding long-term perspectives. CIDER was the 
unique inter-institutional public instrument specifically focused on rural matters. It also 
presented a high level of potential effectiveness regarding the wide variety and political 
relevance of its members. Moreover, theoretical restrictions relating to its lack of a budget 
to invest in rural programmes could be overcome as a result of potential agreements between 
ministries and the concentration of resources in different regions of the country. These funds 
were greater than those that would have been expected from any feasible CIDER budget 
directly driven by an interministerial commission without technical means and little staff. 
The following policy proposal intended to reinforce the commission pre-existing base and 
to permit a long-term process of institutional readaptation. This would improve the capacity 
of the state to act more efficiently as regards specific rural requirements in which 
coordination would present higher levels of effectiveness than isolated sectoral measures. 
The suggested set of polices, however, should be understood as the very first steps toward 
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a progressive but flexible process of CIDER self-ratification. Thus, concrete results rather 
than rigid and theoretical plans were expected to become the main arguments to guide the 
future process of CIDER's institutional consolidation. 
9.5.1. Institutional changes for joint actions towards rural areas: general aims 
The aims of CIDER's proposals of institutional readaptation were mainly oriented to fulfil 
the two following general aims: 
a) To establish specific tasks and goals to be regularly done by CIDER as regards public 
coordination in rural matters. This secured a specific and well-defined role for CIDER 
within the state and facilitated its long-term institutional sustainability. 
b) To increase the effectiveness of CIDER, as a decision-making public body, by considering 
complementary options to widen the scope of its rather centralized role. Thus, 
decentralisation and popular participation were two major aims to be achieved. Recent 
institutional reorganisation in regional and local government gave favourable chances for 
establishing bi-directional flows of information betwee,n CIDER and regional and 
intra-regional agents directly and indirectly concerned with rural matters. Additionally, 
the existence of CIDER's decentralised regional bodies involved in decision-making would 
highly facilitate the implementation of CIDER's centralised agreements regarding 
general axes for coordination. 
9.5.2. Timing to contextualize CIDER-CPRD's aims 
CIDER's main hopes as regards the achievement of successful long-term results as an 
intersectoral body was through self ratification. Concrete results in the application of policies 
should become more relevant than unfeasible theoretical propositions. Therefore, CIDER's 
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principal long-term aim was to be achieved through the progressive fulfilment of its short-and 
medium-term aims. 
To facilitate the process of policy evaluation, CIDER's CPRD considered the following 
framework for timing its policy propositions: 
a) Short-term policies: defined by any agreement, programme, measure or project which was 
proposed to start being implemented by the respective executive bodies before the 
following period of budget allocation (usually in August-September). 
b) Medium-term policies: they were principally referred to by institutional measures and 
reforms which do not necessarily need financial resources nor a compulsory timing for 
being implemented, but were expected to begin before the Aylwin's government come to 
an end (March, 1994). 
9.5.3. Main actions to facilitate a long-term strategy for joint rural policies 
As has been explained, one of the most important aims regarding CIDER as an 
inter ministerial body was to ensure the continuity of policy-making. Accordingly, it was 
considered very necessary to articulate different ministerial efforts in a joint instrument. This 
was to be the Coordination Programme for Rural Development (CPRD), which would 
develop and recommend coordinated policies within the framework of the government's 
overall programme. 
9.5.3a Reforms at the central level 
In this regard, the main proposals for the institutional innovation for the central level of 
CIDER were: 
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1. To create the CPRD: The periodic formulation of a referential and articulative programme 
for the State through the Coordination Programme for Rural Development. This would 
facilitate combined actions towards rural areas. This proposal was expected to fulfil the 
general aims stated in CIDER's Decree No 55, and its subsequent operation as an institutional 
body. The CPRD would be initially oriented to: 
a) The periodic formulation of combined axes for interministerial coordination in accordance 
with the government's general aims. A meeting of CIDER's ministries was proposed to 
occur every two months as a way to raise policy proposal. This did not restrict more 
regular contacts to discuss bilateral or multilateral programmes. 
b) The identification and implementation of multisectoral agreements and programmes, which 
in addition to the axes, were oriented to face problems whose solution proved to lie far 
beyond isolated sectoral measures. 
c) The identification of actions oriented to facilitate and achieve inter-institutional 
coordination and regular contacts among the different bodies involved in the 
implementation of the policy agreements, at both national and regional levels. 
d) The definition of different mechanisms and responsible bodies to carry out a periodic 
evaluation of the different programmes and agreements. 
2. Modification of Decree No 55: This was proposed in order to overcome certain 
ambiguities (see Chapter 8) and also to give some legal endorsement to the expected 
innovations as regards CIDER's new responsibilities. This point will be further developed in 
the next chapter. 
9.5.3b Reforms at the regional level 
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As a result of recent changes in Chile's municipal and regional law, regional governments 
were identified as the most favourable decentralised level on which to base CIDER's 
programmes for widening its functional scope of actions. 
A responsibility of regional government is to define regional development plans. These plans 
could be developed to create linkages with centrally-planned attempts to tackle rural 
problems. It was not intended for these potential linkages to interfere with the administrative 
.independence of regional governments. However, these linkages between central and regional 
government facilitated the implementation of national policies directed to solve problems 
affecting the country as a whole. In this way, the regional government was thought of as the 
main agent in identifying, proposing and implementing particular programmes in accordance 
with the peculiar characteristics of rural problems in each particular region. This would be 
the regional dimension of the CPRD. 
In parallel, the central government, through the ministries, was supposed to supplement and 
reinforce regional budgets through the allocation of centrally-driven resources in the region 
(as in the case of health, education, or public works) or through granting some privileges in 
the approval of intersectoral or sectoral regional projects by the Ministry of Planning at the 
central level. In addition, it was also proposed to grant to regional governments some 
resources made available for the state coming from international funds and to be allocated to 
special programmes. Thus, the combination of central and regional policies and programmes 
. could greatly reinforce regional budgets and also extend the scale of benefits coming as a 
result of isolated development programmes driven by central government. 
Accordingly, the main proposal for innovation at the regional level was: 
1. To suggest to regional governments the constitution of a regional body for Rural 
Development. First, this would collaborate in the identification and execution of the CPRD 
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at the regional level. Secondly, it would be able to identify additional joint efforts for 
improving conditions in rural areas by intensifying the use of the financial and institutional 
means available. 
The constitution of this body, however, would be the result of an internal regional initiative. 
Therefore no inflexible structure was suggested for it in terms of its members. Conversely 
it was highly convenient to challenge the participation of members from different sectors as 
in the case of NGOs, universities, social organisations and the private sector. However, it 
was considered necessary to include at least the SEREMls representing CIDER's ministries. 
Some of the actions to be developed by these bodies were: 
a) Constitution of a regional body and its secretariat to coordinate and implement special rural 
programmes in the region. The SEREMI of agriculture would be the executive 
secretary as a way of taking advantage of its direct link with the Minister of Agriculture 
-CIDER's president at the national level. 
b) Formulation of short- and medium-term development aims and programmes for rural areas 
and their link to the master regional plan of development. A permanent process of control 
and self-evaluation was to be considered and be transmitted to the central government. 
c) To ensure the diffusion of the different instruments available in the region to both the 
public and private sectors in order to facilitate joint programmes in rural areas. 
d) Utilise and reinforce the different institutional means available to increase bilateral and 
multilateral flows of information among the interest groups involved in rural matters. 
Direct popular participation at the local level was to be promoted. 
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e) To continue the central support to the Maule's region CIDER which was working as a pilot 
experience since 1991. 
The creation or reinforcement of regional bodies oriented to increase the focus on rural 
matters in their respective regions were expected to reverse recent development trends. Not 
much could be expected from direct government intervention in overcoming the main 
problems affecting development in rural areas. However, regional governments seemed to 
be better prepared to act against the peculiar factors present in their own regions. 
Furthermore, the existence of ad-hoc CIDER commissions to coordinate rural policies could 
become a good means to increase technical, financial and political agreements within regional 
bodies and support different initiatives oriented to overcome not only historical rural 
disadvantages but also a progressive process of intra-regional centralism, as far as the 
allocation of public investment was concerned. 
9.6. Summary 
It can be said that though the state has little room for manoeuvre in order to directly address 
complex problems with public policies, better coordination could be considered a useful 
instrument for improving the efficiency of the state. However, additional efforts need to be 
made in order to find out new innovative strategies for setting up programmes on the basis 
of mutual cooperation as was the case of the CPRD. A preliminary evaluation on the 
implementation of this proposal is going to be presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 10. Evaluation of CIDER's Coordination Programme for Rural 
Development 
Introduction 
Since January 29, 1992 when the Coordination Programme for Rural Development was 
unanimously approved by seven ministers, four vice-ministers and with the presence of other 
ministerial authorities, CIDER continued working on a relatively regular basis, at least until 
the end of Aylwin's constitutional period (March 1994). However, in spite of the fact that 
significant actions proposed in the CPRD started to be developed, perhaps the most 
significant of CIDER's achievement was its continuity through into Frei's government that 
started in March 1994. Thus, President Frei not only decided to continue working with 
CIDER but also urged his ministers to increase and reinforce all joint efforts towards rural 
areas, focusing special attention on the most backward sectors in the countryside (MINAGRI, 
1994) 
Conversely, however, some factors acted against the achievement of greater coordination 
among interministerial working groups. Although different explanations could be found for 
that, lack of staff to control central and regional initiatives, and failures in formulation and 
approval of some specific sectoral projects could be mentioned. 
This chapter has, therefore, as a main aim to present an attempt at evaluation of the main 
outcomes resulting from the implementation of actions proposed through the CPRD (see 
Chapter 9). In order to fulfil this aim, the following analysis is directed to review actions 
implemented at the institutional level -in accordance with the different proposals suggested 
to reinforce CIDER's structure, and those actions that were directly related to the 
implementation of new joint programmes in rural areas. As regards this last point, special 
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attention will be given to the pilot experience carried out by the regional CIDER of the Maule 
region. 
10.1. Actions Implemented at the Central Level of Government 
The most important measures carried out at the central level of government were those that 
came as a result of the approval of the CPRD. Accordingly, it was explicitly agreed by all 
ministers to implement as soon as possible the proposals suggested through the coordination 
plan prepared by CIDER's advisory committee. Concerning that agreement, different 
decisions oriented to continue or start additional and complementary actions towards the rural 
sector began to be implemented by central government. However, as it was earlier mentioned 
it become rather difficult to evaluate the real impact that these actions had in the development 
of rural areas. This difficulty is mainly explained by the short period of time that has passed 
since both the CPRD was approved and the new set of actions directed to benefit rural areas 
started to be implemented. 
Therefore, the main attention concerning the forthcoming analysis should mainly be directed 
to evaluate the political and technical capacity that CIDER's members presented to redirect 
the institutional condition of their respective bodies towards a more collective attempt to 
tackle the particular problems which have been identified regarding rural areas. In that way, 
coordination has become one important additional means oriented to multiply those benefits 
coming as the result of the implementation of rather isolated sectoral efforts, within the scope 
of a less-intensive participative role of the state. 
10.1.1. Agreements and measures concerning the implementation of short-term axes for 
coordination 
Actions and agreements which started to be carried out from 1992 onwards, within short-term 
perspectives, were to be implemented according to two perspectives: actions or programmes 
238 
implemented under joint participation and actions or measures carried out individually by 
each ministry. In this regard, the main agreements - stated in the minutes of the meeting of 
CIDER'S ministers (MINAGRI, 1992) - reached by CIDER's members concerning its 
immediate actions were: 
1. CIDER's ministries should base their allocations from central budgets on the information 
of rural poverty areas provided by the overlapping of the three diagnoses. That did not mean 
that it was necessary to redirect ministerial programmes. But it gave privileges to those 
communes in poverty, while decisions on investment within different areas of the country 
were under discussion. 
Two concrete examples are demonstrated by joint actions of the Minister of Public Works 
and the Sub-secretary of Fishing and a new programme started by INDAP. The first two 
bodies decided to work together and to allocate their budgets for providing infrastructure for 
small-scale fishermen (Public Works) and for social programmes for fisherman (Sub-secretary 
of Fishing). They selected communes that showed higher level of poverty according to one 
of CIDER's diagnoses. This involved some restructuring of the Public Works's budget to be 
allocated during 1993, benefiting seven poor rural communes that had previously not been 
considered for investment. In parallel, INDAP'S Department of Rural Development started 
a new field-project oriented to increase popular participation through the existing popular 
communal organisations in seven of the poorest communes identified by CIDER. 
It is worth mentioning that the inter-institutional Forestry Action Plan, PAF-Chile, Gointly 
sponsored by three ministries, the main forestry institution of the private sector -CORMA, 
and the organisation of forestry workers), had as its main aims to both to tackle social 
problems related to forestry areas in poverty and to identify special forestry programmes 
which could become the engine of increased production. This Plan identified areas to benefit 
from investment according to CIDER's survey of rural communes in poverty (OAF-Chile, 
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1993) 
2. Different ministries, notably Agriculture and Women's Affairs, offered their current 
editorial infrastructure in order to publish on a regular basis the existing programmes, laws 
and bilateral agreements among institutional bodies oriented to benefit rural areas. 
3. Ministers supported the initial axes which were proposed by the CPRD to increase 
ministerial coordination as regards rural problems related to multisectoral constraints. 
Furthermore, an additional programme/axis was proposed to be started, as soon as possible, 
concerning measures oriented to tackle problems and restrictions affecting almost 1 million 
landless peasants. This was a major aim identified by government from the beginning since 
it was one of the main social effects resulting from the active land market that followed from 
the expansion of export-led agricultural production. 
So, among the most relevant programmes started from these axes were: 
a) National plan for irrigation: CIDER's executive secretary started to participate with 
members of the National Commission for Irrigation, at the national level, in order to 
coordinate the schedule of different actions concerning Pencahue's irrigation project. 
Permanent contacts were also established with other members of the CT A as far as 
specific sectoral measures were needed. This implied regular visits to the Maule region 
where the regional CIDER created an special programme to collaborate with the 
implementation of actions oriented to tackle social constraints. (This initiative will be 
more extensively presented in the analysis of CIDER's experience carried out by the 
Maule region'S government). An interesting outcome of this new initiative was the 
solution of more than 50 problems of land title affecting small producers in the new 
irrigation area. Otherwise they would have been prevented for benefiting from the 
irrigation subsidy contemplated in Decree Law 18,450. 
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b) Programme directed to benefit landless peasants: 
Initially proposed and coordinated by the Ministry of Housing, an integrated attempt oriented 
to setting up small rural villages for landless families started to be developed in 1992. The 
main aim' of the programme was to direct part of the rural housing subsidies to areas in which 
small settlements could be developed. Thus, the provision of houses with a small plot of land, 
supposed to be mainly used for the production of horticultural crops for subsistence (between 
half and a quarter of a hectare), were to be considered in areas where public lands were still 
available. For that purpose the Ministry of Agriculture's body SAG (in charge of the 
reallocation of former communal lands devoted to the land reform process), offered the 
transference of those lands considered suitable for the implementation of the Ministry of 
Housing's projects. The transference of land titles was assumed by the Ministry of National 
Territory. 
SAG distributed information about the availability of properties for this project to the 
Ministry of Housing. Four regional representatives of the Ministry of Housing at the regional 
level (SEREMIs of Regions IV, VI, VII and X) initially agreed in accepting SAG's offer. In 
parallel, both INDAP and INIA agreed to collaborate with this initiative through the provision 
of credits and technological transfer. They suggested appropiate crops to be cultivated on 
those lands. Finally, as a result of this integrated programme FOSIS gave to the Ministry of 
Housing 700 million pesos (nearly $1.8 millions) to contribute to the general project. The 
first programme that was identified under this scheme was in the commune of Peumo (Region 
VI) where the beneficiaries established a cooperative so that they jointly could pay for the 
initial deposit in order to qualify for the credit for houses. 
As regards the rest of the joint initiatives identified in the CPRD, most of the responsibilities 
were given to regional governments. 
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4. It was decided to reinforce actions to overcome some of the legal constraints, imposed by 
the National General Comptroller, in order to facilitate the implementation of new agreements 
between government bodies. As a result of an explicit proposition made by the Minister of 
Housing, ministers agreed to continue discussing this matter at the presidential cabinet level.. 
5. It was agreed to distribute the CPRD to different public bodies at the regional level. 
Accordingly, the text was sent to nearly 15 public institutions and to most regional 
" Intendentes" • 
Finally, permanent contacts among CIDER's members (but notably in the case of those of 
the CT A) proved to be an useful lobby for the discussion of different technical matters related 
to both bilateral and multilateral affairs concerning the exercise of government. Surprisingly, 
a number of them were not necessarily related at all to rural subjects. 
10.1.2. Agreements and measures concerning the implementation of medium-term 
institutional innovations for CIDER 
The approval of the CPRD gave explicit endorsement to actions oriented to identify and 
implement additional measures directed to reinforce the current institutionality regarding 
public coordination in rural areas. However, it was agreed that the implementation of the 
different propositions contained in the CPRD should not be imposed upon any of the several 
potentially affected bodies. In that way, even though decisions to innovate came as a result 
of a rather centralised policy, no compulsory actions were to be followed at any level except 
those contemplated in Decree No. 55. 
Accordingly, the main institutional innovations approved by government and consequently to 
be developed after CPRD approval were: 
1. Agreement in expanding and decentralising CIDER: CIDER's ministers unanimously 
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agreed in expanding further functional linkages with regional governments in order to 
increase the level of operations of this centralized coordinative body. It was decided, 
however, that this agreement should become by no means a compulsory imposition for 
regional government but only a suggestion to establish a bi-directional channel to facilitate 
special actions towards rural areas. 
Furthermore, it was also suggested that the constitution of these ad-hoc regional bodies should 
be established in parallel with the identification of specific programmes to be developed in 
the respective regions according to the specific problems that rural areas presented. This was 
in order to prevent duplication of efforts (it needs to be mentioned that certain regions, as 
with the case of the Biobio, had already established their own regional commission for rural 
development). However, it was considered highly necessary that these regional bodies were 
headed by the respective regional "Intendente" as a way of: maximizing institutional 
coherence within regional public bodies; generating political support for the whole process 
of implementation of special regional programmes directed to rural areas; and ensuring wider 
linkages with other regional bodies that form part of regional cabinets. Special attention was 
also directed to continue supporting from the central level actions developed by the CID ER 
of the Maule region, especially in respect to the integrated programme oriented to facilitate 
the implementation of Pencahue's irrigation project in the commune ofPencahue (MINAGRI, 
1992). 
Since the CPRD was approved, 5 regional CIDERs were officially established by the 
respective "Intendentes" and different authorities from the central government (Regions I, V, 
VI, VII and IX). 
2. Reforms in Decree No 55: Perhaps the most significant institutional innovation was the 
official approval of CIDER's modified Decree No 55 by President Aylwin on January 27th 
1994. 
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As a result of the initial approval by CIDER's ministers in 1992 the search for concrete 
actions focused on giving this coordinative body better prospects for its long-term 
sustainability. The Ministry of Agriculture prepared the general basis for a modified Decree 
No 55 in order to be discussed and approved by CIDER's ministers. The result of this 
agreement reached in December 1993, was the introduction of changes in the decree with the 
intention of better defining its future role as regards horizontal coordination within the 
institutional framework of the Chilean State. The main changes were as follows: 
a) CIDER's executive secretary should be appointed by the President of the Republic, from 
a suggestion made by the Minister of Agriculture. This was instead of it being a position 
automatically assumed by the national head of INDAP. The main argument for this 
change was that it was considered that this had to become a high-ranking position and 
held on a full-time basis. Former experiences showed that the head of INDAP had little 
time to assume the demanding duties involved. 
b) It was established that CIDER should annually present to the President of the Republic, 
for his approval, a programme of public coordination for rural development -CPRD, in 
accordance with the core presidential programme. This inclusion intended to clarify the 
future role of CIDER as a permanent policy-making body within the state, possessing 
concrete aims and tasks. 
c) Although CPRD programmes would continue being developed and financed by their 
respective sectoral components, the general coordination, evaluation and control of the 
CPRD must be directly assumed by the Ministry of Agriculture at both central and 
regional levels. This last measure implied that the Ministry of Agriculture, represented 
at the regional level by its respective SEREMI, became the main coordinative actor as 
regards rural development programmes at the regional level representing and acting on 
behalf of the Minister of Agriculture as CIDER president. So, even if any particular 
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region had created a body for coordination in rural matters, the respective SEREMI of 
the Ministry of Agriculture became responsible for the coordination of any programme 
of national interest identified at the central level. In spite of the fact that, according to the 
regional law , any programme or policy decided to be carried out at the national scale by 
central government should be unconditionally assumed by regional governments, the new 
responsibility of coordination given to the Ministry of Agriculture's SEREMls should not 
interfere with the direct attributions of the Ministry of the Interior in charge of the 
exercise of regional government. Conversely, this proposition intended to take advantage 
of the potentialities that the new regional law presented. Therefore, identifying a general 
coordinator at central and regional levels for both the implementation and control of 
different CIDER programmes and for the identification of regionally-based programmes 
for rural development was considered a highly necessary requirement in order to facilitate 
the achievement of CIDER's short-, medium-and long-term aims and consequently, better 
expectations for people in the countryside. 
Therefore, CIDER's actions for horizontal coordination at the national level can be 
summarized in two main results: an initial attempt at identifying spatial and functional 
policy-levels (axes) of mutual concern for promoting joint public actions in rural areas; 
and a set of legal innovations oriented to support and multiply them according to 
long-term perspectives. In that way the CPRD could be understood as an explicit 
proposition from government in order to give more coherence to state intervention in an 
area in which additional efforts were severely needed. 
10.2. Actions Implemented at the Regional Government Level: the CIDER's Experience at 
the Maule Region 
At the final stage of the Aylwin's government there were five different CIDERs working in 
rural coordination at the regional level. The most significant attempt as regards joint 
programmes in the countryside was developed by the regional CIDER of the Maule Region. 
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While most regionally-based CIDERs were just starting to identify interministerial actions in 
their respective regions (notably using the Maule region's experience as a main point of 
reference), the Maule's CIDER (taking advantage of its pilot experience started in October 
1991) not only was able to identify and apply two core programmes of rural policy but it also 
developed a self-evaluative mechanism with respect to its experience at the communal level. 
Accordingly, this section has been oriented to present the way in which Maule's CIDER, with 
the political and technical support of part of the central government, responded to the 
challenge of setting up a decentralized programme to increase public coordination in rural 
policies, in accordance with the aims and propositions of the CPRD. In order to do this, the 
analysis is divided into three main parts. The first part presents the intra-regional organisation 
that this body adopted to fulfil its tasks. The second part gives some insights as regards the 
two core programmes developed in the region. The third part is devoted to present some 
results derived from the application of both programmes. 
10.2.1. Organisation of Maule's CIDER 
Since this regional commission was created, its internal constitution has shown a high level 
of both dynamism and functionalism. This dynamism was due to two main factors: the 
openness of its structure in order to link the participation of all different regional actors 
interested in collaborating with the process of improving general conditions in rural matters; 
the requirements that have progressively appeared as regards demands imposed by the 
development of its two core programmes of coordination (see the following point). 
From its constitution this regional CIDER decided to work on a weekly basis at two levels: 
meetings among regular members and guests; taking advantage of the weekly regional-cabinet 
meetings with the " Intendente " . Although at the beginning this body reproduced the same 
central organisation of CIDER, the final structure in 1994 was different (see Figure 10.1). 
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This body incorporated additional ministries (such as Economy and Women's Affairs) and 
other public and private regional representatives (University of Talca, the national peasant 
organisation, NGOs, among others), but also the four provincial governments of the region, 
and nine regional municipalities. At the top of the regional CIDER was the " Intendente " . 
Acting as the executive secretary was the SEREMI of agriculture. The heads of the other 
services of the Ministry of Agriculture in the region (lNDAP, CONAF, SAG and INIA) 
comprised CIDER's secretariat. 
10.2.2. CIDER's Regional Axes for Coordination: the Pencahue Irrigation Project and the 
Regional Participative Programme Against Poverty 
From the very beginning, Maule's CIDER started to focus its actions towards coordination 
in accordance with two of the axes contained in the CPRD: the national irrigation plan and 
strengthening the activities of rural communes in poverty. Consequently, after discussions 
within the regional government directed to identify a strategy to coordinate actions in both 
areas of concern, Maule's CIDER agreed to work in parallel on both axes at the communal 
level according to the following programmes: 
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Figure 10.1 OHGANISATION OF TIlE REGIONAL COMMISSION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT - 'CIDER' -11IE MAULE REGION 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
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lO.2.2a A medium-term strategy of coordination in the Pencahue Valley: a supportive 
programme for the implementation of Pencahue irrigation canal 
At the regional level, Maule's CIDER created a sub-commission headed by the head of 
INDAP. The main purpose was to identify and coordinate actions to be taken in the 
hinterland which would benefit from new irrigation. In addition, a general coordinator was 
appointed in the area. His main task was to link the project area with regional government. 
Moreover, because most of this area was comprised by the commune of Pencahue, its mayor 
was also included. 
As a result of the main initial requirements identified by this sub-commission, Maule's 
CIDER identified 9 main fields of concern for policy formulation. The main fields for joint 
policy were: organisation of communal space; research on the potential use of land; 
transference of technology and training in irrigation; irrigation at the intra-plot level; 
agribusiness development and productive linkages; transportation and road improvement; 
environmental concerns; immigration and emigration; and peasant organisation. It is worth 
mentioning that in addition to the participation of the permanent CIDER members other 
external bodies also assumed specific tasks (NGOs, the State Bank, Talca's provincial 
government, and the National Commission for Irrigation). 
As a result of a number of meetings carried out both in the commune of Pencahue and at the 
regional government level, these tasks were assumed by the different bodies involved in 
Pencahue's coordination programme. 
1O.2.2b The Pencahue's irrigation project: Preliminary results from CIDER's coordination 
programme 
Due to the fact that this project was part of a nationwide programme for irrigation, the most 
important technical decisions concerning Pencahue' s irrigation project were identified and 
implemented by central government (notably budgetary flows, technical engineering decisions, 
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spatial coverage of the core and secondary canals). Actions at the regional and local levels, 
concerned the whole implementation process. Moreover, most of these particular actions 
came as a result of the diagnosis and consequent programme envisaged and implemented by 
Maule's CIDER but using regional funds. 
Although it became difficult to quantify in real terms all the benefits achieved through joint 
efforts as regards this particular axis of coordination, in a report published by Maule's 
CIDER (SEREMI Agricultura Region del Maule, 1992), the following were considered the 
main preliminary results: 
- Allocation of 17 million pesos (nearly US$40,000) for training programmes in irrigation 
procedures oriented to small-scale agricultural producers in the commune of Pencahue. 
- Contribution to finance demonstration plots for agricultural production, and visits by 
small-scale agricultural producers. This joint initiative is currently sponsored and financed 
by the National Commission for Irrigation and by some regionally-based private 
agribusinesses -notably IANSA (National Industry of Sugar, also involved in tomatoes and 
fruit processing) and from the Chilean Tobacco Company. Both enterprises initially agreed 
in establishing medium-term productive links with small- and medium-scale producers. 
- Clarification of all problems concerning land titles, including the granting of land titles to 
all agricultural producers able to benefit from the INDAP-FOSIS agreement concerning Law 
18,450. 
- Implementation, from the National Commission for Irrigation, of a special programme to 
finance irrigation projects (law 18,450) all along the hinterland of the Pencahue canal. 
Subsidies to small producers in the area were offered through a pre-existing agreement 
between INDAP and FOSIS. 
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- Implementation of a programme oriented to lower pollution levels in the Lircay river from 
which the waters of the Pencahue canal are extracted. This measure was taken to guarantee 
irrigation with waters of high quality. 
- It was decided to redirect part of the Ministry of Public Works budget to replace the old 
and narrow bridge that linked the commune of Pencahue to the main regional road network. 
The existing bridge was unable to support higher and heavier traffic levels. 
- Maule's CIDER gave significant support and assistance to the identification of Pencahue's 
communal development plan. 
An interesting outcome of this experience was that most of the resources allocated by 
CIDER's bodies in this commune came as a result of the implementation of their own 
regionally-based strategy and through funds specifically obtained from regional budgets. 
However, perhaps the most important outcome that resulted from this experience was that this 
axis of coordination became part of Maule's regional development plan. Thus, this experience 
presented a significant contrast with previous ways in facing irrigation projects in the country. 
In these, most of measures were decided upon by a group of experts at the central level and 
implemented through external bodies created only for that specific purpose. 
10.2.3. Maule's CIDER programme of participation against poverty 
Since Maule's regional government was aware that the Maule region presented the highest 
level of rural poverty in the country in 1990, it showed no objection to establishing a regional 
programme against poverty under the terms suggested by the centrally-identified CPRD of 
CIDER. However, even though Maule's CIDER maintained permanent contacts with the 
central technical advisory committee (in order to orientate its strategy against rural poverty 
in the region), it is worth mentioning that most of the implementation of the programme and 
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budget allocation was assumed through the use of their own technical and financial resources. 
This initiative was restricted from the very beginning to some specific areas in the region, 
mainly due to regional shortages in the availability of financial resources, staff and time. 
Maule's CIDER envisaged its strategy against poverty as having three main aims: 
1O.2.3a Aims and background of the Programme 
1. To collaborate with the implementation of the CPRD through the enforcement of additional 
public actions in the most backward rural communes. 
2. To utilise as much as possible the new institutional tools available after the approval of the 
new regional and municipal laws. 
3. To encourage and increase previously neglected popular participation at the local level by 
intensifying flows of information between communal organisations, the new 
democratically-elected local governments ("municipaJidades") and Maule's regional 
government. 
In order to reconciliate these aims, Maule's CIDER established a programme whose main 
purpose was to link the policy-making process of regional government regarding rural poverty 
with the specific demands that rural inhabitants presented. It was not intended to replace the 
main orientation of the regional development plan. The programme was seen as 
complementing the Plan by considering the requirements of people living in poverty. These 
could be used as a reference for the allocation of public resources. 
As a result of initial discussions carried out at the regional level, it was decided to focus 
attention in eight communes (two in each of the four regional provinces, see Figure 10.1). 
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The communal criteria was based on CIDER's map of poverty; six of the eight communes 
were located in the dry-lands ("secano") of the Coastal Range. The remaining two units were 
selected from the region's Central Valley. In these two communes (Parral and Longavi) 
socio-productive problems resulted from monocultural-patterns of agricultural production in 
increasingly uncompetitive crops; notably rice (see Chapter 4). 
The institutional organisation that Maule's CIDER adopted to develop the programme 
included the participation of the four provincial governments of the Maule region (Curic6, 
Talca, Linares and Cauquenes) and the local governments of all respective Municipalities 
(Licanten, Hualafie, Empedrado, Curepto, Longavl, Parral, Chanco and Pelluhue). For this 
specific axis of coordination, Maule's CIDER adopted a decentralised intra-regional 
organisation in order to cover not only the whole programme area but also all the existing 
functional-administrative channels between government and people. 
People's participation in this programme was secured and channelled through two main 
mechanisms: the incorporation of respective communal mayors and councillors (which were 
democratically elected by the communal population), and by the participation of all popular 
organisations representing different interests of the communal population (neighbourhood 
associations, organisation of producers, and other grass-root organisation, etc.). 
Regional NGOs were also included. Their main role was to act as coordinators between the 
people and the rest of the regional institutional bodies. Some of these NODs, notably CATEV 
and CRATE, had been implementing interesting small development programmes in Maule's 
rural areas since the military regime. 
1O.2.3b Implementation of the programme 
The method chosen to implement the overall programme was based on the initial schedule 
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of a number of meetings to be held with the different components of the programme in the 
respective communes. There were three stages contemplated in the programme: 
1. The first step was the identification of a specific diagnosis at the communal level which 
included the main requirements that both the community and local government considered 
feasible to be solved by an with regional government. This procedure was coordinated by the 
different bodies of local government and with the close collaboration of the NGOs. 
2. The second stage of the programme was to be implemented through direct contacts at the 
communal level between Maule's CIDER members involved in the programme (SEREMIS, 
provincial coordinators, NGOs and other guests), communal authorities and the 
representatives of communal popular organisations. The main outcome of this stage was the 
establishment of specific deals, tasks and agreements for joint collaboration to be assumed 
by the participating bodies, oriented to overcome the constraints identified in the communal 
diagnosis. 
3. The third and final phase of the programme was identified in order to evaluate the level 
of implementation achieved regarding the specific deals and tasks assumed by the different 
bodies in the previous stage. It was decided that this evaluative procedure would be controlled 
through a new set of meetings at the local and regional levels. However, during these 
evaluative meetings the actions identified in the second phase of the programme continued. 
1O.2.3c The programme of popular participation against poverty: some results from 
CIDER's coordination programme 
Two regional publications of evaluation were produced for this programme (MINAGRI, 
1992, 1994; SEREMI Agricultura del Maule, 1992, 1994). The following analysis has been 
mainly based on quantitative results obtained between October 1991 and September 1992. 
Results concerning the following period between October 1992 and August 1993, have been 
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principally obtained from preliminary evaluations. 
Between October 1991 and August 1993, 66 meetings took place in the different 
municipalities chosen by Maule's CIDER. As regards the main aims pursued by the 
programme of Maule CIDER, minutes of CIDER's secretariat (signed and approved by all 
participant members) show a total number of 380 implementation-deals agreed by different 
participants during 29 working meetings. One implementation deal, however, could include 
more than one action. As an example, one action directed to solve problems of land titles 
could finally imply solutions for more than one beneficiary. 
The communal distribution of the 380 deals and the institutional bodies concerned can be seen 
in Table 10.1. As regards a classification, it can be clearly seen that 57.9 per cent of the 
deals were assumed by representatives at the regional level (notably by bodies of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Ministry of Public Works). However, bodies at the local level also had 
an important role by assuming 28.9 per cent of the tasks. They used their own scarce 
resources and, according to mayors, mobilized a strong collaboration with communal people; 
existing programmes were not affected. NGOs (notably CRATE and CATEy) also proved 
to be efficient agents in working with other institutions. They not only participated in 77 per 
cent of all communal meetings but also took responsibility for 21 deals during the 
programme's first year of implementation (similar to the participation of provincial 
governments) . 
Undoubtedly, what was more important than the number of deals was the outcomes that 
resulted from the evaluation stage of this experience. As can be observed in Table 10.2, 105 
deals (27 per cent) and associated tasks had been satisfactorily achieved during the first year. 
If actions in execution are included, this number increases to 274; that is to say 72 per cent 
of agreed actions were, at that time, either successfully implemented or on their way to being 
finished. Conversely, implementation of the remaining 27.9 per cent were postponed 
, 
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(principally these applied for further FNDR funds) or had no chance of being solved through 
the different institutions involved in the programme (SEREMI Agricultura Region del Maule, 
1992). According to the latest evaluation carried out in January 1994, a total number of 600 
deals had been set up through the programme of which 60 per cent had been successfully 
implemented by August 1993 (SEREMI Agricultura Region del Maule, 1994). 
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Table 10.1 CIDER's Institutional Distribution of Implementation - Deals by Communes the maule region 1992 
A CURICO TALCA LINARES CAUQUENS TOTAVIl 
INSTITUTIONS B LI HUA CUR EMP LON PA PEL CH NO % 
C R A 
1. Rel:i!!nal Agricultural 
Government a) Indap 4 5 10 2 5 6 6 4 42 ILl 
Ministries & b) Seremi 2 12 8 4 2 1 29 7.6 
Services c) Conaf 1 4 3 6 3 2 2 21 5.5 
57.9% d) Sag 1 1 2 0.5 
~-!~~~-------------- 1 1 0.3 ---- ---- --- ----- -- ---- -- ---- ---- ------
Sub-Total 7 9 27 17 8 12 \0 5 95 25.0 
- Public Works 6 2 1 1 2 2 20 34 8.9 
- Education 6 2 4 1 3 1 3 20 5.3 
- Essam S A· 3 1 3 2 1 1 11 2.9 
- Sernam·· 2 5 1 3 11 2.9 
- National Territory 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 10 2.6 
- Health . 2 1 5 1 8 2.1 
- Planning 1 1 4 1 1 8 2.1 
- Housing 1 2 1 1 2 8 2.1 
- Economy 4 1 1 5 1.3 
- Youth Service 4 5 1.3 
- Transport 3 3 0.8 
- Digeder··· I I 2 0.5 
Sub-Total 30 22 46 38 1.5 21 19 29 220 57.9 
2. l&£i!l - Chanco 37 37 9.7 
Government - PelIuhue 21 21 5.5 
Municil!alit· - Curepto 17 17 4.5 
!§ - Empedrado 9 9 2.4 
28.9% - Licanten 8 8 2.1 
- Longavi 7 7 1.8 
- Hualane 7 7 1.8 
- Parral 4 4 1.1 
Sub-Total 8 7 17 9 7 4 21 37 110 28.9 
3. Provincial - Curico 8 6 14 3.7 
Governmentli - Cauquenes 5 I 6 1.6 
7.6% - Linares 3 2 5 1.3 
. 
- Ta\ca 2 2 4 1.1 
Sub-Total 8 6 2 2 3 2 5 1 29 7.6 
- Crate 6 1 2 9 2.4 
4.NGO - Catev 1 3 4 1.1 
5.5% - Indeso 2 2 O.S 
- Ceforca 1 1 2 O.S 
- DAR 2 2 0 . .5 
- Improa I 1 OJ 
- Fedecur 1 I 0.3 
Sub-Total 6 4 3 .5 1 0 1 1 21 5.5 
s. Others 0% - Uta I 0 0.0 
COMUNAL TOTAL 52 39 68 54 26 27 46 68 380 100. 
0 
• Maule's drinking water company; •• Previous name of the Ministry of Women's Affairs; ••• Department of Sport and 
Recreation 
(I) Percentages have been rounded to one signiticant tigure; A Provincial Government; B Commune 
Table 10.2 The MAULE Region Preliminary Control in the Execution of 'CIDER's' Implementation Deals at the Communal Level to 30 September 1992. 
~- --- -- _ .. _-
- - -
--- -- - -- - - --- -- ---- -~~ 
-- -
PROVINCIAL COMMUNE EXECUTED IN EXECUTION PENDING NO SOLUTION TOTAL %(1) 
GOVERNMENT 
Hualane 12 22 4 1 39 10.3 
CURl CO Licanten 12 20 15 5 52 13.7 
SUBTOTAL 24 42 19 6 91 23.9 
Empedrado 20 24 9 1 54 14.2 
TALCA Curepto 27 27 13 1 68 17.9 
SUBTOTAL 47 51 22 2 122 32.1 
Longavi 8 9 6 3 26 6.8 
LINARES Parra! 10 8 4 5 27 7.1 
SUBTOTAL 18 17 10 8 53 13.9 
Chanco 10 35 21 2 68 17.9 
CAUQUENES Pelluhue 6 24 9 7 46 12.1 
SUBTOTAL 16 59 30 9 114 30.0 I , 
IMPLEMENTATION DEALS 105 169 81 25 380 100.0 
TOTAL 
IMPLEMENTATION DEALS % 27.6 44.5 21.3 6.6 100.0 
(1) Percentages have been rounded to one significant figure 
Source: CIDER Secretariat of the Maule Region, 1992 
-~~- --------
10.2.3d Some achievements 
According to the same source, some of the achievements of Maule's CIDER were the 
following: 
Focusing projects financed on the FNDR funds for development in the problems communes 
of the programme: 
- Training projects in most of these communes for the implementation of new multiple-use 
activities (in forestry and pasture) so that small-scale peasants could find alternative uses for 
their land, could generate additional income and grown crops less detrimental for this 
impoverished environment (15.6 million pesos, nearly US$40,000 in real currency). 
- Provision of low-interest loans and subsidies to dryland ("secano") small-scale peasants 
oriented to the use of new technology and planting of vine stock to improve wine production 
(10.0 million pesos, or US$25,0000 dollars allocated in Cauquenes and Pelluhue communes). 
This project benefited a large number of dry land peasants historically involved in production 
of uneconomic vintages, notably Pals. The main vine stock used to replace that of Pals was 
chardonnay and Reisling. 
- Resources for 10.0 million pesos (US$25,000) for a detailed diagnosis of the communes of 
Parral and Longavi specialising in rice production. Rice production in these communes 
suffered from low competitiveness as regards growing imports in rice. This survey was one 
of the basis for converting land under rice into other uses. It was implemented by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in association with the regional Governments of Maule and Bioblo 
regional governments (see Munoz, 1994). 
- Finance has been allocated (7.0 million pesos, or US$17,500) to diversify and produce 
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agroindustrial-horticultural crops in most of these communes. 
- Allocation of 3 million pesos (US$7,200) in the commune of Empedrado for the 
implementation of small-scale projects for edible fungus. Since these crops are able to be 
developed in combination with forestry activities, it has become a good productive chance to 
give some economic relief to Empedrado' s peasants that have been very much affected by the 
expansion of forestry plantations in the commune (see Chapter 4). 
Other result included: 
- creation of departments of rural development in all of the participating municipalities and 
elaboration of rural development programmes. 
- training by the Ministry of Planning at the regional level for municipal civil servants in both 
project formulation and evaluation. 
- establishment of small-scale fishermen's associations in the communes of Chanco and 
Pelluhue. 
- important collaboration with the Ministry of Publics work in improving maintenance of 
secondary roads in all communes. 
- significant collaboration from ESSAM (regional company for drinking water) in the solution 
of problems relating to water quality. 
- elaboration of a diagnosis for tourism in most of the communes oriented to provide 
information concerning local-scale tourist activities. 
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- collaboration with the Ministry of Education for adapting the educational curriculum 
towards more rural needs. This involved developing small horticultural plots at the school and 
the establishment of technical education in secondary schools focusing on agriculture. 
Additional collaboration with the Ministry of Education provided educational materials. 
- significant collaboration with the Ministry of Health for improvements in the equipment of 
communal small-size services ("postas rurales"). 
lO.2.3e Some comments 
An interesting argument given by the executive secretary of Maule's CID ER, which intended 
to explain the level of success achieved, was that a significant number of requirements from 
the communal diagnosis was satisfied without large amounts of financial resources from 
regional government. But the main shortage was as regards skilled human resources and 
technical assistance for both the identification and implementation of specific actions needed 
within the programmes. 
Lack of resources to education and health was not necessarily related to the allocation of 
expensive infrastructure but to lack of basic equipment. As an example, lack of a telephone 
in some small hamlets prevented the accessibility of people to basic health care. Although it 
was possible to give people relief from some minor illness in communal health centres, it was 
not possible to use the rural ambulance simply because no telephones were available to 
communicate the emergency to clinic some few kilometres away. One of the main ambitions 
of poor rural people in hamlets and "villorrios" is still to gain access to health care through 
better communication. Thus, the allocation of telephones in some hamlets was an important 
indirect measure to improve the spatial coverage of health services. 
If actions regarding both main axes of coordination for regional government are taken into 
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account, policies towards rural areas have not only substantially increased but have also been 
more focused on aspects that local bodies have explicitly identified as their main needs. 
Furthermore, if one takes into account that the budget of these poor municipalities does not 
exceed US$400,OOO a year, the additional investment allocated through the different projects, 
along with technical assistance from both public and private sources constitute a significant 
contribution to these communes, compared with the historical context. 
The challenge at the local level for overcoming the weakness of financial resources in a 
historically centralised state is more complex than political actions intended to change this 
uneven spatial pattern of budgetary allocation from government. Since the political 
importance of most rural municipalities is small and hence their likelihood of gaining more 
central funds is limited, some lessons could be taken from the experience of the programme 
in the region. For example, municipal links with the private sector in order to establish 
associations based on mutual cooperation and inter-municipal alliances in order to share staff 
and technical resources and tackle common problems are interesting initiatives for reducing 
the constraints imposed by shortages of municipal resources. 
10.3. CIDER's Coordination Programme for Rural Development: Some Concluding Remarks 
In spite of the fact that CIDER's programme of coordination for rural areas was not part of 
the initial agenda of the Aylwin government, it progressively gained ministerial support. Two 
main arguments can be used by way of explanation. First, the political level of government 
(represented by ministers) was always ready to consider new technical suggestions which 
could improve the administration of government and consequently expectations of higher 
levels of popular political support. Secondly, ministers welcomed the programme because no 
substantive additional financial resources were required in order to carry out most of the 
actions comprised in the general CPRD. 
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After the initial effort oriented to define the main guidelines for coordinated government 
intervention in rural matters, most the attention was directed to the implementation of the 
programme. The implementation process was carried out through three main sources of 
action. First, by implementing intra-ministerial measures, through which each sectoral body 
intended to act in accordance with CIDER agreements established in ministerial meetings. For 
this purpose each ministerial representative on the technical advisory committee usually 
became the intra-ministerial coordinator concerned with these policies. Secondly, another way 
of implementing CIDER actions was through the creation of functional inter ministerial 
working groups to deal with those joint intersectoral programmes at both central and regional 
level. Outcomes were expected to be not only sectoral allocation of resources but also the 
creation of regular bi- and multisectoral medium-term agreements and programmes between 
bodies oriented to face multifactorial problems. Finally, in parallel to the implementation of 
previous actions the Ministry of Agriculture made significant efforts in finding a final 
compromise oriented to reinforce the previous institutionality upon which it would be possible 
to expect more feasible outcomes as regards state intervention in the countryside from 
different administrative levels. 
10.3.1. Some constraints facing CIDER 
Although no guidelines were established to evaluate CIDER's outcome, especially since from 
the very beginning of its experience most of the efforts were directed to its own process of 
self-ratification, there are some aspects from the experience of the period 1991-1994 that 
should be considered for future references. 
10.3.1a Programme coordination and control of programmes 
Even though it was not particularly difficult to generate both technical and political 
agreements at the central level of government oriented to implement additional actions for 
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benefiting rural areas, most of the obstacles concerning the implementation procedure came 
as a result of insufficient control mechanisms as regards the operationalisation of each 
particular joint programme. Perhaps because the CPRD was never intended to become a 
compulsory plan with specific and quantitative aims to be achieved during a certain period 
of time, no means of control was established for the implementation process. 
As a result, however, different factors affected the implementation of programmes. In spite 
of the high level of collaboration obtained from ministries to discuss CPRD proposals, not 
all of them contributed with the same enthusiasm as regards the role that their body was 
supposed to assume during the implementation of the different programmes. Because all CTA 
members were high-ranked ministry advisors, they were unable to become involved in the 
implementation and control of all multilateral programmes in which they were participating. 
Delegation of power to other ministerial members was not always an easy alternative 
especially since very often they were not entitled to take relevant decisions. Although this 
restriction could have been solved relatively easily through the permanent participation of a 
coordinator for each programme appointed by CIDER's secretariat, CIDER had not enough 
staff in order to be assigned for the fulfilment of such a task at the beginning of the 
experience. Therefore, CIDER's most successful results were mainly engineered by dedicated 
attempts rather than from clear institutional implementation guideline. A clear example of this 
was Maule's CIDER experience, in which the participative role of its executive secretary 
could mobilize a significant part of the region's institutional forces. Conversely, regional 
CIDERs like these the Aconcagua and Libertador Bernardo O'Higgins did little more than 
establish themselves (a lack of resources for the implementation of programmes was the main 
explanation given by these regions). 
Thus, restrictions concerning evaluation and control of CIDER programmes became one of 
the main explanations to understand why the Ministry of Agriculture proposed to assume 
responsibilities regarding internal coordination and control of CIDER programmes in the 
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already modified Decree No SS. 
1O.3.1b Financing of CIDER programmes 
It has to be remembered that the main aim of CIDER was to increase coordination rather than 
to become an executory body. However, the main objective of coordination was to strengthen 
the allocation of joint institutional resources in rural areas. In this way, even if better levels 
of coordination could have been achieved for different programmes, the implementation stage 
was still the most relevant objective to be pursued. Therefore, if any of the participating 
institutions in any specific joint programme failed to allocate their resources, the likelihood 
of success for the whole programme was extremely jeopardized. 
Through the whole CIDER experience this risk was normally present, but principally at 
regional and local levels, due to the way in which resources were normally provided for 
project implementation. Since financial resources were principally available as a result of 
successful applications to FNDR funds, ministries and their institution did not always succeed 
in financing their particular component of the programme. Moreover, the relatively long 
period of time involved between the identification of projects and the potential availability of 
resources (sometimes up to one year) became a factor of discouragement for ministerial 
involvement in short- and medium-term programmes. As a result effectiveness of 
implementation tended to be less when there were more participants in the programme. This 
constraint, however, not only significantly affected CIDER's joint programmes but also the 
whole planning process that was carried out at the regional and local levels. 
Thus, some institutions have shown scarce interest in participating in specific 
inter-institutional programmes due to the fact that no significant financial resources have been 
initially allocated for financing such programmes. Perhaps one of the clearest examples was 
the exit of the Talca University (UT AL) from both programmes of Maule's CIDER because 
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external funds were not directly available for financing its participation. 
Last but not least, additional finances to cover day-to-day expenses of regional bodies in the 
areas in which programmes were being developed proved to be another significant constraint 
for: the implementation of Maule's programmes in the selected nine communes; and for the 
potential extension of these programmes to other poor communes. Although this might be 
considered a rather trivial source of constraints, shortages in petrol, as an example, very 
much prevented a more active participation of different institutions in fieldwork activities, 
notably NGOs and other small organisations. However, this factor has been also normally 
used for explaining the higher level of spatial centralisation of regional governments. 
1O.3.1c Staff shortages for facing complex medium-term programmes 
Shortages of staff in most of the decentralised public institutions can be mentioned as a 
significant limitation for these institutions to assume new responsibilities, additional to those 
for which they were directly responsible for. Normally, SEREMIs had to participate in a 
number of regional activities in addition to their central roles as the representative of their 
minister in the region and member of the regional cabinet. As SEREMI offices seldom 
comprised more than three or four technical staff members, most work tended to prioritise 
day-to-day matters. As a result ofthis it became extremely difficult to schedule medium-term 
meetings among high-ranking civil servants especially when they were scheduled outside the 
regional capital city. 
This problem also characterised central government. However, attempt at implementation at 
this level could be carried out by different intra-ministerial bodies, depending on the 
particular tasks that the ministry was commissioned to deal with (e.g Ministry of Agriculture 
-problems of forestry were dealt with by CONAF). 
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lO.3.ld Fears of institutional competition and political interest groups 
According to the tradition of Chilean public administration most duties regarding technical 
coordination of government bodies have normally been assigned to the Ministry of Planning 
at both central and regional levels. Although there was no significant friction as regards 
leadership in coordination of programmes at the central level of government, some problems 
started to arise between the SEREMIS of agriculture and planning at the regional level. This 
was because the SEREMI of agriculture was CIDER's executive secretary and the SEREMI 
of planning was the coordinator of regional cabinets (see Chapter 7). Frictions in the Maule 
CIDER were particularly difficult. This friction over institutional competence in Maule was 
minimized as soon as the Ministry of Planning explicitly renewed its support for the whole 
CIDER programme and when the regional "Intendente" stressed that CIDER programme was 
one of the Maule's main regional initiatives. 
If one particular ministry dominated in the regional implementation process as regards 
financial resources, that ministry preferred usually sectoral recognition to collective 
acknowledgment. This collective acknowledgment would normally have benefited the 
executive secretary of CIDER. It is important to note that even though the government was 
conformed by a multi-party coalition, this did not mean that every participating political party 
and individual had abandoned the search for political support. Not surprisingly, a number of 
regional SEREMls became elected deputies in Congress in the 1994's election. 
10.4. Summary 
The need for greater coordination between public bodies has been one of the most recurrent 
statements made by people who advocate better levels of state efficiency. Coordination, 
however, does not have a single purpose to be fulfilled in a larger number of meetings among 
people in charge of dealing with similar subjects or between top-rank civil servants or even 
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politicians enjoying the facility to take relevant decisions. Coordination should be used by the 
state as a medium- and long-term institutional instrument oriented to tackle complex problems 
whose solutions seem to transcend sectoral capabilities. 
Development issues should not be the only reason for adopting joint actions by the state. 
Coordination is required to face other multisectoral challenges, such as facing severe 
environmental problems and securing improvements in competitive advantages. All these 
challenges undoubtedly imply the need for additional efforts from the state without neglecting 
the relevant role that all sectoral bodies must play. 
CIDER intended to use its coordination programme to improve institutional efficiency in rural 
areas. The CPRD was oriented to show how some of the challenges affecting rural 
development could be better tackled as a result of a complementary strategy from the state. 
Furthermore, the long-term balance between CIDER's failures and successes seems to be 
highly dependent on its future technical and political support at both central and regional 
levels. 
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Chapter 11. Conclusions 
11.1 An Attempt of Integration 
Undoubtedly, the process of restructuring of the agricultural sector in Chile initiated in the 
mid-1970s has generated new challenges and demands on the role of the state. The dynamic 
that the countryside has been experiencing has led to the emergence of profound 
socio-geographical changes that have resulted from the adoption of outward-oriented strategies 
of development. Most of these changes have occurred as a result of the requirements imposed 
by the development of nontraditional primary activities within a highly competitive 
international and domestic context in which productive efficiency appears as a paramount 
prerequisite. 
As regards the agro-forestry export sector, the successful immersion of Chilean exports in 
world markets has resulted from different intervening factors such as: unsatisfied markets, 
flows of transnational and domestic capital investment, state incentives, and favourable 
socio-geographical conditions. The latter have been very much related to the intensive and 
efficient exploitation of the country's comparative advantages in which climatic features, 
cheap labour and land markets appeared to be the most important. The relevance of these 
variables were clearly illustrated in the fast expansion of export-led vineyards and forestry 
plantations in the Norte Chico and in the "secano" respectively. Both cases largely 
contributed to the fact that the national aggregate of agricultural, agroindustrial, and forestry 
exports increased in value threefold between 1985 and 1991. 
However, despite the significant macroeconomic success achieved by the Chilean economy, 
the process of the country's wider immersion into both the free-market economy and world 
markets has been largely selective in social and spatial terms. As this study has shown 
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through its different stages, neither all the social actors nor all regions have profited to the 
same extent from this economic shift. But, conversely, some social groups and regions have 
not only been unable to participate successfully within the new productive strategy of 
development but they have also been severely affected by the agricultural process of 
restructuring. In this regard, the results obtained from both case studies (the Norte Chico and 
the Maule Region) might be useful for envisaging an attempt at explanation concerning the 
previous contrasts as a substantive component of the new emerging socio-productive pattern. 
From a macro analysis, the existence of climatic advantages for growing agricultural and 
forestry products proved to be perhaps the main short-term factor in explaining the allocation 
of capital investment within the most reactive areas. Moreover, the easy access to productive 
land (either from the state or from private sources) was also important during the first stages 
of this process of capital expansion. This was the case that affected plots derived from: the 
agrarian-reform programme; the agricultural communities; or from the "secano" region. In 
all these cases the low level of bargaining power of small- and medium-sized peasant farmers 
could not neutralise the fast expansion of large-scale export business over their lands. 
Conversely, as was mentioned by the larger export companies investing in the Norte Chico 
(see chapter 3), problems related to land titles very much restricted the expansion of 
export-led activities in other advantageous climatic areas, as occurred within the lagging 
Norte Chico's valleys (principally in the Choapa and Huasco) and also in the " secano " . 
Otherwise, land markets could have also expanded in these areas especially if possibilities for 
the amalgamation of small- and medium-sized properties were present. 
Finally, the availability of labour was not a restriction which could explain the differential 
expansion of export-oriented agro-forestry activities in Chile. Labour was always accessible, 
cheap and flexible enough as to satisfy the productive requirements throughout any 
potentially-productive area of the country. In this regard, it can be mentioned that much 
territorial expansion of export-led production was able to be supplied by the region's own 
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labour force as a result of a growing number of landless peasant farmers. 
The country's process of immersion in outward-oriented development strategies has also 
implied a significant fall in protectionist measures favouring both import-substituting domestic 
production and against agricultural imports. As a result, the response of the country's 
traditional agricultural sectors has been clear: crises of competitiveness in most of the 
traditional agricultural crops, and growing volumes of imports of these same products, 
notably in grain and cereals. However, these lower levels of competitiveness of Chilean 
agricultural production could not only be blamed as the result of the interaction of domestic 
productive features. This argument can be supported by the fact that shows how some low 
protected domestic agricultural sub-sectors have started to compete with highly subsidised 
international production. In this last regard, the case of wheat is a clear illustration of this 
unequal process of competition as is illustrated by the analysis of U.S. agricultural 
protectionism; ironically this last country has become one of the most influential international 
advocates of the free-market economy. The adverse impact of this new economic trend at the 
geographical level has been shown by the recent evolution of a large portion of the Maule 
regIOn. 
From the social perspective, the resulting pattern concerning the differential access of rural 
people to the benefits derived from the country's process of agricultural restructuring seems 
to be more simple and clear. On the one hand, a reduced productive elite (principally large 
companies) has been assuming both the risks and benefits associated with the still-profitable 
export businesses. On the other hand, a large number of agricultural workers is ready for 
profiting from the benefits of growing, though rather seasonal, labour markets in which 
efficiency and commitment have come to be relatively well paid in comparison with historical 
trends. Upon all of them, however, large multinational corporations continue doing their 
usual business. 
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However, small- and medium-sized peasant farmers, many of them living in poverty, have 
become the most marginalised social group within the whole process of agricultural 
restructuring. Because of the many restrictions affecting their socio-economic conditions they 
have been not only unable to evolve and obtain benefits in parallel with the current process 
of agricultural modernisation, but in most cases they have also been pushed out of the sector 
(at least as producers). Often, this social outcome has been justified by the argument that this 
is a requirement for pursuing the higher levels of productive efficiency that the sector needs 
in order to successfully compete within the new economic context. However, even INDAP 
(the most powerful state instrument in helping small- and medium-sized farmers) spent 
significant efforts in trying to assist these groups of rural people. Evidence shows that its 
performance was insufficient; in fact, no more than 25 per cent of small-scale farmers were 
assisted by INDAP instruments until 1993. 
As a result of this new socio-productive pattern, the Chilean countryside has been visibly 
evolving towards a complex mosaic between modernity and backwardness in which rural 
poverty is still a common and widespread condition. 
From a statistical perspective poverty has been diminishing recently as result of increasing 
levels of income. However, there are parallel trends which are not considered in the 
aggregate but have proved to be particularly important concerning the quality of life of rural 
populations. One important trend is associated with the loss of farmer's lands. Even for the 
smaller-sized peasants farmers the availability of land gives to the peasant family the 
possibility of food. In this way, even if they are statistically poor according to income 
standards, their land provides them with the chance to produce at least some food. Otherwise, 
as the Norte Chico and Empedrado cases illustrated, most of the possibilities that landless 
peasants have in order to survive are linked to the highly competitive and seasonal labour 
market. Paradoxically, in parallel to all the disadvantages that this new process of further 
disempowerment (Friedmann, 1992) could imply for rural people in poverty, they are at the 
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risk of no longer being considered poor and, as a consequence, not qualify for ad hoc special 
subsidies. Therefore, further attempts for conceiving poverty from a wider perspective are 
urgently needed. Poverty is a multifactorial situation and does not imply merely a situation 
that can be simply determined by a certain level of income. In parallel, greatly improved 
statistical systems are required to assess people I s quality of life and to contribute towards 
defining appropriate standards of living. No doubt, the poor must also take part in the 
provisioning of their own needs rather than to exclusively rely on the state to solve their 
problems. 
For the policy-making framework, this new socio-productive pattern of rural evolution has 
generated additional challenges to the traditional ones but now within a new context of state 
intervention. In this regard, all these challenges within a democratic environment, must be 
confronted with largely diminished means. In addition, the possibilities for allocating financial 
expenditure in social investment within non-exporting sectors have also been severely 
restricted. Both restrictions have become imperatives imposed by the undergoing structural 
adjustment process in order to maintain so-called public discipline. 
The state is currently confronting a contradiction between growing needs for actions but with 
lesser possibilities for intervention. This has stimulated the search for greater levels of public 
efficiency in order to tackle the complex factors affecting development in the country. One 
example of this was the attempt for greater coordination pursued by the Interministerial 
Commission for Rural Development. 
Although there was a certain level of agreement within the Chilean government concerning 
variables, problems, and factors that needed to be confronted in order to increase rural 
development on a more equitable basis, the requirement of a strict balance between 
desirability and feasibility (concerning state intervention) became the most relevant barrier 
for both identification and implementation of public policies. Consequently, the 
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Interministerial Commission for Rural Development through an additional effort (without 
attempting to replace the competence of any existing institution) intended to link as much as 
possible in its general proposal for rural areas the following main aspects: 
a) the use of current information on socio-productive processes developing in the Chilean 
countryside; 
b) the consideration of challenges and constraints that could guide the identification of 
state-led measures, programmes and policies towards rural areas; 
c) the utilisation, on a joint basis, of the existing institutionaIity at the central, regional, and 
communal levels, but without interfering in their respective levels of autonomy; and 
d) the participation of people as one important guideline for the implementation of 
programmes and policies. Although it is clear that the search for development cannot be 
only led by shortages and/or demands, people's participation must be considered an 
important component of any participative strategy of development. 
According to the information provided in chapter 10 it could be said that these objectives 
were to some extent fulfilled by 1993. Although the main long-term objective identified by 
the commission (its sustainability as an effective policy-making body) needs to be evaluated 
in the future, a significant number of programmes identified either by the CT A or by the 
regional government of the Maule region were at least starting to be implemented. Among 
all of them, however, perhaps the most valuable outcome was the extremely positive attitude 
to collaborate that was shown by both people and government at the local level with respect 
to the Maule region IS poverty programme. 
However, some interesting findings resulting from the implementation of this general strategy 
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of coordination can be noted in order to be considered for future actions concerning rural 
areas: 
1. As the participative programme in 8 communes (most of them in poverty) illustrated, 
popular demands proved to be related to multidimensional issues of which only 25 per cent 
directly concerned the Ministry of Agriculture. So, efforts to improve social conditions upon 
a participative basis must be confronted collectively. Better levels of horizontal coordination 
appeared to be highly necessary especially if the rather vertical way in which the Chilean 
state is organised is taken into consideration. This requirement applies to the different 
territorial levels of government. In this regard, regional levels showed better levels of success 
for moving from policy-identification towards policy-implementation. However, the central 
level was significantly important concerning political support for deconcentrated programmes. 
2. The identification of specific axes to guide multilateral programmes proved to be a 
favourable mechanism to improve horizontal coordination. This alternative not only made it 
easy to identify any sectoral component concerning these programmes but also facilitates a 
periodic process of evaluation regarding the central aim. 
3. As the Pencahue canal programme of regional coordination showed, the establishment of 
linkages between nationwide and inter-regional programmes implemented by the state and 
regional governments have been positive. This alternative facilitates the supplementation of 
national and regional budgets and prolongs the implementation of programmes and measures 
with regard to the core articulative aim, through the utilisation of regionally-based budgets. 
4. The relative spatial and functional isolation of some poor communes in addition to the 
scarcity of budgets that they present must not be misleading in any serious attempt oriented 
to confront rural development. This aspect is particularly important if the responsibility that 
local government has in financing both basic services (health and education) is considered; 
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education is the most determinant factor for helping new generations to escape from poverty. 
Both decentralisation and deconcentration are unable to achieve their inherent aims if they are 
not accompanied by significant additional flows of funding to regional and local governments. 
S. Last, but not least, it can be argued that the need and possibilities for a direct and strong 
state intervention oriented both to minimize the symptoms and factors traditionally affecting 
developing countries and to minimize at least part of the externalities resulting from the 
adoption of outward-oriented strategies of development are not necessarily inconsistent with 
the requirement imposed by the advocates of the free-market economy. Conversely, one 
realistic challenge to overcome some of the existing constraints seems to be related to the 
necessity to develop better states in accordance with the challenges and restrictions imposed 
by the new international and national context. 
There is no doubt that many additional considerations could be added. However, these have 
to be considered only as some preliminary conclusions resulting from a collective effort to 
improve rural conditions in rural areas, most of them developed in less than three years, and 
without budgets other than the sectoral ones. In this regard, further discussions and 
evaluations with respect to this attempt at public coordination are urgently needed from all 
the participating actors directly and indirectly involved in both the identification and 
implementation of the Coordination Programme for Rural Development. This evaluative 
feedback seems to be the most important prerequisite for determining the future role of the 
Interministerial Commission for Rural Development -CIDER. 
11.2. Some Limitations of the Research 
Many limitations can be mentioned with respect to the development and results obtained by 
this research. Some of them are: 
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1. Limitations in the identification of social groups and spatial areas concerning rural poverty. 
Significant features related to rural poverty do also exist in urban communes (those with more 
than 50 per cent of their population living in urban areas). Furthermore, a large number of 
rural people live in small- and medium-sized urban centres (this was particularly the case of 
landless peasant farmers who migrated from the countryside as a result of the land market). 
Conversely, not all the rural population living in poor communes is directly affected by 
poverty. Consequently, any strategy to confront poverty under the current classification of 
rurality at the communal level (including the CIDER strategy of public coordination) would 
inevitably segregate out a large number of poor rural people. Unfortunately, no more 
disaggregated information on spatial areas in poverty but at the communal level was available 
in 1991. The same constraints apply with respect to the current definition of poverty. As was 
mentioned, there are a large number of variables and factors influencing poverty which are 
not considered by current statistical sources. This fact also induces some bias in the 
policy-making process. 
2. Significant rural bias with respect to both diagnoses and policy-making propositions 
considered in this research: 
The geographical division of urban and rural spaces is a rather fictitious and subjective 
process of socio-productive classification. All different geographical elements are 
continuously interacting through a mosaic of flows of goods, information, and energy which 
cannot be isolated from each other nor partially separated without putting at risk the holistic 
interpretation of social processes and patterns. Thus, the analysis and propositions of both 
rural processes and policies respectively concerning the Chilean case are inevitably affected 
by severe limitations, especially if the previous theoretical approach is taken into 
consideration. Several technical, institutional and political constraints very much restrict 
possibilities for using a wider approach. Unfortunately, as was mentioned before, to be aware 
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of the requirements of a proper balance between desirability and feasibility cannot be 
neglected as the very first step to be considered by a planner if helshe intends to have some 
level of access to both identification and implementation of policies. In any case, however, 
there is enough evidence of urban bias in theory and practice as to deny certain privileges to 
the rural population (Lipton, M.1977). 
3. Constraints for evaluating CIDER's Programme for Rural Development in terms of its 
aims and the preliminary results: 
Different limitations could be argued in this regard. In the first place, it is technically difficult 
to evaluate both failures and successes of a strategy whose main aim was to increase 
coordination; the accountability of coordination as a task is difficult to measure. This problem 
became the main reason for proposing control and evaluative stages for CIDER's future. 
Secondly, the short period that has occurred between the identification and implementation 
of different CIDER central and regional programmes make it difficult to evaluate CIDER's 
performance in terms of both: its position as a relatively new interinstitutional public body; 
and as an instrument oriented to increase the level of rural development. Concerning this last 
objective, there is no information on whether or not rural people increased their quality of 
life in those areas affected by CIDER programmes, and on the role played by all the other 
different bodies involved in rural policies within the national context. But without doubt, the 
main constraint for evaluating CIDER's performance is related to ethical principles, especially 
if the close link existing between the CIDER experience and the author of this thesis is taken 
into account. So, the level of objectivity of this inside analysis and evaluation is undoubtedly 
jeopardised by this condition. Therefore, further discussions concerning both the evaluation 
of this attempt for policies and on alternative means to increase public coordination for 
benefiting rural population are seriously required. 
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11.3. Further Possibilities for Research 
In parallel to the requirements for additional research in concomitance with the previous 
limitations of the thesis, some additional fields of interest can be envisaged. 
1. Analysis and forecasts concerning the future evolution of nontraditional exports in Chile: 
The growing value of the Chilean currency resulting from both increasing exports and Chile's 
position as a new emerging financial market at the international level is making the 
reproduction of capital investment difficult in primary exports with low value added, as is the 
case with agricultural products. Recent problems resulting from the widening of the gap 
between the rising value of imported inputs for production and the lower exchange rate of the 
dollar in domestic financial markets is lessening the profitability of export-led production. 
Growing competition for Chilean table-grapes in Europe and North America from South 
African, Indian, and Brazilian production has become another factor of concern. 
However, other products and regions have also started to be linked with world markets. As 
an example, fishery and seafood production has begun to contribute to the national economy 
and has transformed part of the Chilean coastal landscape. New extracting activities and 
small- and medium scale processing plants have become a relatively new source of income 
for a large group of people involved in this sub-sector, especially from Chiloe southwards. 
No significant information has yet been provided, however, on the regional impact of this 
activity. The recent trends of the Aisen and Magallanes regions concerning the establishment 
of spontaneous coastal hamlets, the marketing of local production with domestic and 
international traders (even during illegal extracting periods), and the severe environmental 
impact from these activities are still unknown. 
Forestry activities are also supposed to increase in the near future. In addition to the spread 
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of exotic plantations, a new law concerning the exploitation of the native rain forest seems 
to be ready for its debut in the country. However, several environmental concerns have 
started to arise in the country mainly as a result of the significant geographical area covered 
by a rich native forest from the Maule region southwards and due to the explicit interest 
shown by large domestic and foreign companies in producing cellulose and chips. It is worth 
mentioning that some native varieties take more than a thousand years for reaching their 
maturity. The environmental problems currently affecting the southern extreme of the 
Magallanes region illustrate the problematic of resource-based industries in some regions. 
Thus, in addition to the social impacts of the exploitation of the country's comparative 
advantages, environmental matters have recently became prominent. These social and 
environmental conditions will have to be more carefully balanced in the future against the 
country's long-term perspectives for both macroeconomic and regional success in supplying 
world markets. Environmental protectionist barriers, mainly in Europe, have become an 
important factor to be overcome for most primary-exporting countries (see Chapter 5). 
2. Potential domestic impacts affecting the agricultural sector resulting from Chile's 
participation in new international trading-blocs (notably in NAFT A, APEC and 
MERCOSUR): 
As the rural dynamic of the Maule region is starting to show the opening up of the economy 
is severely affecting the competitiveness of most of the traditional Chilean agricultural crops. 
Therefore, the balance between costs and benefits of such initiatives needs to be closely 
analyzed in order to deal with both domestic policies oriented to prepare the Chilean 
productive structure for international competition and for being well prepared for international 
negotiations concerning the future role of the country within all these trading blocs. 
The complexity shown by most bi- and multilateral free trade agreements illustrate that 
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specific negotiations are required by item in order to establish a final general agreement. In 
this regard, it is important to mention that most of the current free-trade agreements 
determine not only possibilities for wider markets but also impose drastic regulations with 
respect to imports from non-participant members. Therefore, some potential benefits 
resulting from wider export possibilities concerning some particular countries could be 
neutralised by losses with respect to other nations or with respect to other trading blocs in 
which the country is starting to participate. In this regard, the potential impact in the country 
resulting from both economic and geopolitical complementarities and exclusions considering 
the future share of Chile in NAFT A, APEC and MERCOSUR need to be analyzed in depth. 
Consequently, impacts at both intra-national and at the geo-political sphere need to be widely 
explored in advance of setting up final agreements with respect to the particular conditions 
through which the country is supposed to participate in any of the existing or emerging 
trading blocs. Lack of information concerning the potential final balance between imports and 
exports, with respect to the different advantages and disadvantages involved in sharing the 
existing free-trade agreement, would inevitably result in serious deterioration of the country's 
terms of trade, though some particular sub-sectoral benefits might arise. 
3. Identification of new theoretical approaches concerning new regional dynamics that have 
evolved from the development of nontraditional exports: 
In contrast to the fertile field for theories and policies that accompanied inward-oriented 
strategies of import-substituting-industrialisation in Latin America and Chile in which the 
growth pole doctrine was an illustrative example, very little has been said yet as regards the 
new socio-economic pattern of uneven development evolving in these countries. This aspect 
seems to be important in order to identify the new role of the state as a result of the 
democratic context regarding both social and territorial terms. 
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Undoubtedly, this field of concern needs to be approached from different perspectives. From 
the international perspective it seems useful to analyze some successful development 
experiences followed by those countries which have successfully evolved from the 
development of a socio-economic structure based upon the exploitation and processing of 
primary resources. Without doubt, some cases such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
could be more closely monitored in order to provide useful information concerning their 
specific development patterns. This aspects seems to be more closely linked to the socio-
economic processes through which Chile has been historically evolving. However, significant 
literature has been more closely interested in trying to relate the Chilean case with the 
process of development followed by some Asian NICs (notably South Korea), regardless of 
the significant differences between these nations concerning both their productive structures 
and the role of the state. 
From the national perspective, it seems important to develop new theories and developmental 
alternatives in closer relation to the new emerging regional patterns which have started to 
arise in Latin America. In any case, the impact of the development of nontraditional exports 
in Latin America is not a new process at all. Although there are some differences concerning 
the socio-political environment and the actors involved, the spread of multinational capital 
involved in primary exports in Central America and in some regions of northern Africa 
through the 1950s and 1960s has provided valuable information with respect to the main 
trends which affected rural population in these areas as a result of the spread of export-led 
crops and plantations. 
In addition, more researches seem to be urgently needed with respect to the role that the state 
has to perform in developing countries affected by structural adjustment programmes. As this 
research intended to illustrate, a strong participation of the state in order to correct and revert 
painful social costs resulting from the spread of export-led productive capital seems not to 
be inconsistent with the requirement imposed by international funding agencies. Conversely, 
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it is clear that more state influence is required in order to confront uneven social development 
patterns. However, this does not necessarily mean the development of a bureaucratic public 
institutional framework but a more efficient and coordinated public system. In this regard, 
the experience which has started to result from the implementation of the country's new 
regional and municipal institutionality illustrates how the state can improve its performance 
in order to facilitate a more efficient and decentralised allocation of public resources. In this 
respect, more evaluative analysis is required especially with respect to the dynamic affecting 
both the socio-productive structure and the exercise of local government in the most 
functional and geographically-marginalised rural municipalities. 
Last but not least, the dynamic affecting urban areas must also be monitored more closely. 
It is clear that most of the developmental factors powering the national economy come from 
the exploitation of rurally-based primary resources. In contrast with the urbanisation process 
resulting from the industrial substitutive model of development followed by the country 
since the late 1930s, the development of nontraditional exports seems not to be redirecting 
the population flows to the countryside but instead seems to be increasing rural depopulation. 
As a result, a growing number of urban people have been demanding better working 
opportunities in a geographical environment not closely related to the new socio-productive 
process of development. Therefore, further research in this geographical domain is also 
required in order to provide some information which could assist the public process of policy-
making, especially with regard to the search for more even and long-term socio-geographical 
patterns of development. It has to be remembered that the process of administrative 
regionalisation of Chile was identified by using the nodal or polarised region as a main 
theoretical background. Very much related to the role of cities in industrialised economies, 
the main Chilean urban centres were thought to become the main generative centre for 
regional development during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Undoubtedly, this criteria was 
very much in tune with the process of substitutive industrialisation that the country was 
experiencing at that time. Since the 1980s, however, most of the productive economic flows 
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have started to be more closely related to primary activities; this also applies to the new 
industrial economic base in which the processing of primary resources has become an 
important part of the Chilean manufacturing sector. As a result, the traditional locational 
pattern of urban industrial concentration has started to be replaced by a more widely-spread 
location of Chilean industries throughout the country. No doubt, these new geographical 
processes provide valuable information with respect to the possibilities for further discussions 
concerning the analysis and identification of new typologies of systemic regional dynamics. 
This aspect seems to be particularly important when regions are identified in order to be 
utilised as an instrument for promoting regional development. 
However, although there is no doubt that development is a challenge that needs to be pursued 
through long-term initiatives, it must be also remembered that there are urgent day-to-day 
needs affecting the poor, and that these can undermine the future of the whole society. 
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Appendix 
Most of the information used in the analyses of the Norte Chico and Maule regions was 
directly collected in the field by the author either as a member of an academic research group 
or as an individual researcher. 
- Information on the Norte Chico study area: 
The five Norte Chico valleys have been extensively analyzed by the Department of 
Geography of the University of Chile since export-led table grapes started to be produced in 
the region in the early 1980s. Since then, the regional impacts of this productive activity have 
been monitored through: annual fieldwork with undergraduate and postgraduate students; 
through more than ten medium-term research projects (3 to 4 years) developed by academic 
staff of the Department of Geography and financed by the national scientific-research fund 
(FONDECYT); and through one international research project jointly developed by the 
Department of Geography of the University of Chile and Birmingham and the Environmental 
Change Unit of the University of Oxford. Thus, both preliminary and final information on 
processes affecting this study area have been presented in many national and international 
conferences by both students and staff of the Department of Geography. It is worth 
mentioning that most of the information available in Chile concerning the impact of 
nontraditional exports in the Norte Chico have been collectively produced and discussed 
through more than ten years by the same research team. 
Therefore, concerning the information provided in Chapter 3, it has been collected from four 
main sources: 
a. Primary information collected by the author as regards: labour demand by producers 
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in both the Limari and Copiapo valleys (35 per cent of the land under table-grape 
plantations was surveyed); surface-area covered by vineyard plantations in the five Norte 
Chico valleys; origin of the labour force engaged in table grape activities (interviews with 
producers and questionnaires of labour working in the different productive stages in both 
the Limari and Copiapo). Due to the fact that most of this information has been presented 
in national and international conferences, the respective sources have been referred to in 
the bibliography in terms of the author's papers. 
b. Direct periodic interviews (from 1984 to 1991) with key local people who have 
witnessed from within the process of restructuring in the Limari and Copiapo valleys: 
primary teachers, priests, directors of neighbourhood associations, and members of the 
police force. 
c. Primary information collected collectively but processed and published by other 
members of the research group, together with the author or by students. This has been 
the case with information concerning land markets in both private and communal lands; 
on changes in land use; and in the social impact of vineyard expansion (these are quoted 
in the bibliography as papers). 
d. Information jointly collected with both undergraduate and postgraduate students 
supervised by the author. The resulting dissertations and monographs are quoted under 
the student name. 
- Information on the Maule region: 
In addition to the published statistical information quoted in Chapter 4, most of the references 
were provided from direct interviews with mayors (in the cases of the Empedrado and Parral 
Municipalities), and with key informers who provided unpublished statistical information 
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.. 
which was used for illustrating the impacts of the opening up of the Chilean economy in the 
backward Maule region. As a result of this, valuable unpublished and preliminary 
information was collected from the Regional Government of Maule (SERPLAC), from the 
SEREMI of agriculture, and from INDAP. This information has been respectively quoted in 
the bibliography. 
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